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PART A 
 
I. ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES AND TRENDS, FIRM PERFORMANCE AND 
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR IN THE LIGHT OF TECHNOLOGICAL MARKET 
CHANGE 
 
"All truth passes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it 
is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident." 
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) 
 
Any economic principle, the success of firms, the outcomes of strategies, customer needs and 
activities are more or less affected by the concept of uncertainty. 
In this connection, Akerlof’s (1970) essay “Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism”1 is one of the most respected essays in economics, and has profoundly 
influenced economic thinking in virtually every field of economics (from industrial organization 
and public finance to macroeconomics and contract theory). 
His paper uses the market for used cars as an example of the problem of quality uncertainty. 
There are good used cars and defective used cars (‘lemons’), normally as a consequence of sev-
eral not-always-traceable variables such as the owner’s accident history, quality and frequency 
of maintenance and driving style. Because a buyer of a used car cannot beforehand (free of 
charge, if at all) assess its quality, her ‘best guess’ for a given car is that the car is of average 
quality and accordingly, she will be willing to pay only the price of a car of known average 
quality for it. This means that the owner of a good used (i.e., carefully maintained, never-
abused) car will be unable to get a high enough price to make selling that car worthwhile. 
                                                     
 
1
 A lemon is an American slang term for a car that is found to be defective only after it has been bought. 
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Therefore, owners of good cars will not place their cars on the used car market. The withdrawal 
of good cars reduces the average quality of cars on the market, causing buyers to revise their 
expectations for any given car downward. This, in turn, motivates the owners of moderately 
good cars not to sell, and so on. As a result, suppliers of high-quality cars are driven out of the 
market. 
Consequently, asymmetric information seems to play a key role, potentially affecting any mar-
ket where the quality of goods would be difficult to see by anything other than casual inspection 
(e.g., market for cars, market for education, insurance markets, market for loans, art markets, 
etc.). To prevent a market failure according to this simple model framework, the information 
asymmetry has to be eliminated or reduced which involves further costs (i.e., through seals of 
approval or quality, or independent experts). Applied to works of art, the mediating role of gal-
leries as experts prevents the art market to fail. How (mediating) firms evolve competitive suc-
cess in markets with high quality uncertainty is subject to chapter IV (Part B). 
In this context, Williamson (1975) famously analyzes transactional variables (e.g., bounded 
rationality, uncertainty, asymmetry in information), which help govern the mode and perfor-
mance of organizations. It explores the formation, evolution, and operation of organizations, 
especially hierarchical ones, and markets. All of this is called by Williamson an "organizational 
failure framework": Organizational or market development depends upon failures traced to 
transactional factors. This framework copes with questions of structure, of size, of technology, 
and of decision making in organizations.
2
 Outside organizations, a strategic concept on competi-
tive forces governing competition in an industry has essentially shaped economic thinking: for 
nearly three decades, the ideas of Porter (1980, 1985) have been highly influential to our under-
standing of the way in which firms compete. Particularly, the concepts of differentiation and 
cost leadership have had an immense impact on business practice and research (Besanko et al. 
2010; Grant 2010). Porter and others (e.g., Barney 1997; Mintzberg and Quinn 1988; Tirole 
1988) assert, and empirical evidence supports (e.g., Dess and Davis 1984; Kotha and Vadlamani 
                                                     
 
2
 In this connection, it may be referred to Podolny (1994) who points to the importance of social structure 
in providing the framework within which organizational actors economize on transactions. 
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1995; Miller and Dess 1993; Miller and Friesen 1986a, 1986b; Phillips, Chang, and Buzzell 
1983; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997), that differentiation and cost leadership are fundamental 
to business strategy and that these foci can be linked to business success. 
Virtually following in the footsteps of the Porter tradition, a different economic camp advocat-
ing customer relationship management (CRM) has emerged. In a metaphorical sense, a “revolu-
tion” (Winer 2001) or rather “explosion” (Payne and Frow 2005) of CRM has considerably 
changed the strategic alignment of many companies. With the Internet and other telecommuni-
cation innovations drawing us ever closer to the economist’s concept of a perfect market, many 
products and services are increasingly perceived more like commodities (Srinivasan, Anderson, 
and Ponnavolu 2002). In this context, the essence of the information technology revolution con-
stitutes the opportunity to build better relationships with customers than has been previously 
possible in the offline world (Gupta and Aggarwal 2012). By combining the abilities to respond 
directly to customer requests and to provide the customer with a highly interactive, customized 
experience, companies have considerably improved preconditions and ability today to establish, 
nurture, and sustain long-term customer relationships than ever before. The ultimate goal is to 
transform these relationships into greater profitability by increasing repeat purchase rates and 
reducing customer acquisition costs. 
Allowing for the preconditions of these considerations, Brynjolfsson and Mendelson (1993) 
note that the structure of the organization's information system is a key element of organization-
al transformation.
3
 In this regard, Jensen and Meckling (1992) represent the structure of organi-
zations as an efficient response to the structure of their information costs. Accordingly, a change 
                                                     
 
3
 They argue that new technologies allow managers to handle more functions and widen their span of 
control. Fewer levels of management hierarchy are required, enabling companies to flatten the pyramid of 
today’s management structure. Moreover, the new information technologies allow decentralization of 
decision-making without loss of management awareness; thus employees at all levels can be encouraged 
to be more creative and intrapreneurial. Hence, the organizational structures are said to become more 
flexible, more responsive, and ultimately result in higher quality. 
The firm and the market have each been frequently modeled as primarily information processing institu-
tions (Galbraith 1977; Hayek 1945). At this point, it may also be referred to Miles et al. (1978), who 
propose a well-reputed theoretical framework dealing with alternative ways in which organizations define 
their product-market domains (strategy) and construct mechanisms (structures and processes) to pursue 
adaption strategies. 
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in information costs must induce a change in organizational structure. In particular, IT has 
changed the costs of processing and transferring certain types of information (e.g., quantitative 
data). Using the Jensen-Meckling terminology, different network participants can make more 
effective use of their specific knowledge when the costs of transferring and processing general 
knowledge are reduced. Furthermore, technology enables the development of markets that, by 
their very nature, transform specific knowledge into general knowledge. In other words, the 
reasons for the recent hype on CRM come out more basic: they are of a strategic nature, being 
cost-induced by the IT development. The latter changes the interaction of competitive forces and 
particularly builds the basis for any customer relationship concept. 
Yet, there is no uniform definition in the literature: the concepts of CRM vary from narrow per-
spectives associated with technology, as Kutner and Cripps (1997) simply put it as “data-driven 
marketing”, to strategic and holistic approaches. From the latter viewpoint, CRM is not simply 
an IT solution that is used to acquire and grow a customer base, but involves a profound synthe-
sis of strategic vision, a corporate understanding of the nature of customer value in a multichan-
nel environment as well as the utilization of the appropriate information management and CRM 
applications, and high-quality operations, fulfillment, and service (Payne and Frow 2005). 
Thereby, the necessity of a cross-functional integration of processes, people, operations, and 
capabilities has to be pointed out. 
A strategy development process requires a dual focus on the organization’s business strategy 
and its customer strategy (Payne and Frow 2005). These perspectives are reflected in the find-
ings by Reimann, Schilke, and Thomas (2010) that CRM enhances the business strategy of cost 
leadership (firm perspective) and drives firms’ differentiation efforts, particularly in highly 
commoditized industries (customer perspective). Recent research on this subject has empha-
sized that both differentiation and cost leadership strategies have a positive impact on perfor-
mance (Acquaah and Yasai-Ardekani 2008), thus confirming the impact of CRM on firm 
achievements (i.e., enhanced strategic position in the market and improved performance out-
comes). 
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Several studies highlight the need to understand the mechanisms and conditions that influence 
how and when CRM affects firm success (e.g., Reimann, Schilke, and Thomas 2010; Shugan 
2005; Zablah, Bellenger, and Johnston 2004). 
The variety of economic methods and models is immense. One central approach to the above-
mentioned issue is data mining (also called ‘knowledge discovery in databases’) which com-
bines tools from statistics and artificial intelligence and describes the process of discovering 
interesting and useful patterns and relationships in large volumes of data (Clifton 2013). The 
application of data mining tools in CRM is an emerging trend in the global economy. Analyzing 
and understanding customer behaviors and characteristics is the foundation of the development 
of a competitive CRM strategy, so as to acquire and retain potential customers and maximize 
customer value. In this connection, loyalty programs are critical CRM tools used to identify, 
reward, and successfully retain profitable customers. Chapters I-III (Part B) of this work give a 
deeper introduction into strategic and methodological aspects of this tool by analyzing and dis-
cussing their design, effectiveness and performance implications. Chapter IV (Part B) focuses 
on market-level performance. 
In a nutshell, this thesis will have a closer look on different aspects of the drivers of consumer 
behavior and competitive strategy outcomes, thereby considering the general issues of 1) the 
growth of e-commerce (Chapter I, Part B), 2) the significance of CRM strategy conception and 
performance (Chapter II and III, Part B), and 3) the comprehension of evolutionary market dy-
namics (Chapter IV, Part B). In the course of the different chapters, we adopt different ap-
proaches and perspectives which are aimed at bringing this topic area down to a round figure. 
The studies hold conceptional and strategic implications for the effective design of CRM pro-
cesses and strategies, and for the success in two-sided markets. 
The increased penetration of CRM philosophies and strategies in organizations can help to im-
prove how firms work to establish valuable long-term relationships with their customers, i.e. 
obtain sustainable market success. This work extends a managerial perspective that stresses the 
importance of cross-functional processes in (CRM) strategy and market evolution. 
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The next section summarizes the four main chapters of this dissertation, elaborates the specific 
research questions and illustrates the contributions to the literature. 
 II. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS AND CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE 
1. Do Online Customers Make Better Purchases? – An Analysis of Point of Sale 
Choice and its Linkages to Customer Loyalty and the (Ir)Rationality of Buying 
Decisions 
Over the last decade (retailing and service-oriented) firms have increasingly been utilizing elec-
tronic distribution strategies to augment their physical infrastructure and sustain their competi-
tive capacity (Bauer, Grether, and Leach 2002; de Vries 2006; Gunasekaran, Lai, and Cheng 
2008; Flavián and Guinalíu 2005; Hitt and Frei 2002). In this context, the outstanding success of 
pure online-business models (e.g., Amazon or Zalando) has considerably raised competition and 
changed the expectation and shopping behavior of consumers (Darley and Blankson 2010; Park, 
Lee, and Han 2007; Srinivasan, Anderson, and Ponnavolu 2002). Besides the fact that an attrac-
tive Internet presence has become a ‘compulsory standard’, electronic commerce has considera-
bly grown (Pavlou and Fygenson 2006). Consequently, firms of the retailing and service sector 
have increasingly transitioned to hybrid models integrating traditional and online distribution 
(Levary and Mathieu 2000; Yao and Liu 2005). Hence, understanding the relevance of either 
channel, thereby incorporating their interdependency as well as leveraging their performance 
has become a pivotal challenge for strategists of all kinds of firms (Ritchie and Brindley 2007; 
Wallace, Giese, and Johnson 2004; Webb 2002). In this context, especially the (general) as-
sessment of the value of loyalty programs, and therefore, profound knowledge about conditions 
and drivers of customer loyalty across distribution channels could help them to define and 
achieve competitive targets more effectively. 
Accordingly, this chapter examines the linkages between point of sale and consumers’ purchase 
behavior. First, we investigate consumer-inherent and contingent factors that drive customers’ 
point of sale choice. Second, adopting a consumer perspective, we study whether online pur-
chases or counter purchases tend to yield higher purchase decision quality. We establish wheth-
er such linkages hold across different customer segments and pricing contexts, and we also ex-
amine consumers’ (collective) learning effects in terms of improving on decision quality over 
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time. Third, moving on to the firm perspective, we study subsequent customer loyalty in either 
distribution channel, and explore how loyalty develops across different segments, pricing con-
texts, and levels of decision quality. 
Based on data from a customer loyalty program in the railway service, comprising more than 
four million transactions of over 300,000 customers, the study results show how various con-
sumer-inherent and contingent factors affect point of sale choice. Contrary to our expectations, 
the rationality of purchase decisions is in fact dependent on the chosen point of sale. Besides, it 
largely varies across customer segments. However, learning effects do occur over time, yet their 
strength differs across low- and high-price contexts as well as across consumer groups. Loyalty 
depends on both pricing contexts and segments as well as on customers’ previous decision qual-
ity and point of sale choice. In particular, the empirical results provide practical implications for 
CRM strategy and implementation. 
The contribution of the first chapter is the following: 
 First, there is a lack of research into customer characteristics that drive the use of online 
purchase systems versus traditional channels, and the question of how different chan-
nels affect customer behavior and customer loyalty remains surprisingly unanswered to 
date (Brown and Dant 2009; Hitt and Frei 2002; Homburg, Hoyer, and Fassnacht 2002; 
Wallace, Giese, and Johnson 2004). Thus, research has not adequately considered mar-
ket-level responses to retailing through online versus offline distribution, although this 
is of essential importance to researchers as well as practitioners. Therefore, the study 
sheds some light on the drivers of point of sale choices. 
 Second, previous studies on two-part pricing systems primarily focus on rather technical 
and game-theoretical aspects (e.g., Feldstein 1972; Hayes 1987; Oi 1971; Yin 2004), 
pricing and promotional issues (e.g., Gijsbrechts 1993; MacKie-Mason and Varian 
1995; Murphy 1977) or flat-rate biases (e.g., Della Vigna and Malmendier 2006; 
Goettler and Clay 2011; Lambrecht and Skiera 2006; Schmale, Ehrmann and Dilger 
2013). But obviously, there is a lack of research into two-part pricing systems across 
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distribution channels (Grewal and Levy 2009), although such pricing schemes are in-
creasingly used in services and are particularly intended to create customer loyalty. This 
study is aimed to fill this gap. 
 Third, we can also offer some insights into potential benefits of a critical re-evaluation 
of individual purchase behavior and of learning effects in the railway service sector, 
which might be generalized to various other contexts where both online and offline dis-
tribution are the norm (e.g., online vs. offline travel bookings, hotels, rental cars). 
 Fourth, customer loyalty is often managed at the aggregate customer level with relative-
ly low or no differentiation across the entire customer base. Thus, individual customer 
level differences (psychographic, demographic, behavioral, attitudinal and so on) may 
be ignored. Kumar and Shah (2004) indicate the necessity of rectifying some fundamen-
tal level problems prevalent with the way customer loyalty is managed and interpreted 
by companies. This study extends research on distribution channel performance, provid-
ing a segment-specific approach. 
 Additionally, few studies have focused on how customer heterogeneity is related to 
online versus offline distribution (Hitt and Frei 2002; Tsai and Lee 2009). Directing at-
tention to the question, of “what factors influence a consumer’s choice of the Internet 
versus conventional channel”, Grewal and Levy (2007) point this issue out as another 
major research gap. 
Thereby, this chapter offers managerial implications to both strategy and customer relationship 
management, for how the (segment-specific) configuration of two-part tariff systems can en-
hance performance, by exploring these specific gaps in the literature from (1) a descriptive, as 
well as from (2) consumer and (3) firm perspective: 
1. What factors influence a consumer’s choice of the Internet versus a conventional chan-
nel? 
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2. Does either type of distribution channel tend to yield ‘better’ results in terms of con-
sumers’ purchase decision quality? Do potential linkages apply across consumer seg-
ments and pricing contexts alike? Can consumers realize learning effects that enhance 
their decision quality over time, and if so, what conditions accelerate or hamper those 
learning effects? 
3. How loyal are customers who choose online channels compared with those preferring 
counter purchase? How are different consumer segments, pricing contexts and levels of 
individual decision quality related to loyalty? 
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2. Competing Risks for Train Tickets – An Empirical Investigation of Customer 
Behavior and Performance in the Railway Industry 
Understanding how firms can profit from their customer relationships is highly important for 
academics and practitioners (Boulding et al. 2005; Payne and Frow 2005). Customer relation-
ship management (CRM) can be characterized as an organizational capability having the poten-
tial to be a source of competitive advantage, which in turn permits firms to improve their posi-
tioning and ultimately enhance their performance (Day 2004; Hogan, Lemon, and Rust 2002; 
Mithas, Krishnan, and Fornell 2005). In this connection, Reimann, Schilke, and Thomas (2010) 
establish the link between CRM and business strategies and develop our theoretical understand-
ing of the process by which CRM contributes to an organization’s success. 
Particularly, previous research has also stressed the need to generate further insights into the 
outcomes of CRM practices in the transportation sector, and towards opportunities for influenc-
ing consumer choices more effectively (Ellinger, Daugherty, and Gustin 1997; Ellinger, Daugh-
erty, and Plair 1999; Ramanathan 2010; Steven, Dong, and Dresner 2012). Additionally, 
Zablah, Bellenger, and Johnston (2004) argue that mechanisms through which CRM enhances 
performance are not well understood, and therefore managers have little (conceptual) guidance 
on how to focus their CRM efforts. Shugan (2005) claims that more research is needed to isolate 
and fully understand the generative mechanisms through which CRM affects a firm’s perfor-
mance. 
Accordingly, drawing on previous work in transportation research (Daugherty et al. 2009; El-
linger, Daugherty, and Plair 1999; Grawe, Daugherty, and Dant 2012; Ramanathan 2010; Ste-
ven, Dong, and Dresner 2012), this study is the first that uses competing risks models to analyze 
consumers’ choices, and particularly subsequent changes, of two-part pricing contracts that 
enable railway customers to travel at discount prices for an up-front fee during the contract pe-
riod. Based on large-scale, unique loyalty program data comprised of more than four million 
individual transactions of German railway customers, comprehensive travel history data span-
ning a timeframe of almost six years is arranged within a competing risks framework. Based on 
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a semi-parametric proportional hazards model stratified by failure type we simultaneously esti-
mate effects on three types of contractual events: cancellation, upgrade, and downgrade of a 
loyalty card (‘BahnCard’). Focusing on CRM practices, we find several relevant factors, some 
of which railway companies can influence to their advantage. For example, installing auto-
renewal procedures for loyalty cards decreases cancellation risks, automated electronic mailings 
(e.g., reminders and account statements) and advertising (e.g., ticket offers) can be counterpro-
ductive and increase the risk of cancellation. A better understanding of these key drivers is es-
sential when discussing the effectiveness of CRM practices, especially in the context of custom-
er loyalty programs, and if proposing business strategies matched to future market development 
in the transportation sector. 
This chapter seeks to provide new theoretical insights by integrating previous research on CRM 
and two-part pricing schemes for the transportation sector. Our results offer practical implica-
tions for transportation companies and other service sectors, e.g., concerning the creation and 
management of customer programs when using two-part pricing schemes, and provide perfor-
mance and policy implications for suppliers of comparable transportation services as well as 
strategic impulses for firms applying two-part pricing schemes in general. 
The contribution of the second chapter is the following: 
 First, it adds to the recent literature on transportation and logistics management that 
emphasizes the growing need for customer orientation and relationship management 
(e.g., Ganesan et al., 2009; Grawe, Daugherty, and Dant 2012; Ramanathan 2010; Ste-
ven, Dong, and Dresner 2012) by systematically exploring how such approaches can be 
managed in practice, as well as by highlighting their specific effects on (un)desired 
business outcomes in the context of rail travel. 
 Second, little empirical evidence links program participation with actual loyalty and 
firm performance. Besides, the drivers of loyalty remain predominantly elusive (McCall 
and Voorhees 2010). This chapter investigates such drivers in a railway-setting and dis-
cusses corresponding performance implications, particularly, concerning the creation 
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and management of customer loyalty programs and customer relationship management 
practices when using two-part pricing schemes. 
 Third, there is little research into consumers’ contract choices and travel behavior in the 
context of two-part pricing schemes, although these are commonly used in railway 
transportation as well as other sectors. As a consequence, a comprehensive approach 
towards understanding customers’ travel behavior and particularly, the determinants of 
their contractual choices and changes therein, is lacking in the literature on (rail) trans-
portation settings. The same applies to the question how such decisions can be influ-
enced effectively. 
 Fourth, we extend the conventional cancellation risks framework by applying compet-
ing risks models to the specific context of customer loyalty cards, which provides a 
broader perspective on customer retention in the railway sector. Our method has not 
been transferred to transportation studies on consumer travel behavior before. Based on 
this unconventional methodological approach (see also, Li et al. 2012; Smith 2012; 
Wen, Wang, and Fu 2012, for recent methodological contributions in the rail sector), 
our results would help transportation firms assess the potential effects of promoting, re-
developing, and fine-tuning their two-part pricing schemes on consumers’ subsequent 
contractual choices and usage decisions, both initially and over an extended period. 
 Additionally, the awareness of the need to improve our understanding of the outcomes 
of CRM practices in the transportation sector and also of the resulting opportunities to 
influence consumer choices more effectively has grown considerably in recent years 
(see Ellinger, Daugherty, and Gustin 1997; Ellinger, Daugherty, and Plair 1999; Rama-
nathan 2010; Steven, Dong, and Dresner 2012, on various aspects of customer services 
and loyalty in logistics and transportation settings). We point out some systemic flaws 
in one of the biggest loyalty programs in Germany, and highlight some critical leverage 
points relevant to improving the effectiveness of loyalty programs in rail travel. 
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Thereby, this chapter offers managerial implications for how to assess the key drivers in loyalty 
programs, by exploring these specific gaps in the literature: 
1. What determines contractual choices of customers? How can these choices be influ-
enced effectively? 
2. What key drivers ensure the effectiveness of loyalty programs? 
3. How can such approaches be managed in practice, and which specific effects on 
(un)desired business outcomes are entailed in the context of rail travel? 
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3. Learning Effects in Loyalty Programs: Performance Impacts of Decision-
Making Behavior and Pricing 
Recent years have witnessed a steep increase in company investments in customer relationship 
management (CRM) strategies. In particular, loyalty programs have been among the most fre-
quently used forms of CRM efforts in many industries (Kim et al. 2009). The success of cus-
tomer loyalty programs enhances customer retention. Its success depends on how consumers 
accept and use their corresponding loyalty cards: From firm perspective, existing academic re-
search demonstrated the rationale behind loyalty program adoptions theoretically (Kim, Shi, and 
Srinivasan 2001; Zhang, Krishna, and Dhar 2000), and provided empirical evidence for their 
effectiveness (Bolton, Kannan, and Bramlett 2000; Leenheer et al. 2007; Lewis 2004; Mägi 
2003). Yet, little research has examined customer perceptions concerning positive outcomes of 
loyalty programs (Mimouni-Chaabane and Volle 2010), and consumer adoption of loyalty 
cards, particularly consumer learning in loyalty programs, has not been explored in the literature 
at all. 
Based on a comprehensive loyalty program data set of German railway customers, chapter III 
analyzes the structure of consumer learning and ‘unlearning’ curves4 in low- and high-price 
contexts of railway services, and discovers whether learning and unlearning throughout loyalty 
card usage is characterized by an inverse relationship. 
Further, this research illustrates the linkages of loyalty card usage, learning, and pricing issues 
to cancellation behavior, and highlights multiple effect changes over time. Using a sequential 
logit model, it is shown that learning effects and pricing strategies do have an impact on reten-
tion rates and their influence changes with ongoing contract duration. 
For structuring customer loyalty programs, the implication for marketing managers is to consid-
er behavior patterns as a result of tariff arrangements and to facilitate learning how to correctly 
use the loyalty cards, thus leading to associated higher retention rates. 
                                                     
 
4
 In this context, unlearning curves represent the development of those customer shares ceasing to use 
their loyalty card optimally, i.e. rationally. 
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The contribution of the third chapter is the following: 
 First, this research adds to theory how customers learn in loyalty programs, and how 
behavioral aspects, particularly learning, and price structures affect customer loyalty. 
Thereby, it offers some results concerning the research gap emphasized by McCall and 
Vorhees (2010) who point out that despite the proliferation of loyalty programs, little 
empirical evidence links program participation with actual loyalty, and the drivers of 
loyalty remain elusive. 
 Second, research has investigated the interrelationship between customer experience 
and churn rates. In this context, Jamal and Bucklin (2006) provide empirical evidence 
from satellite television industry. This study seeks to extend their finding concerning 
service experience in terms of usage, learning and unlearning to the railway sector, 
which are relevant most likely in various other customer loyalty program contexts, par-
ticularly in two-part tariff systems (e.g., airlines, car-sharing, hotels). 
 Third, this research likewise complements a recent literature on choice and consumption 
under multi (two and more)-part tariffs (Ascarza, Lambrecht, and Vilcassim 2012; Bagh 
and Bhargava 2007; Grubb 2009; Grubb and Osborne 2012; Iyengar, Ansari, and Gupta 
2007; Jensen 2006), which has so far abstracted from potential effects of the tariff struc-
ture on usage and customer retention. 
 Fourth, our approach approves the concept of perceived price fairness (Bolton, Warlop, 
and Alba 2003; Xia, Monroe, and Cox 2004), at this, the result being consistent with 
prospect theory and mental accounting, which suggests that consumers tend to perceive 
multiple prices as more punishing than a single price of equal amount (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979; Thaler 1985; Thaler and Johnson 1990). Besides, framing effects provide 
numerous opportunities to isolate important loyalty drivers while simultaneously evalu-
ating the effectiveness of these, as indicated by McCall and Voorhees (2010), who also 
emphasize that more research is needed to better explain how the aggregate framing of a 
program affects consumer evaluations. 
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 Additionally, Grewal and Levy (2009) add to existing issues in e-tailing research, point-
ing on how to coordinate online and offline distribution channels in the context of two-
part pricing systems. Our results provide explicit indication for differences in loyalty in 
different distribution channels of the railway setting and can help to develop sustainable 
CRM concepts and strategies. 
Thereby, this chapter offers managerial implications for how to evaluate consumer learning in 
loyalty programs, by exploring these specific gaps in the literature: 
1. How does consumer learning about (non-)optimal choices affect customer retention 
rates? 
2. How relevant is an integrative treatment of usage, usage adoption (i.e., learning), and 
perceptional price policies and strategies in the development and application of custom-
er retention concepts? 
3. How do consumers’ perceptions of prices affect loyal behavior? 
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4. The Success of Art Galleries: A Dynamic Model with Competition and Infor-
mation Effects 
Two-sided markets (or networks) can be found in many industries. Examples are manifold: vid-
eo game consoles and credit cards, health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and operating 
(software) systems, communication networks (such as the Internet), the whole media industry 
and newspapers, the pay-tv market and scientific journals as well as the market for new works 
of art exhibit the economics of two-sided markets (Eisenmann, Parker, and van Alstyne 2006; 
Rochet and Tirole 2003). These are characterized by two sets of agents, e.g., patients and doc-
tors, end-users and developers, consumers and advertisers, artists and art collectors, etc. who 
interact with each other via an intermediary or platform (e.g., hospital, software/media compa-
ny, art gallery, etc. (Rysman 2009)). In this connection, the outcomes of the interaction are af-
fected by the decisions of both sets of agents, i.e. by an (uninternalized) externality (Armstrong 
2006; Rochet and Tirole 2006). 
Since most two-sided markets are prone to quality uncertainty (on one or even both sides of the 
market), the crucial economic question is whether competition among intermediaries in two-
sided markets plays a role for the outcome of the market process. From an economic perspec-
tive, the art market displays the pivotal problems of two-sided markets with high quality uncer-
tainty and considerable innovation intensity. Uncertain subjective quality evaluations trigger the 
emergence of institutions in a market economy intended to reduce this uncertainty. Referring to 
this fact, a whole industry of experts has evolved, which helps to overcome quality uncertainty 
by actively evaluating and distributing information on works of art (Becker 1982; Caves 2000; 
Currid 2007). In a world centered on stardom and hits we assume that the glamorous business of 
arts should not only have superstars on the side of artists, but also winners on the side of galler-
ies. 
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Building on Rosen’s (1981) and Adler’s (1985) central theories on star effects, this paper ana-
lyzes quantitatively whether superstar effects exist in this deep-pocket market
5
 and if so, to find 
an adequate approximation of the underlying mechanism for the evolution of art galleries. Ac-
cordingly, we derive ‘market success’ of art galleries from annual rankings (Kunstkompass) of 
the world’s most in-demand artists and generate art market data from the years 2001, 2004 and 
2008. This ranking is formalized, connected to dynamic models of several specified processes 
from statistical physics, as well as interpreted economically, and finally empirically tested. The 
findings suggest that the success of art galleries depends strongly on information and innovation 
effects, but is hardly affected by competition effects. We find that the superstar effect in the case 
of galleries can be understood as an appropriation of search and entrance costs which emerge 
whenever consumption requires special knowledge and social inclusion. 
The contribution of the fourth chapter is the following: 
 First, Franck and Nüesch (2007) and Ehrmann, Meiseberg, and Ritz (2009) point out 
that the superstar effects are predominantly analyzed in mass markets, whereas deep-
pocket markets like the market for art galleries are still hardly ever explored. So, the 
chapter extends the literature of superstar effects. 
 Second, we take up ideas from statistical physics to model processes that allow us to 
analyze the development of different types of distributions of success in the market for 
art galleries. This way, we shed some light on the evolutionary dynamics of the success 
of art galleries, which can presumably be transferred to various other two-sided markets 
characterized by high quality uncertainty. 
 Third, we apply new methods of empirical testing to determine which distribution best 
fits our data. Our data reveals lognormal distribution (as the consequence of a geometric 
Brownian motion) constituting the underlying stochastic process. By offering an eco-
nomic meaning for this process, we hypothesize that the art marketing process is not in-
                                                     
 
5
 A ‘deep-pocket’ market is characterized by the fact that a relatively small number of consumers are 
willing to pay a large premium to consume the services of the few ‘best’ performers. 
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herently rudderless, and we propose a reversed version of Baumol’s (1986) assumption 
and suggest that the imperfection of the available information on prices and transactions 
does matter (in the sense that better information about the behavior of the market could 
help to make decisions more effectively). 
 Additionally, we find that economic peculiarities may also be main drivers of the evolu-
tion of success. This is (not only) the case in cultural markets when quality uncertainty 
is high for the final customers, and when on the side of the intermediary platform spe-
cific investments are required to build up a sustainable reputation with both artists as 
well as art collectors and investors. Having established such a reputation, competition 
among intermediary platforms plays hardly any role. Again, it seems very likely that 
this result could be generalized for other two-sided markets with high quality uncertain-
ty. 
Thereby, this chapter gives heed to a more sophisticated understanding of the evolutionary dy-
namics of the success of galleries, and more generally, success in (two-sided) markets with high 
quality uncertainty, by exploring these specific gaps in the literature: 
1. Do the economics of the gallery sector support the long-term success of individual ac-
tors? 
2. How can a gallery that was successful in the past gain an ever increasing reputational 
advantage as an expert in the selection of future trends compared to less successful gal-
leries? 
3. What kind of dynamic economic process takes effect such that a small, inconsequential 
firm (here an art gallery) becomes dominant in a field? 
  
III. INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK 
The core of this dissertation contains four main chapters. These chapters are unified by the idea 
of analyzing the drivers of consumer behavior and market evolution through integrating a plu-
rality of perspectives and (multidisciplinary) modeling approaches while placing particular em-
phasis on the concepts of customer life cycle, rationality of consumer decision-making and firm 
performance. Figure 1 illustrates the organization of chapters. By taking both the customer and 
the firm perspective into account, employing both static and dynamic models, as well as adopt-
ing segment-specific and generic longitudinal approaches, the research framework at hand ex-
tends the literature on CRM and market performance, and particularly sheds lights on customer-
driven success factors and competitive strategy outcomes. As the chapters are modular in na-
ture, they can be read solitarily according to individual foci of interest. Figure 2 provides a syn-
opsis of research aims, methods and findings. 
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Research Aim: 
Providing empirical evidence of the drivers of custom-
ers’ PoS choice (online vs. traditional channel) and its 
linkages to purchase behavior. 
Research Aim: 
Providing empirical evidence of success drivers and 
performance in CRM practices. 
Methodological Approach: 
Logistic regression model, chi-square, Fisher-Yates 
and t-tests; based on customer loyalty program data. 
Methodological Approach: 
Semi-parametric proportional hazards model stratified 
by failure type; based on customer loyalty program 
data. 
Results: 
Customer heterogeneity affects outcomes of retail 
strategies that combine distribution channels, and is 
important for allocating resources effectively 
across/within channels; Despite opportunities for ac-
quiring information relevant for purchase decisions at 
either PoS, decision quality is much higher in online 
channels; Contrary to what previous studies would 
predict, customer loyalty is higher in online channels 
compared with traditional channels. 
Results: 
Installing auto-renewal procedures decreases cancella-
tion risks, automated electronic mailings and advertis-
ing can be counterproductive and increase the risk of 
cancellation. The findings offer practical implications 
for transportation companies and other service sectors 
and provide performance and policy implications for 
suppliers of comparable transportation services as 
well as strategic impulses for firms applying two-part 
pricing schemes in general. 
Chapter III 
Learning Effects in Loyalty Programs 
Chapter IV 
The Success of Art Galleries 
Research Aim: 
Providing empirical evidence on the impact of learning 
effects in loyalty card usage and pricing issues on can-
cellation behavior over time. 
Research Aim: 
Providing empirical evidence of dynamic processes 
that take effect such that a small, inconsequential firm 
becomes dominant in a field; including economical 
interpretation of corresponding model parameters. 
Methodological Approach: 
Sequential logit model, t-tests; based on customer loy-
alty program data. 
Methodological Approach: 
Stochastic processes from statistical physics, Kolmo-
gorov-Smirnov tests, Clauset power law test; based on 
German art market data (Kunstkompass) over several 
years. 
Results: 
The structure of learning curves differs (learn vs. un-
learn, low- vs. high-price context); learning effects and 
pricing strategies do have an impact on retention rates 
and their influence changes with ongoing contract 
duration; For structuring customer loyalty programs, 
the implication for marketing managers is to consider 
behavior patterns as a result of tariff arrangements and 
to facilitate learning how to correctly use the loyalty 
cards, thus leading to associated higher retention rates. 
Results: 
The success of art galleries depends strongly on in-
formation and innovation effects, but is hardly affect-
ed by competition effects; the superstar effect in the 
case of art galleries can be understood as an appropri-
ation of search and entrance costs which emerge 
whenever consumption requires special knowledge 
and social inclusion. 
Figure 2. Integrative Framework 
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PART B 
 
I. DO ONLINE CUSTOMERS MAKE BETTER PURCHASES? – AN ANALYSIS 
OF POINT OF SALE CHOICE AND ITS LINKAGES TO CUSTOMER 
LOYALTY AND THE (IR)RATIONALITY OF BUYING DECISIONS 
 
“The real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new 
lands, but seeing with new eyes.” 
Marcel Proust (1871-1922) 
1. Abstract 
Based on a large-scale, unique longitudinal dataset comprising more than four million individu-
al transactions, we study linkages between points of sale and consumers’ purchase behavior. We 
focus on online versus traditional over-the-counter channels. First, we investigate consumer-
inherent and contingent factors that drive customers’ point of sale choice. Second, adopting a 
consumer perspective, we study whether online purchases or counter purchases tend to yield 
higher purchase decision quality. We establish whether such linkages hold across different cus-
tomer segments and pricing contexts, and we also examine consumers’ learning effects in terms 
of improving on decision quality over time. Third, moving on to the firm perspective, we study 
subsequent customer loyalty in either distribution channel, and explore how loyalty develops 
across different segments, pricing contexts, and levels of decision quality. Hypotheses are tested 
in the context of two-part pricing schemes in travel services that are particularly intended to 
create customer loyalty, and offer a rare opportunity for an objective assessment of purchase 
optimality. Our results show how various consumer-inherent and contingent factors affect point 
of sale choice. Contrary to our expectations, the rationality of purchase decisions is in fact de-
pendent on the chosen point of sale. Besides, it largely varies across customer segments. How-
ever, learning effects do occur over time, yet their strength differs across low- and high-price 
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contexts as well as across consumer groups. Loyalty depends on both pricing contexts and seg-
ments as well as on customers’ previous decision quality and point of sale choice. We provide 
implications for upgrading consumers’ purchase behavior and for segment-specific customer 
acquisition and retention. 
  
Do Online Customers Make Better Purchases? 
 
36 
2. Introduction 
More and more firms pursue electronic distribution strategies to augment their physical infra-
structure for product and service delivery (Hitt and Frei 2002; Laroche et al. 2005; Pan and 
Zhang 2011). As the Internet has evolved into an important distribution channel and marketing 
medium, it has profoundly transformed the way consumers shop and gather information (Bart et 
al. 2005; Grewal and Levy 2009). At the same time, competitive retail environments and de-
creasing switching costs make customers ever more difficult to retain (Srinivasan, Anderson, 
and Ponnavolu 2002). Under these challenging conditions, retailers must allocate their resources 
effectively within and across distribution channels to create sustainable customer relationships 
(Bart et al. 2005). 
As investments in customer relationships and multichannel distribution become increasingly 
central to long-term company strategies, an essential question is how using different distribution 
channels adds value to firms that invest in them (Hitt and Frei 2002). Yet, there is a lack of re-
search into customer characteristics that drive the use of online purchase systems versus tradi-
tional channels (Brown and Dant 2009; Hitt and Frei 2002; Reinartz, Krafft, and Hoyer 2004; 
Wallace, Giese, and Johnson 2004), and the question of how different channels affect consumer 
behavior and customer loyalty remains surprisingly unanswered to date (Brown and Dant 2009; 
Hitt and Frei 2002; Homburg, Hoyer, and Fassnacht 2002; Reinartz, Krafft, and Hoyer 2004; 
Wallace, Giese, and Johnson 2004).  
Across distribution channels, customer loyalty is a critical goal for firms (Jacoby and Chestnut 
1978; Laroche et al. 2005; Wallace, Giese, and Johnson 2004). Loyal customers buy more often, 
are willing to pay higher prices, and generate positive word of mouth (Oliver 1997; Reichheld 
1993; Wallace, Giese, and Johnson 2004; Zeithaml, Berry, and Parasuraman 1996). According-
ly, many companies initiate loyalty programs, particularly in the service sector. Loyalty pro-
grams provide consumers with incentives for repeat business, which encourages them to contin-
ue their purchase behavior (Keh and Lee 2006). Bolton, Kannan, and Bramlett (2000), Keh and 
Lee (2006), Leenheer (2007), Meyer-Waarden (2008), or Vesel and Zabkar (2009) study out-
Do Online Customers Make Better Purchases? 
 
37 
comes of such programs, particularly, behavioral loyalty and retention. Yet, Berman (2006) and 
Keh and Lee (2006) argue that despite their proliferation, many programs do not produce the 
results desired by the firm. Still, insights into the responsiveness across different customer seg-
ments and their respective buying behavior as well as effects of loyalty programs in different 
channels are unfortunately scarce (Allaway et al. 2006; Gommans, Krishnan, and Scheffold 
2001; Ramsay 2010; Shankar, Smith, and Rangaswamy 2003). In sum, research has not ade-
quately considered market-level responses to retailing strategies in online vs. offline distribu-
tion, although this is of essential importance to researchers as well as practitioners (Peterson and 
Balasubramanian 2002).  
Based on an extensive, proprietary, longitudinal dataset comprising more than four million indi-
vidual consumer transactions, we provide insights into this context by studying linkages be-
tween consumers’ point of sale choice and purchase behavior. First, we investigate how con-
sumer-inherent and contingent factors drive point of sale (PoS) preferences in terms of choosing 
online versus traditional over-the-counter channels. Second, from a consumer perspective, we 
study whether Internet purchases or counter purchases tend to yield higher purchase decision 
quality, and whether these linkages hold across different segments and pricing contexts. We also 
explore learning effects concerning potential improvements on the quality of consumers’ pur-
chase decisions over time. Third, moving on to the firm perspective, we study subsequent loyal-
ty behavior of customers choosing either distribution channel, and examine how such loyalty 
relates to different customer segments, pricing contexts and levels of previous decision quality. 
Hypotheses are tested in the context of two-part pricing schemes (loyalty cards) in services, as 
these are particularly intended to create customer loyalty, and offer a rare opportunity for an 
objective assessment of purchase optimality. We focus on the German rail travel sector, where 
consumers can choose to buy loyalty cards that allow them certain discounts on future fares. 
Thus, the analysis is based on one of the most prominent loyalty programs in the largest Euro-
pean economy (BahnCard, 4.5 million participants in 2011). Our results document how a range 
of consumer-inherent and contingent factors affect PoS choice. We can also establish that con-
Do Online Customers Make Better Purchases? 
 
38 
trary to our expectations, the quality, or rationality, of purchase decisions in fact depends on the 
chosen PoS. Besides, it largely varies across customer groups and high- vs. low-price contexts. 
Moreover, learning effects do occur over time, yet their strength varies across consumer seg-
ments as well as pricing contexts and chosen PoS. Customer loyalty depends on all these as-
pects: on PoS choice, the rationality of previous purchase decisions, as well as customer seg-
ments and pricing contexts. We contribute to the retailing literature by offering theoretical and 
managerial implications. 
The paper is organized as follows: In the next chapter, we explain the conceptual background to 
the study. The third section presents hypotheses. Subsequently, we describe our data and meth-
ods. Section 5 summarizes our results. The last section concludes and offers implications. 
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3. Conceptual Background 
Point of Sale. Firms have increasingly transitioned to hybrid models that integrate physical 
stores and online systems – for example, retailers like Barnes and Noble or Wal-Mart have 
combined outlet stores with substantial investments in an attractive online presence (Hitt and 
Frei 2002). Particularly in services, firms frequently mix online and counter distribution to 
augment or even supplant ‘traditional’ distribution (e.g., travel agents, financial institutions, 
insurance providers). 
There is little systematic knowledge about the drivers that make consumers prefer Internet ver-
sus traditional channels (Gommans, Krishnan, and Scheffold 2001; Ramsay 2010; Shankar, 
Smith, and Rangaswamy 2003). Previous research in consumer behavior applies risk theory and 
suggests that consumers make purchase decisions according to the perceived risk inherent in the 
decision (Hitt and Frei 2002; Laroche et al. 2005; Weathers, Sharma, and Wood 2007). Per-
ceived risk exhibits two components – uncertainty (the likelihood of unfavorable outcomes) and 
consequences (the importance of a potential loss) (Bauer 1960; Cox and Rich 1964; Mitchell 
and Greatorex 1993). The assessment of buying options on the consumer side depends on the 
consumer’s confidence in the ability to make the ‘right’ purchase decision, which is also contin-
gent on the place of purchase (Mitchell and Greatorex 1993). Due to the ‘intangibility’ inherent 
in online purchases, online channels are commonly believed to increase perceived risk and as-
sessment difficulties compared with traditional over-the-counter settings. However, Berthon et 
al. (1999), Laroche et al. (2005), and Thakor, Borsuk, and Kalamas (2004) also discuss the 
functionality of the Internet in offering a plethora of information to consumers who are willing 
to search for it, suggesting that the Internet should facilitate purchase decisions rather than com-
plicate them.  
Accordingly, demographic characteristics – to the extent that they are linked to what consumers 
perceive as desirable skills to acquire and behaviors to adopt – can induce preferences for either 
distribution channel (Hitt and Frei 2002). Several market research studies (e.g., Zickuhr and 
Smith 2012) show that the average PC user, who may engage in online purchasing, is younger 
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and more affluent than the average population. Consumers using online banking have also been 
found to differ from counter users in demographic characteristics (Hitt and Frey 2002). Besides, 
aspects like risk aversion, experience in acquiring information online, or preferences for engag-
ing in interaction with salespersons versus online exchange, may drive consumers to choose 
Internet or counter PoS (Barber and Odean 1999; Hitt and Frey 2002; Oestreicher-Singer and 
Sundararajan 2010). Resulting from these diverging characteristics and preferences, consumers’ 
subsequent decision-making processes and purchase behavior might differ as well.  
(Ir)Rationality of Purchase Behavior. Brown and Dant (2009) note that researchers who inves-
tigate topics involving the Internet should utilize theories not frequently applied, like microeco-
nomic theory, consumer choice theory, and social exchange theory. Consequently, our analysis 
is based on the microeconomic model of expected utility maximization, which implies that indi-
viduals choose an object over another if this object is assigned a higher value by the consumer’s 
specific preference function (Hirshleifer 1965; Machina 2008; Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
1944). We assume that consumers try to achieve the highest level of utility possible in their 
choice of a particular offering. Yet obviously, they face constraints in satisfying their wishes as 
extended search for ‘adequate’ purchases becomes complicated and time-consuming. Consum-
ers’ rationality in forming preferences is limited by the information they can acquire, by cogni-
tive limitations, and by the finite amount of time available to reach a decision (Baumol and 
Quandt 1964; Rubinstein 1998; Simon 1957). Given the context at hand, the optimality of pur-
chase decisions is comparatively easy to assess (for consumers as well) by a simple cost-benefit 
approach. There are three possible scenarios, depending on individual travel behavior: First, 
consumers can ‘overuse’ their loyalty card, meaning they would be better off overall if they had 
bought a more expensive card up-front (a more expensive card allows greater reductions on 
subsequent fares). Second, they may ‘underuse’ their card, meaning they would benefit more 
from holding a less expensive card, as the ticket fare reductions gained do not cover the higher 
initial price paid for the card. Third, consumers may succeed in buying in an ‘optimal’ way, that 
is, they would be worse off if they had bought either a cheaper (or none) or a more expensive 
card. The latter behavior is considered as making a ‘rational’ or ‘optimal’ purchase decision in 
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the following, other behaviors are considered as ‘non-optimal’ or ‘irrational’ (‘beyond optimal’ 
for over-usage, ‘suboptimal” for under-usage).6 We suggest that consumers’ decision quality 
will depend on a range of influential factors, and accordingly, study drivers of consumer choice. 
Customer Loyalty. Loyalty has been extensively studied in the literature based on various defi-
nitions (Day 1969; Jacoby and Chestnut 1978; Keh and Lee 2006; Oliver 1997). In line with 
Srinivasan, Anderson, and Ponnalovu (2002), we define ‘loyalty’ as a customer’s favorable 
attitude towards the firm that results in repeat buying behavior, placing the focus on actually 
observable repeat purchasing.
7
 Customer loyalty is of extreme interest to firms as it can be 
strongly linked to profitability (Oliver 1997; Reichheld 1993; Zeithaml, Berry, and Parasuraman 
1996), and even a small decrease in customer loyalty can make a large difference for earnings 
(Wallace, Giese, and Johnson 2004). Loyalty becomes ever more important as the Internet fuels 
retailing competition and reduces switching costs (Srinivasan, Anderson, and Ponnalovu 2002). 
Thus, enhancing loyalty is a critical defensive strategy for firms to retain their customer base 
and prevent customers from switching to competing services. Accordingly, many companies 
have started loyalty programs to incentivize repeat business and to encourage consumers to 
continue their transactions with the firm (Keh and Lee 2006). The value and the efficiency of 
such programs have been the subject of controversial discussions among researchers and practi-
tioners: Despite their proliferation, they often do not produce the results desired by the firm 
(Bolton, Kannan, and Bramlett 2000; Key and Lee 2006; Leenheer 2007; Meyer-Waarden 2008; 
Vesel and Zabkar 2009), and little is known about the responsiveness across different customer 
                                                     
 
6
 One may argue that ‘optimality’ is simple to judge in retrospective, yet not when making the buying 
decision, due to unforeseen changes in circumstances, incorrect but initially plausible assumptions about 
the future, asf. Then, when considering the circumstances surrounding the specific moment of ex ante 
decision-making, consumer behavior could still have been rational. However, in light of the very elemen-
tary cost-benefit calculation applicable and the fact that numerous sample consumers frequently repeat 
their initial purchase ‘mistakes’ over years in a row without changing their purchase behavior ever, we 
suggest that such behavior is often not based on rational decision-making. 
7
 Scholars have argued that behavioral loyalty (i.e. repeat purchase) does not capture the multidimension-
ality of the loyalty construct, as loyalty should also include psychological aspects like commitment (Ku-
mar and Shah 2004). Thus, habitual or convenience purchases, and those induced foremost by promotion-
al incentives, have been cited to explain why “loyalty” programs may appear not to work (Keh and Lee 
2006; Kumar and Shah 2004; Uncles, Dowling, and Hammond 2003). Due to data limitations, we follow 
the more basic approach and focus on repeat purchase, as there is no data on consumers’ psychological 
drivers and underlying motivations for this extensive dataset. 
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segments and their respective buying behavior (Allaway et al. 2006; Berman 2006; Keh and Lee 
2006).  
Against this background, our research questions are:  
(1) Descriptive Perspective: What consumer-inherent characteristics or contingent factors drive 
customers’ PoS choice when deciding to buy through online versus over-the-counter channels?  
(2) Consumer Perspective: Does either type of distribution channel tend to yield ‘better’ results 
in terms of consumers’ purchase decision quality? Do potential linkages apply across customer 
segments and pricing contexts alike? Can consumers realize learning effects that enhance their 
decision quality over time, and if so, what conditions accelerate or hamper those learning ef-
fects? 
(3) Firm Perspective: How loyal (in terms of continued purchase behavior) are customers who 
choose online channels compared with those preferring counter purchase? How are different 
customer segments, pricing contexts and levels of decision quality related to customer loyalty? 
We provide several contributions: First, few studies have explicitly focused on how customer 
heterogeneity is related to online versus offline purchasing (Hitt and Frei 2002; Tsai and Lee 
2009). Although some research has discussed customer characteristics, these are typically not 
hypothesized to vary between distribution channels (Bakos 1991, 1997; Brynjolfsson and Smith 
1998; Clemons, Hann, and Hitt 1999; Hitt and Frei 2002; Lee 1998; Varian and Shapiro 1998). 
Besides, previous studies on firm prospects in online retailing have emphasized cost savings 
(e.g., substituting staff costs with lower information technology costs, or transaction cost reduc-
tions; Clemons and Row 1992; Gurbaxani and Whang 1991; Malone, Yates, and Benjamin 
1987) and revenue increases through price and product differentiation and social network effects 
(Bailey and Bakos 1997; Clemons, Hann, and Hitt 1999; Oestreicher-Singer and Sundararajan 
2010; Varian and Shapiro 1998), but have not focused on determinants of consumer responsive-
ness to particular channels. We show how customer heterogeneity is related to online versus 
offline PoS choice and subsequent purchase behavior. Second, although customer satisfaction 
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with purchase decisions is extensively studied, decision quality is not, although it complements 
satisfaction research by providing a more objective and less volatile assessment of purchase 
advantageousness. We establish under what conditions customers tend to make better buying 
decisions and offer some insights into the potential scope and the benefits of learning effects. 
Third, as retail managers and academics become increasingly interested in issues related to the 
‘true’ value of loyalty programs, our results inform e-commerce strategy by offering implica-
tions for more effective customer acquisition and retention in the two most important channels. 
In addition, there is a lack of research into two-part pricing systems across distribution channels, 
although such pricing schemes are increasingly used and are particularly intended to create cus-
tomer loyalty. In sum, we add to the literature investigating multichannel distribution, as a better 
understanding of the linkages between customer heterogeneity, decision quality and loyalty 
behavior is important for retailers that combine distribution channels, and for allocating re-
sources effectively across and within channels. Our research framework is summarized by Fig-
ure 3. The next section presents hypotheses. 
 
Figure 3. Research Approach  
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4. Hypotheses 
4.1 Descriptive Perspective: Point of Sale Choice 
Internet usage has been found to vary systematically with consumer characteristics, particularly 
with demographics (Bart et al. 2005; Mittal and Kamakura 2001; Zickuhr and Smith 2012). For 
example, consumers lacking Internet experience are more frequent among older than younger 
age groups. Besides, older consumers tend to perceive online purchasing as more risky, more 
time-consuming and more difficult than buying via traditional channels (Yoon 2002). Then, the 
uncertainty involved in any purchase evaluation online may be amplified by feelings of insecu-
rity towards the technology needed to enable the transaction as well as by privacy and security 
concerns (Hitt and Frei 2002; Laroche et al. 2005; Miyazaki and Fernandez 2001; Weathers, 
Sharma, and Wood 2007). Previous research also suggests that older people have more persis-
tent shopping habits and value the benefits of an existing transaction pattern more than the 
young, leading to greater inertia, also as such behavior allows reducing physical and mental 
efforts (Baltas, Argouslidis, and Skarmeas 2010). Moreover, age is likely to be negatively corre-
lated with other kinds of exploratory behavior as well, like variety seeking and search activity 
(Guo 2001; Van Kenhove, de Wulf, and Van den Poel 2003). 
Scholars have also observed gender differences in shopping behavior concerning information 
search, the use of price reductions, and responses to store stimuli (Grewal, Gotlieb, and Mar-
morstein 2003; Harmon 2003; Noble, Griffith, and Adjei 2006; Otnes and McGrath 2001). For 
example, some studies argue that female customers are more risk-adverse than male ones when 
making purchase decisions, whereas male customers have been found to be more benefit-
oriented, show a greater willingness to gather information, and display greater confidence in 
processing information as well a more achievement-oriented purchase behavior (Baltas, Ar-
gouslidis, and Skarmeas 2010; Noble, Griffith, and Adjei 2006; Otnes and McGrath 2001). 
In addition, various contingent factors may influence PoS preferences. For example, geograph-
ical regions vary in population density. Densely populated regions may offer more counter pur-
chase options (and concerning the study context, a higher number of travel destinations and 
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more frequent schedules, rendering the possession of a loyalty card more attractive compared 
with regions where rail travel is less convenient). Also, they may offer better infrastructure in 
general, including faster Internet connections or more choices among providers, or its popula-
tion may be more affluent and experienced with Internet purchases than the population in less 
developed areas. Consequently, the regional setting could affect consumer choices.  
Moreover, the price of a good or service determines how critical the risk of ‘buying something 
wrong’ is perceived. Therefore, the price level should be a central criterion for consumers’ mo-
tivation to reduce purchase uncertainty, which may also drive channel choice (Grewal, Gotlieb, 
and Marmorstein 1994; Shimp and Bearden 1982a, 1982b). Besides, depending on consumer 
characteristics, some consumers may refrain from online purchases in high-price settings, 
whereas others may even prefer acquiring information online and deliberately use the Internet in 
case of high-price purchases. Then, the pricing context may also moderate effects of consumer-
inherent characteristics as well as contingent factors on PoS choice, for example, as some cus-
tomer segments and regional subcultures may be more risk averse or face stronger budget con-
straints than others. Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
H1: Consumer-inherent as well as contingent factors determine customers’ point of sale 
choice. 
H1a: Customers’ point of sale choice varies with age. 
H1b: Customers’ point of sale choice varies across genders. 
H1c: Customers’ point of sale choice varies across geographical regions. 
H1d: Customers’ point of sale choice varies across high- and low-price 
contexts. 
H1e: The effect of pricing contexts on customers’ point of sale choice varies 
with age, gender, and across geographical regions. 
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4.2 Consumer Perspective 
Consumers must allocate their budgets in a way that best serves their individual needs, given 
constraints of time and information processing abilities. As consumers themselves choose to buy 
online versus offline according to where they believe to find the information needed for taking 
informed decisions, systematic differences between online and counter purchases as regards the 
level of decision quality are not necessarily to be expected. Rather, consumers self-select into 
their respectively preferred channel which they perceive as the ‘better’ transaction means.  
However, decision quality will depend on consumers’ motivation to invest efforts into the pur-
chase decision. Then, decision quality may vary across low- and high-price settings, as custom-
ers may pay more attention if “more money is at risk” (Dowling and Staelin 1994; Ross 1975). 
Moreover, some customer segments may make more well-considered decisions as they are more 
risk-averse or face more budget constraints than others. Life experience may also promote indi-
viduals’ decision quality, so that decision quality likely varies across customer segments. 
Zeithaml, Berry, and Parasuraman (1993) find that similar to experience, prior knowledge of a 
product or service allows for a clearer mental representation of it. Such representation helps 
diminish the risk associated with a purchase, and by causing greater ease of evaluation, it lowers 
the efforts needed for making a good decision (Laroche et al. 2005). Accordingly, decision qual-
ity should increase with repeated buying. Besides, customers may also inform others interested 
in the respective offering. Particularly in high-price contexts, consumers may pay more attention 
to the quality of their purchase decisions, and strive for learning from purchasing mistakes for 
future decisions. Some customer segments may be more inclined to learn, e.g., due to greater 
risk-aversion or higher achievement orientation. However, if PoS choices are not systematically 
related to decision quality, learning capacities of customers may not depend on channel choice, 
either. 
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This is formulated in the following hypotheses: 
H2: The quality of consumers’ purchase decisions does not depend on online versus offline 
point of sale choice. 
H2a: Purchase decision quality varies across low- and high-price contexts. 
H2b: Purchase decision quality varies across customer segments. 
H2c: Purchase decision quality increases over time. 
H2d: The increase in purchase decision quality varies across low- and high-
price contexts and across customer segments, but not across points of 
sale. 
4.3 Firm Perspective 
Although studies on loyalty programs in the traditional counter environment are plentiful, little 
empirical research is available for online sales situations, particularly, based on large-scale data 
(Gommans, Krishnan, and Scheffold 2001; Ramsay 2010; Shankar, Smith, and Rangaswamy 
2003). Some evidence indicates that online customers are likely less loyal than counter custom-
ers, as electronic means of communication do not foster commitment as much as personal inter-
action (De Berranger and Meldrum 2000; Granovetter 1973; Uzzi 1999). Personal contact and 
face-to-face encounters with salespeople may then create a greater sense of familiarity with the 
service or the company for consumers (Gulati 1995; Uzzi 1999). Besides, online customers may 
be more variety-seeking in general, as low search costs in online channels allow them to consid-
er a greater range of purchase options (Anderson 2006; Elberse 2008). In consequence, online 
customers may tend to try out competing services or switch to other product and service catego-
ries more frequently (Baumgartner and Steenkamp 1996; Kahn 1995; McAlister and Pessemier 
1982; Ramsay 2010; Ratner, Kahn, and Kahneman 1999; Tang and Chin 2007). On the contra-
ry, some scholars claim that customers could even be more loyal online (Shankar, Smith, and 
Rangaswamy 2003), whereas other expect little differences overall (Walsh et al. 2010). 
Moreover, although loyalty has been studied extensively in the literature, its relation to retail 
pricing strategies is not well understood (Allender and Richards 2012). Yet, pricing contexts 
should affect loyalty behavior as in high-price contexts more pronounced risk aversion may 
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rather drive consumers to stick with a firm whose services have proven satisfactory. In addition, 
preferences for repeat purchase behavior may vary by customer segments, e.g. depend on the 
respective tendencies towards inertia or variety-seeking behavior. Similarly, customers who 
have made adequate purchase decisions in the past benefit more from staying with their particu-
lar firm compared with others who display non-optimal decision quality. The latter consumers 
may also blame their ‘bad’ decisions, once noticed, on the firm rather than on their own behav-
ior, possibly resulting in reduced motivation to stay loyal to the company. 
Formally: 
H3: Customer loyalty depends on online versus offline point of sale choice. 
H3a: Customer loyalty varies across low- and high-price contexts. 
H3b: Customer loyalty varies across customer segments. 
H3c: Customer loyalty varies with purchase decision quality. 
Figure 4 summarizes our hypotheses framework. 
 
Figure 4. Hypotheses Framework  
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5. Data, Variables and Methods 
5.1 Sample 
The data were provided by the main German railway company Deutsche Bahn AG (DB) and 
drawn from the customers in DB’s customer loyalty programs ‘bahn.bonus’ and ‘bahn.comfort’. 
They include more than four million transactions conducted with any of the 800,000 BahnCards 
in the sample, encompassing the entire purchase history of over 300,000 customers. DB cus-
tomers can basically choose between three contracts: the BahnCard25 (BC25), the BahnCard50 
(BC50) and the BahnCard100 (BC100). Each contract is available for first and second class 
travel. The number of the BahnCard contract type signifies the discount it affords on the regular 
ticket price for a 12 month period from the date of issue. Thus a BC25 gives a 25% discount, a 
BC50 means a 50% discount and a BC100 means a 100% reduction on standard domestic fares 
for a year. Currently, standard second class BahnCard contracts cost EUR 57 for the BC25, 
EUR 230 for the BC50 and EUR 3,800 for the BC100. First class variants cost EUR 114 for the 
BC25, EUR 460 for the BC50 and EUR 6,400 for the BC100.  
Some adjustments were made to enhance reliability of the database. First, we excluded all pro-
gram members whose overall lifetime sales did not exceed zero. Then, we dropped customers 
with inconsistent or not clearly assignable contracts (resulting from e.g., goodwill cancellations 
or registration errors). We concentrate on second class BahnCards only to ensure contracts are 
comparable. For analyzing PoS choice, decision quality, and loyalty, we focus on customers that 
newly join the loyalty program, i.e. BC25 and BC50 customers (as BC100 users do not pur-
chase any tickets due to their flat rate travel advantage, their decision quality cannot be moni-
tored) that bought their first BahnCard during the sample period from December 2002 through 
July 2008. For investigating learning effects, we focus on the entire sample’s purchase history. 
The winter of 2002/2003 constitutes a structural break in the data as first the ‘old’ BC50 was 
substituted by the (new) BC25, but re-introduced after a break of several months in winter 
2002/2003. Thus, data collection starts in winter 2002/2003 with the introduction of the new 
loyalty card system. Our final dataset features about 300,000 BahnCards bought by almost 
90,000 customers, with corresponding in-depth information on every transaction conducted by 
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those customers over time, including purchase dates, prices paid, reductions obtained, travel 
departure and destination, asf. 
5.2 Variables 
The binary variable PoS indicates whether a BahnCard was bought via the Internet (PoS = 1) or 
via a counter (PoS = 0). We use customer age (in years), gender (1 – male, 0 – female), the 
price (in Euros) of BahnCard purchase (which varies for BC50 and BC25 contracts, and also 
due to price adjustments or promotions), and region dummies according to each customer’s 
postal code. We control for purchases on workdays versus leisure days as counters may be 
closed on Sunday (1 – Sunday, 0 – workday), and for temporal effects using dummies per quar-
ter (e.g., BahnCards may sell better in winter when road conditions are bad) and year (e.g., in-
creasing environmental consciousness, changes in GDP or job market perspectives may affect 
changes in travel means). 
We assess decision quality (the optimality of purchases) based on the simple cost-benefit ap-
proach described that generates ‘optimality boundaries’ for travel behavior. We consider the 
initial prices paid for the BahnCard and future investments in corresponding tickets for each 
customer, and record whether that customer would be better off if having chosen either a cheap-
er or a more expensive card instead of the existing one. Accordingly, each customer is assigned 
to one of the decision quality categories optimal, suboptimal or beyond optimal on an annual 
basis (see Appendix A).  
Previous research in the context of behavioral loyalty studies argues that cancellation activity 
represents a particular suitable loyalty measure (Bolton, Kannan, and Bramlett 2000; Guillén et 
al. 2012; Xevelonakis and Som 2012). The variable cancellation (1 – cancellation occurs, 0 – 
otherwise) shows whether a customer maintains or cancels a BahnCard contract at the end of the 
operative period. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics. Tables 2 and 3 provide correlations. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
  BC25 BC50 
 
Variable 
 
Description 
Mean/Frequency 
for Binary Variables 
 
Std. Dev. 
Mean/Frequency 
for Binary Variables 
  
Std. Dev. 
PoS Internet (PoS=1), counter (PoS=0) .1466 .3537 .2870 .4524 
age Customer age in years 42.3233 17.6616 41.7818 19.8404 
gender 1 – male (m), 0 – female (f) .4104 .4919 .4349 .4958 
Price BC purchase price 49.0502 17.4053 134.6074 48.0984 
region0 Postal area codes .0671 .2502 .0783 .2686 
region1 .1138 .3176 .0935 .2911 
region2 .1274 .3334 .1049 .3064 
region3 .1202 .3252 .1332 .3398 
region4 .0855 .2796 .0862 .2807 
region5 .0994 .2992 .0971 .2961 
region6 .1132 .3169 .1022 .3029 
region7 .1145 .3184 .1163 .3206 
region8 .0987 .2982 .1128 .3164 
region9 .0602 .2379 .0754 .2641 
Sunday Sunday purchase (1 – yes, 0 – no) .1078 .3102 .1330 .3395 
quarter1 Controls for the quarter .2963 .4567 .2011 .4009 
quarter2 … .3146 .4644 .1226 .3280 
quarter3 … .1859 .3890 .2603 .4388 
quarter4 … .2032 .4024 .4160 .4929 
year2002 Controls for the year .0295 .1693 0 0 
year2003 … .1950 .3962 .2183 .4131 
year2004 … .1763 .3811 .2019 .4014 
year2005 … .1849 .3882 .1736 .3788 
year2006 … .1754 .3803 .1734 .3786 
year2007 … .1866 .3896 .1730 .3783 
year2008 … .0519 .2218 .0594 .2365 
sub_opt Suboptimal usage (1 – yes, 0 – no) .7383 .4396 .6151 .4866 
byo_opt Beyond optimal usage (1 – yes, 0 – no) .0538 .2255 .0019 .0436 
cancellation Cancellation event (1 – yes, 0 – no) .0767 .2662 .0943 .2923 
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BC25 PoS age gender price region1 region2 region3 region4 region5 region6 region7 region8 
PoS 1.0000            
age -0.1697 1.0000           
gender -0.0484 -0.1033 1.0000          
price -0.1632 0.3367 -0.0185 1.0000         
region1 0.0110 -0.0115 0.0245 -0.0074 1.0000        
region2 -0.0135 0.0232 -0.0094 0.0063 -0.1355 1.0000       
region3 -0.0039 0.0204 -0.0104 -0.0195 -0.1301 -0.1443 1.0000      
region4 0.0065 0.0124 0.0085 0.0161 -0.1080 -0.1198 -0.1150 1.0000     
region5 -0.0040 0.0063 0.0053 0.0052 -0.1150 -0.1275 -0.1224 -0.1016 1.0000    
region6 -0.0065 -0.0092 0.0049 0.0106 -0.1225 -0.1359 -0.1305 -0.1083 -0.1153 1.0000   
region7 -0.0145 -0.0171 0.0007 -0.0197 -0.1265 -0.1403 -0.1347 -0.1118 -0.1190 -0.1268 1.0000  
region8 0.0058 -0.0142 -0.0097 -0.0020 -0.1164 -0.1291 -0.1239 -0.1028 -0.1095 -0.1167 -0.1204 1.0000 
region9 0.0121 -0.0039 -0.0067 -0.0005 -0.0902 -0.1000 -0.0960 -0.0797 -0.0848 -0.0904 -0.0933 -0.0859 
Table 2. BC25: Correlations (Logistic Regressions) 
 
BC50 PoS age gender price region1 region2 region3 region4 region5 region6 region7 region8 
PoS 1.0000            
age 0.1000 1.0000           
gender -0.0032 -0.1077 1.0000          
price 0.0563 0.1049 -0.2040 1.0000         
region1 -0.0278 -0.0321 0.0212 0.0329 1.0000        
region2 -0.0151 0.0185 0.0074 0.0130 -0.1099 1.0000       
region3 -0.0083 0.0289 -0.0265 -0.0275 -0.1259 -0.1342 1.0000      
region4 -0.0018 0.0159 0.0115 -0.0029 -0.0986 -0.1051 -0.1204 1.0000     
region5 -0.0029 0.0262 -0.0005 -0.0015 -0.1053 -0.1123 -0.1286 -0.1007 1.0000    
region6 -0.0299 0.0209 0.0146 0.0341 -0.1084 -0.1155 -0.1323 -0.1036 -0.1107 1.0000   
region7 -0.0080 -0.0049 -0.0053 -0.0160 -0.1165 -0.1242 -0.1422 -0.1115 -0.1190 -0.1224 1.0000  
region8 0.0446 0.0006 -0.0155 0.0092 -0.1145 -0.1221 -0.1398 -0.1095 -0.1169 -0.1203 -0.1294 1.0000 
region9 -0.0131 -0.0211 0.0013 -0.0245 -0.0917 -0.0978 -0.1120 -0.0877 -0.0937 -0.0964 -0.1036 -0.1018 
Table 3. BC50: Correlations (Logistic Regression) 
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5.3 Methods 
Descriptive Perspective (Point of Sale Choice). 
Following a randomization of the dataset, we assign the sample cases to either a train dataset 
(80% of cases) or a test dataset (20%). Using the train dataset we apply logistic regression anal-
ysis, using PoS as the dependent variable. Customer age, gender, the price paid for the 
BahnCard and postal codes (region; region0 is the baseline category) are independent variables. 
The interaction terms          ,              and              are formed using 
mean-centered variables (Aiken and West 1991). We add the controls Sunday and dummies for 
each quarter (quarter 3 is the baseline category) and year (2008 is the baseline category; 2002 is 
excluded due to missing data for the BC50 sample): 
 (     )  
 
     
   , where 
                                                           
                                                        
                                                  
                                          
For the train data, we estimate  -coefficients based on Maximum-Likelihood. Results for the 
BC25 sample are displayed in Table 4 (Table 5 for BC50). Then, we score the test data of BC25 
and BC50 customers according to the obtained parameter estimates. To validate the scoring 
procedure in the test dataset, we run another logistic regression on PoS choice, this time using 
the respective score value as explanatory variable. The results provide evidence of appropriate 
model fit (for BC25 customers, Table 4; for BC50, Table 5). Moreover, Figure 5 shows the cor-
responding ROC (receiver operating characteristic) curve that illustrates the explanatory value 
of the classification method applied (Figure 6 for BC50). The ROC curve originates from signal 
detection theory (Egan 1975; Fawcett 2006) and is created by plotting the ‘true positive’ rate 
(sensitivity) against the ‘false positive’ rate (given by 1–specificity, where specificity = ‘true 
negative’ rate). Finally, we also assess the performance of our models via a classification meth-
od: To handle the trade-off between overall model accuracy and ‘true positive’ rate and ascer-
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tain that our models are valid and well-balanced, we define cut-off values based on the parame-
ter estimates of the train data and classify the customers of the test dataset based on their score 
values (Metz 1978; Steyerberg et al. 2010). Accordingly, chi-square tests for independence be-
tween PoS choice and the classification results confirm the appropriateness of the prediction 
models for both BC25 (Pearson chi2(1) = 1.7e + 03; p < 0.001) and BC50 samples (Pearson 
chi2(1) = 2.0e + 03; p < 0.001; Mantel 1963). 
Consumer Perspective and Firm Perspective (PoS, Decision Quality and Loyalty). 
The analyses are based on customer age segments: Youngsters, age < 35; Middle Agers, 35 <= 
age < 50; Seniors, 50 <= age < 65; Elderlies, age >= 65 (Stanley, Ford, and Sande 1985; Tepper 
1994). These segments are further divided into the subsegments male and female. Then, we 
apply chi-square tests in every customer segment and subsegment to determine whether PoS 
choice is related to a) optimal, suboptimal and beyond optimal BahnCard purchase, and b) can-
cellation activity (loyalty). In case of small cell frequencies, we apply additional Fisher-Yates 
tests (Finney 1948). In this context, the latter test provides more robust results than a chi-square 
test (although corresponding results do not differ in terms of significance levels in our sample). 
For both samples, and each segment and subsegment, we examine in which channel customers 
overall tend to achieve higher decision quality, based on probability calculations conditional on 
the chosen PoS. We also show the exact respective percentages of optimal buying decisions 
(conditional on PoS choice) reached by each customer (sub)segment. Further, we list the respec-
tive incidence of optimal and non-optimal decision quality as well as cancellation shares on an 
annual basis for both BC25 and BC50 customers (Table 8, 10) and across Internet and counter 
PoS (Table 9, 11). 
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6. Results 
6.1 Descriptive Perspective 
The regression analysis reveals that PoS choice depends on consumer-inherent demographic as 
well as contingent factors (supporting H1; see Tables 4, 5). For both BC25 and BC50 custom-
ers, age and gender have a significant influence on PoS choice, supporting hypotheses H1a and 
H1b. Higher age enhances the probability of an Internet purchase in the BC50 sample, but de-
creases Internet purchase in the BC25 sample. Being female enhances the probability for a 
counter purchase across both samples. Regional aspects contribute to explaining PoS choice as 
well (supporting H1c). PoS choice is also in part dependent on pricing contexts (here, we refer 
to both the different samples of BC50 and BC25 and the price variable as components of the 
‘pricing context’; for consumer and firm perspective analyses, for technical reasons we refer to 
the samples rather than the price variable): On the one hand, drivers of PoS choice differ across 
the (more expensive) BC50 and the (cheaper) BC25 samples, and on the other, a higher initial 
price for BahnCard purchase increases transactions via the Internet in the BC50 sample; even 
though price is insignificant in the BC25 sample (so we suggest these findings provide some 
support for H1d).  
Almost all interaction terms are significant, yet their effects are different across the BC50 and 
BC25 samples. This supports the idea that the effect of pricing contexts on customers’ PoS 
choice varies with age and gender (as proposed by H1e). In the BC50 sample, higher price and 
higher age together slightly increase the probability of an Internet purchase. This is interesting 
as previous research would have argued that older consumers tend to be both less technology 
affine and more risk-averse than young ones (Baltas, Argouslidis, and Skarmeas 2010; Guo 
2001; Hitt and Frei 2002; Van Kenhove, de Wulf, and Van den Poel 2003), and probably en-
compass a lower proportion of Internet users anyway, so that more counter purchases would 
have been expected. A potential reason for the results observed here may be that those older 
consumers that engage in frequent travelling (which may also be indicated by choosing the 
more expensive BahnCard that grants higher reductions on subsequent fares) despite their high 
age may be particularly ‘modern’, affluent or mentally fit compared with their age group, and 
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may thus be more inclined to collect information online and transact via e-commerce than cliché 
images of senior people would predict. Moreover, the probability of buying over the counter 
when being female decreases for high age BC50 customers. In the BC25 sample, higher prices 
weaken the negative effect of age and of being female on Internet PoS choice, which may be 
intuitive (despite the initially different influence of higher price on PoS choice, which may in 
part result from comparatively low variance in the BC25 price variable compared with the BC50 
sample) if higher prices in the BC25 sample cause customer to behave more similar to the cus-
tomers in the BC50 segment. A few of the region x price interaction terms are significant in 
both samples as well, indicating that some regions are more price-sensitive than others, yet we 
cannot observe a general geographical pattern. Furthermore, our tests applied as described in the 
methods section offer conclusive evidence that both models outperform any random models. 
Yet, model fit also suggests that additional factors may be interesting to study in explaining PoS 
choice (also due to its size, the dataset is limited to the variables described here). 
6.2 Consumer Perspective 
Concerning purchase decision quality, Tables 6 and 7 show that the percentages of both online 
and counter customers who use their BahnCard optimally is almost two times higher in the high-
price context (BC50) than in the BC25 sample (almost every second customer versus every 
fourth for online purchases; more than four out of ten versus less than a quarter for counter pur-
chases). Thus, as theory would predict customers seem to make more mature decisions if ‘more 
money is at risk’ and accordingly, display higher decision quality in high-price contexts (sup-
porting H2a).  
As regards demographics, in the BC50 sample decision quality decreases with age. For exam-
ple, concerning online purchases (Table 7; 4
th
 column, “Percentage P(opt=1| PoS=1)”), 51.04% 
of youngsters make optimal decisions (above sample average). Decision quality is lower for 
middle agers (46.42%) and seniors (44.06%), and considerably lower for elderlies (39.78%). 
Similar results apply to the BC25 sample (Table 6; 4th column, “Percentage P(opt=1| PoS=1)”): 
For online purchases, 32.97% of youngsters make optimal decisions (above sample average), 
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and decision quality decreases for middle agers (33.28%, still above sample average), seniors 
(21.29%), and decreases drastically for elder people (7.03%). For counter purchases, youngsters 
behave optimally in 27.82% of cases (above sample average), decision quality increases slightly 
for middle agers (28.24%), but is reduced for seniors (18.27%), and strikingly low for elder 
people (4.24%). 
Concerning gender effects, in the BC50 sample (Table 7; 4
th
 column, “Percentage P(opt=1| 
PoS=1)”) decision quality in the Internet channel is generally higher when being female, which 
holds for all age groups other than elder people. For counter purchases (Table 7; 5
th
 column, 
“Percentage P(opt=1| PoS=0)”), males tend to make better decisions across age groups. In the 
BC25 sample (Table 6; 4
th
 column, “Percentage P(opt=1| PoS=1)”), males make better decisions 
in the Internet channel across all age groups other than middle agers. For counter purchases 
(Table 6; 5
th
 column, “Percentage P(opt=1| PoS=0)”), male decision quality is higher across all 
groups (all t-tests with p < 0.05). Thus, H2b (“decision quality varies across segments”) is sup-
ported.  
As regards the individual subsamples, taken together, male customers show higher decision 
quality than women in low-price contexts (p < 0.05), but female customers are better in high-
price contexts if buying online (p < 0.01). These findings may lend support to the notion that 
women tend to display higher risk aversion, thus making more well-considered decisions in 
high-price, i.e. high-risk, contexts. 
The chi-square tests also support that PoS choice and decision quality are significantly linked in 
both the BC25 and BC50 sample as well as in many of the segments and subsegments (p < 0.05) 
(Table 6, 4b; 6
th
 columns, “Advantage* (customer perspective)”). First, in the BC50 sample, all 
segments and subsegments other than male youngsters tend to make better purchase decisions 
(in terms of the probability of making an ‘optimal’ decision) when buying online. The effect 
holds for the entire sample. Second, concerning customers that underuse their cards and thus 
would be better off with a cheaper one, suboptimal behavior is less frequent if choosing the 
online PoS (across subsegments other than male youngsters and female elderlies; 8
th
 column, 
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“Advantage# (customer perspective)”). Third, as regards those that overuse their cards and had 
better upgrade to a BC100, there are less significant results in the subsegments, but the entire 
BC50 sample and particularly, youngsters, less frequently overuse their cards when buying via 
the counter (10
th
 column, “Advantage+ (customer perspective)”). Similar to the BC50 results, in 
the BC25 sample, first, the majority of segments and subsegments make optimal buying deci-
sions rather when buying online instead of over the counter. The effect holds for the entire 
BC25 sample. Second, beyond optimal behavior is less frequent if choosing the Internet PoS, 
for the entire sample and particularly, for all the young and middle age segments and subseg-
ments. Third, like in the BC50 case, young customers less frequently overuse their cards when 
buying via the counter. For the BC25 sample this effect extends to the middle agers as well. 
However, it does not hold for the entire BC25 sample, as seniors and elderlies tend to overuse 
their BahnCards less if buying online.  
Summing up these results, choosing the Internet PoS significantly increases chances to realize 
high decision quality across most customer segments in both pricing contexts of BC50 and 
BC25. Therefore, we reject hypotheses H2 which suggested that decision quality should not 
depend on the PoS that customers prefer for their transactions. 
As regards learning effects (H2c), Table 8 shows that the percentage of customers who exhibit 
optimal decision behavior in their BC25 choice has continuously grown (independently from 
pricing developments). In the high-price context of BC50, the increase in decision quality is 
even more pronounced (Table 10, 35% in 2003 to 57% in 2008). Thus, collective purchase deci-
sion quality of customers increases over time, lending support to hypothesis H2c. 
Moreover, the strength of learning effects does not only depend on the pricing context, but on 
customer segments as well (for readability, here we focus on gender rather than adding further 
analyses of age effects). In the BC50 sample, learning effects in relation to customer segments 
in terms of gender differ as male customers seem to learn faster than their female counterparts. 
Even so, both optimality ratios settle down at similar levels (Table 10; columns “share opt: m” 
and “share opt: f”). However, in the BC25 sample (Table 8), the direction of learning effects is 
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less balanced (men are significantly better (except for 2008); all p < 0.01). Next, we investigate 
whether learning effects depend on the chosen PoS. Tables 9 and 11 reveal the annual share of 
customers displaying optimal decision quality. We find that both Internet and counter customers 
show annual increases of decision quality. This effect holds for both BC50 and BC25 samples. 
In the BC50 sample, the magnitude of learning effects across the two points of sale is quite 
comparable. In the BC25 sample however, Internet buyers show stronger learning effects than 
counter customers (p < 0.001). Therefore, H2d is supported as the increase in decision quality 
varies across pricing contexts and segments; yet other than expected, this increase also varies 
slightly across PoS. 
6.3 Firm Perspective 
Chi-square tests reveal that PoS choice is associated with customer loyalty for both the BC25 
and BC50 samples as proposed by H3 (Tables 6, 7; second but last column, “Linkages between 
PoS and Cancellation”). In the BC50 sample, customers continue their purchase behavior more 
often if buying via the Internet. This holds for the entire BC50 sample (Table 7; last column, 
“Advantage~ (firm perspective)”) and concerning (sub)segments, for all middle agers, for female 
seniors, and for all elder customers. In the BC25 sample (Table 6), online purchasing is related 
to significantly lower cancellation activity, overall and particularly, in the youngster segment 
and for elder people, particularly, females (annual comparisons as displayed by Table 9 are 
mostly insignificant). Moreover, when comparing the relation of cancellation events and PoS 
choice in the high price context (Table 11), cancellation activity turns out to be significantly 
higher among counter buyers, as t-tests on an annual basis show (p < 0.001). Interestingly, this 
result is contrary to most studies discussing customer loyalty as these often argue that counter 
customers would be more loyal than online customers. However, the finding is in line with re-
sults observed by Shankar, Smith, and Rangaswamy (2003). 
As proposed by H3a, loyalty also varies across pricing contexts (Tables 8, 10 show some differ-
ences in cancellation rates across the two samples). Cancellation rates vary over the years and 
take a rather u-shaped form in the BC25 segment, whereas the u-shape is inverted in the BC50 
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segment, with sharply decreasing cancellation rates in the final year of the sample data. Consid-
ering the available data, BC25 customers are overall slightly less loyal than BC50 customers (p 
< 0.05). However, loyalty depends only marginally on customer segments in terms of gender 
(Table 10; columns “Share cancel: m” and “Share cancel: f” rarely show significant differences) 
and if so, rather in the BC25 sample, where female customers appear to cancel their contracts 
more often than male customers (Table 8; p < 0.10 after 2003; offering only little support for 
H3b). Furthermore, customer loyalty does depend on previous decision quality, as proposed by 
H3c. Additional Chi-square tests reveal that in a few BC25 subsegments, but across all subseg-
ments in the BC50 context, optimal contract choice is associated with (lower; as indicated by 
additional regressions of contract choices on subsequent cancellations) cancellation activity (p < 
0.001). 
 
Figure 5. ROC Curve – Logistic Regression: BC25 Customers (Test Data) 
 
 
Figure 6. ROC Curve – Logistic Regression: BC50 Customers (Test Data) 
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Train Data Coefficient Std. Err. Z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
age *** -.0257 .0029 -8.77 0.000 -.03150 -.0200 
gender ** -.2871 .0920 -3.12 0.002 -.4673 -.1069 
price -.0026 .0018 -1.45 0.146 -.0060 .0009 
region1 .0638 .0439 1.45 0.146 -.0222 .1498 
region2 ** -.1307 .0433 -3.02 0.003 -.2154 -.0459 
region3 * -.0942 .0436 -2.16 0.031 -.1795 -.0088 
region4 .0087 .0460 0.19 0.850 -.0815 .0989 
region5 -.0038 .0451 -0.08 0.932 -.0922 .0845 
region6 † -.0752 .0445 -1.69 0.091 -.1624 .0120 
region7 ** -.1217 .0444 -2.74 0.006 -.2086 -.0347 
region8 .0209 .04480 0.47 0.640 -.0669 .1087 
region9 .0582 .0494 1.18 0.238 -.0385 .1550 
age×price *** .0008 .0001 15.17 0.000 .0007 .0009 
gender×price *** .0102 .0017 6.03 0.000 .0069 .0135 
sunday *** .1317 .0287 4.58 0.000 .0754 .1880 
quarter1 *** -.2179 .0260 -8.37 0.000 -.2689 -.1669 
quarter2 *** -.2735 .0257 -10.66 0.000 -.3238 -.2232 
quarter4 *** -.6381 .0351 -18.19 0.000 -.7069 -.5694 
year2003 *** .2563 .0468 5.47 0.000 .1644 .3481 
year2004 *** -.7180 .0601 -11.94 0.000 -.8358 -.6002 
year2005 *** -.2858 .0571 -5.00 0.000 -.3977 -.1738 
year2006 *** -.3186 .0609 -5.24 0.000 -.4379 -.1994 
year2007 -.0935 .0622 -1.50 0.133 -.2153 .0283 
_cons -2.0879 .1112 -18.78 0.000 -2.3058 -1.870 
 
Number of obs   =      92030 
 
LR chi2(24)     =    7249.41 
 
Pseudo R2       =     0.2857 
   
Test Data Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
score *** 7.3023 .1646 44.37 0.000 6.9797 7.6248 
_cons -3.0205 .0409 -73.82 0.000 -3.1007 -2.9403 
 
Number of obs   =    23013 
 
LR chi2(24)     =    2134.47 
 
Pseudo R2       =     0.2008 
*** p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. All region x price dummies are included in the regression, 
yet not shown for table readability, as result are inconclusive. 
Table 4. BC25: Logistic Regression 
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Train Data Coefficient Std. Err. Z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
age *** .0163 .0014 11.77 0.000 .0136 .0190 
gender * -.1161 .0575 -2.02 0.044 -.2289 -.0033 
price * .0011 .0005 2.17 0.030 .0001 .0022 
region1 *** -.2621 .0348 -7.54 0.000 -.3302 -.1940 
region2 *** -.1963 .0336 -5.85 0.000 -.2621 -.1306 
region3 *** -.1769 .0318 -5.56 0.000 -.2393 -.1145 
region4 ** -.1078 .0347 -3.11 0.002 -.1758 -.0398 
region5 *** -.1266 .0337 -3.75 0.000 -.1928 -.0605 
region6 *** -.3402 .0341 -9.97 0.000 -.4071 -.2734 
region7 ** -.1094 .0325 -3.37 0.001 -.1730 -.0458 
region8 ** .0903 .0322 2.80 0.005 .0272 .1534 
region9 -.0211 .0355 -0.60 0.551 -.0907 .0484 
age×price *** .0001 .0000 3.37 0.001 .0000 .0001 
gender×price * .0006 .0003 2.08 0.037 .0000 .0012 
sunday ** .0574 .0207 2.77 0.006 .0168 .0981 
quarter1 ** -.0611 .0222 -2.75 0.006 -.1047 -.0176 
quarter2 *** -.6513 .0272 23.96 0.000 -.7045 -.5980 
quarter4 *** .8992 .0191 47.14 0.000 .8618 .9366 
year2003 *** -2.8105 .0419 -67.04 0.000 -2.8926 -2.7283 
year2004 *** -1.6721 .0390 -42.82 0.000 -1.7486 1.5956 
year2005 *** -1.3664 .0408 -33.52 0.000 -1.4463 -1.2866 
year2006 *** 1.0289 .0410 -25.09 0.000 -1.1093 -.9486 
year2007 *** -.6062 .0412 -14.70 0.000 -.6870 -.5253 
_cons -.4892 .0794 -6.16 0.000 -.6447 -.3337 
 
Number of obs   =    111888 
 
LR chi2(24)     =    14632.80 
 
Pseudo R2       =     0.2901 
   
Test Data Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
score *** 4.824572 .0872426 55.30 0.000 4.65358 4.995565 
_cons -2.39754 .0315536 -75.98 0.000 -2.459384 -2.335696 
 
Number of obs   =    27972 
 
LR chi2(24)     =    3481.59 
 
Pseudo R2       =     0.1937 
*** p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. All region x price dummies are included in the regression, 
yet not shown for table readability, as result are inconclusive. 
Table 5. BC50: Logistic Regression 
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Segments Subseg-
ments 
Linkages 
between 
PoS and 
Optimal 
Usage 
Percentage 
P(opt=1| 
PoS=1) in % 
Percentage 
P(opt=1| 
PoS=0) in % 
Advantage* 
(customer 
perspective) 
Linkages 
between 
PoS and 
Suboptimal 
Usage 
Advantage
#
 
(customer 
perspective) 
Linkages 
between 
PoS and 
Over-
Usage 
Advantage
+
 
(customer 
perspective) 
Linkages 
between 
PoS and 
Cancella-
tion 
Advantage
~
 
(firm per-
spective) 
BC25 (all) -   25.78 23.96 Internet   Internet X -   Internet 
Youngsters -   32.97 27.82 Internet   Internet   Counter   Internet 
Youngsters Female X 30.10 26.88 -   Internet   Counter   Internet 
Youngsters Male   36.01 29.07 Internet   Internet   Counter   Internet 
Middle Agers -   33.28 28.24 Internet   Internet   Counter X - 
Middle Agers Female   35.20 27.46 Internet   Internet   Counter X - 
Middle Agers Male X 31.75 29.18 -   Internet   Counter X - 
Seniors -   21.29 18.27 Internet X -   Internet X - 
Seniors Female X 18.68 16.10 - X -   Internet X - 
Seniors Male X 24.59 22.28 - X - X - X - 
Elderlies -   7.03 4.24 Internet X -   Internet   Internet 
Elderlies Female   5.66 3.43 Internet X -   Internet   Internet 
Elderlies Male X 10.10 6.80 - X -   Internet X - 
* Comparison of conditional probabilities: P(opt=1| PoS=0) vs. P(opt=1| PoS=1)  criterion: “>” 
# Comparison of conditional probabilities: P(suboptimal=1| PoS=0) vs. P(suboptimal=1| PoS=1)  criterion: “<” 
+ Comparison of conditional probabilities: P(beyond optimal=1| PoS=0) vs. P(beyond optimal=1| PoS=1)  criterion: “<” 
~ Comparison of conditional probabilities: P(cancellation=1| PoS=0) vs. P(cancellation=1| PoS=1)  criterion: “<”. 
Table 6. BC25: Results of the Chi2-Tests 
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* Comparison of conditional probabilities: P(opt=1| PoS=0) vs. P(opt=1| PoS=1)  criterion: “>” 
# Comparison of conditional probabilities: P(suboptimal=1| PoS=0) vs. P(suboptimal=1| PoS=1)  criterion: “<” 
+ Comparison of conditional probabilities: P(beyond optimal=1| PoS=0) vs. P(beyond optimal=1| PoS=1)  criterion: “<” 
~ Comparison of conditional probabilities: P(cancellation=1| PoS=0) vs. P(cancellation=1| PoS=1)  criterion: “<”. 
Table 7. BC50: Results of the Chi2-Tests
Segments Subseg-
ments 
Linkages 
between 
PoS and 
Optimal 
Usage 
Percentage 
P(opt=1| 
PoS=1) in % 
Percentage 
P(opt=1| 
PoS=0) in % 
Advantage* 
(customer 
perspective) 
Linkages 
between 
PoS and 
Suboptimal 
Usage 
Advantage
#
 
(customer 
perspective) 
Linkages 
between 
PoS and 
Over-
Usage 
Advantage
+
 
(customer 
perspective) 
Linkages 
between 
PoS and 
Cancella-
tion 
Advantage
~
 
(firm per-
spective) 
BC50 (all) -   47.13 41.48 Internet   Internet   Counter   Internet 
Youngsters -   51.04 47.36 Internet   Internet   Counter X - 
Youngsters Female   52.23 46.58 Internet   Internet   Counter X - 
Youngsters Male X 49.54 48.29 - X -   Counter X - 
Middle Agers -   46.42 37.93 Internet   Internet X -   Internet 
Middle Agers Female   47.70 35.29 Internet   Internet X -   Internet 
Middle Agers Male   45.53 39.89 Internet   Internet X -   Internet 
Seniors -   44.06 35.04 Internet   Internet X -   Internet 
Seniors Female   45.06 32.47 Internet   Internet X -   Internet 
Seniors Male   42.66 38.78 Internet   Internet X - X - 
Elderlies -   39.78 24.96 Internet   Internet X -   Internet 
Elderlies Female   37.97 21.88 Internet X -   Internet   Internet 
Elderlies Male   44.44 31.99 Internet   Internet X -   Internet 
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Year 
Average 
Price Share opt 
Share 
non_opt 
Share 
cancel 
Share 
opt: m 
Share 
opt: f 
Share 
cancel: m 
Share 
cancel: f 
   
 
 
    
2002 48.8128 0.2470 0.7530 0.1737 .2844 .2180 .1794 .1695 
2003 50.6934 0.2326 0.7674 0.1678 .2731 .2047 .1672 .1677 
2004 44.1237 0.2064 0.7936 0.1763 .2275 .1915 .1711 .1800 
2005 46.8820 0.2120 0.7880 0.1359 .2244 .2034 .1281 .1416 
2006 46.5155 0.2712 0.7288 0.1757 .2815 .2641 .1673 .1816 
2007 45.4857 0.2840 0.7160 0.1862 .3041 .2739 .1701 .2005 
*2008 48.7840 0.3469 0.6531 - .3534 .3442 - - 
*Note: Cancellation activity for 2008 is not studied as data are left-censored (i.e. cancellation activity cannot be observed 
for the entire year 2008). Results on decision quality are based on an extrapolation of behavior observed until July 2008. 
Table 8. BC25: Learning Effects and Cancellation Activity 
 
     
 
PoS=0 
    
 
Year Average Price Share opt Share non_opt Share cancel 
      
 
2002 58.3582 0.2537 0.7463 0.1740 
 
2003 56.8910 0.2214 0.7786 0.1760 
 
2004 46.7273 0.2582 0.7418 0.1759 
 
2005 47.9430 0.2927 0.7073 0.1375 
 
2006 48.1253 0.3212 0.6788 0.1821 
 
2007 40.6609 0.3438 0.6562 0.1919 
 
*2008 44.6161 0.3116 0.6884 - 
 PoS=1     
 Year Average Price Share opt Share non_opt Share cancel 
      
 2002 47.6717 0.2462 0.7538 0.1716 
 2003 49.2262 0.2352 0.7648 0.1335 
 2004 43.9163 0.2023 0.7977 0.1818 
 2005 46.7656 0.2031 0.7969 0.1218 
 2006 46.3147 0.2649 0.7351 0.1241 
 2007 46.3397 0.2735 0.7265 0.1452 
 2008 49.8328 0.3542 0.6458 - 
*Note: Cancellation activity for 2008 is not studied as data are left-censored (i.e. cancellation 
activity cannot be observed for the entire year 2008). Results on decision quality are based on 
an extrapolation of behavior observed until July 2008. 
Table 9. BC25: Learning Effects and Loyalty related to Point of Sale 
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Year 
Average 
Price Share opt 
Share 
non_opt 
Share 
cancel 
Share 
opt: m 
Share 
opt: f 
Share 
cancel: m 
Share 
cancel: f 
    
     
*2002 - - - - - - - - 
2003 130.7686 0.3527 0.6473 .1222 .3867 .3285 .1252 .1199 
2004 131.8937 0.3727 0.6273 .1856 .4045 .3479 .1900 .1821 
2005 132.3499 0.4399 0.5601 .1659 .4459 .4350 .1689 .1634 
2006 136.2422 0.4650 0.5350 .1905 .4624 .4672 .1871 .1934 
2007 139.1215 0.5300 0.4700 .1141 .5294 .5314 .1165 .1118 
2008 153.4854 0.5666 0.4334 - .5719 .5626 - - 
*Note: BC50 was (re)introduced later than BC25 in winter 2002/2003, there is no data for 2002. Cancellation activity for 
2008 is not studied as data are left-censored (i.e. cancellation activity cannot be observed for the entire year 2008). Results 
on decision quality are based on an extrapolation of behavior observed until July 2008. 
Table 10. BC50: Learning Effects and Cancellation Activity 
 
      
 
PoS=0 
    
 
 
Year Average Price Share opt Share non_opt Share cancel 
      
 
*2002 - - - - 
 
2003 141.5240 0.3026 0.6974 0.1240 
 
2004 133.2632 0.4051 0.5949 0.1964 
 
2005 133.3612 0.4738 0.5262 0.1760 
 
2006 137.7170 0.4973 0.5027 0.1981 
 
2007 137.5623 0.5392 0.4608 0.1303 
 
2008 149.1508 0.5359 0.4641 - 
 PoS=1     
 Year Average Price Share opt Share non_opt Share cancel 
      
 *2002 - - - - 
 2003 128.8874 0.3614 0.6386 0.1115 
 2004 131.3194 0.3591 0.6409 0.1597 
 2005 131.7227 0.4188 0.5812 0.1496 
 2006 135.1059 0.4401 0.5599 0.1807 
 2007 140.5441 0.5215 0.4785 0.0963 
 2008 157.8226 0.5938 0.4062 - 
*BC50 was (re)introduced later than BC25 in winter 2002/2003, there is no data for 2002. 
Cancellation activity for 2008 is not studied as data are left-censored (i.e. cancellation 
activity cannot be observed for the entire year 2008). Results on decision quality are 
based on an extrapolation of behavior observed until July 2008. 
Table 11. BC50: Learning Effects and Loyalty related to Point of Sale 
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7. Discussion 
The question of how customers’ characteristics drive the use of online purchasing versus the use 
of traditional channels, and how different channels are related to consumer behavior and loyalty, 
remains surprisingly unanswered to date (Brown and Dant 2009; Hitt and Frei 2002; Homburg, 
Hoyer, and Fassnacht 2002; Reinartz, Krafft, and Hoyer 2004; Wallace, Giese, and Johnson 
2004). Here, we shed light on these issues and add new insights to the literature investigating 
multichannel distribution. Our results provide for a better understanding of the linkages between 
customer heterogeneity, decision quality and loyalty behavior, which is important for retailers 
that combine distribution channels, and for allocating resources effectively across and within 
channels. A more detailed grasp of this context is also essential when discussing the effective-
ness of loyalty-creating approaches, and if proposing business strategies matched to future mar-
ket development. 
First, results from our descriptive analyses show that various consumer-inherent and contingent 
factors affect PoS choice. Demographic factors like age and gender influence PoS preferences, 
as does the pricing context. Interestingly, higher customer age is positively related to Internet 
purchasing in high-price contexts, whereas it is negatively related to Internet purchasing in low-
price contexts. Interaction effects demonstrate that across pricing contexts, the preference for 
Internet purchasing increases (or the preference for counter purchases decreases) with customer 
age and across genders if the initial price for acquiring a loyalty card is comparably high. 
Second, taking a consumer perspective, we can establish that consumers’ purchase decision 
quality is in fact dependent on the chosen PoS. Overall, customers tend to make better decisions 
if choosing Internet transactions (in terms of the conditional probabilities P(optimal = 1| PoS = 
0) and P(optimal = 1| PoS = 1). Customers who tend to overestimate their subsequent use of 
their loyalty card are also generally better off in choosing the Internet channel (conditional 
probabilities P(suboptimal = 1| PoS = 0) and P(suboptimal = 1| PoS = 1)). Younger and medi-
um-aged customers who tend to underestimate their card usage are better off in visiting a coun-
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ter for deciding on transactions, yet older consumers who underestimate card usage tend to dis-
play higher decision quality in Internet channels (conditional probabilities P(beyond optimal = 
1| PoS = 0) and P(beyond optimal = 1| PoS = 1)). Additionally, decision quality largely varies 
across pricing contexts, with significantly better decisions being made in high-price settings, 
and across customer segments, where higher age is strongly associated with substantially lower 
decision quality. Moreover, decision quality of male consumers is generally higher across pric-
ing contexts and across PoS choices, but women achieve better results in high-price Internet 
purchases. However, learning effects over time are considerable, although their strength differs 
across low- and high-price contexts as well as across customer segments and PoS. In high-price 
contexts, both genders experience similar learning effects over time, in low-price contexts, 
learning accelerates for male customers rather than females. Collective learning rates are higher 
in Internet purchasing. 
Third, assuming a company perspective, we study whether customer loyalty depends on PoS 
choice. Our results highlight that overall, Internet customers are more loyal than counter cus-
tomers. Loyalty is higher in high price contexts, marginally higher if customers are male, and 
intuitively, is higher if decision quality has proven perfect. Table 12 summarizes the central 
findings. 
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Table 12. Summary of Results 
Perspective Focus   Hypothesis Result Summary of Central Findings 
Descriptive: PoS Choice 
H1 Consumer-inherent as well as contingent factors determine 
customers’ point of sale choice.  
Customer heterogeneity affects outcomes of retail strategies that combine 
distribution channels, and is important for allocating resources effectively 
across/within channels. 
 H1a Customers’ point of sale choice varies with age. 
 
Contrary to what previous studies would predict, higher age can in fact 
concur with preferences for using online instead of traditional channels. 
 H1b Customers’ point of sale choice varies across genders.  Female customers prefer traditional channels. 
 H1c Customers’ point of sale choice varies across regions. 
 
Regional aspects drive PoS choice, eventually due to differences in socio-
economic patterns and available infrastructure. 
H1d Customers’ point of sale choice varies across high- and 
low-price contexts. 
Partly Con-
firmed 
Internet purchase is generally preferred in high-price contexts, PoS choice 
can vary otherwise. 
H1e The effect of pricing contexts on customers’ point of 
sale choice varies with age, gender, and across geo-
graphical regions. 
 
 
Higher prices increase tendencies for purchasing online particularly among 
older customers, and decrease counter preferences in female customers. 
(Effects depend on regional aspects as well.) 
Consumer:  
Purchase 
Decision 
Quality 
H2 The quality of consumers’ purchase decisions does not depend 
on online versus offline point of sale choice. 
Rejected 
Despite opportunities for acquiring information relevant for purchase 
decisions at either PoS, decision quality is much higher in online channels. 
 H2a Purchase decision quality varies across low- and high-
price contexts. 
 
Decision quality is much higher in high-price contexts. 
 H2b Purchase decision quality varies across customer seg-
ments.  
Decision quality decreases with age.  
Decision quality of male customers is usually higher. (Female customers 
make better decisions only in high-price online settings.) 
 H2c Purchase decision quality increases over time.  As time passes, customers experience collective learning effects. 
 H2d The increase in purchase decision quality varies across 
low- and high-price contexts and across customer seg-
ments, but not across points of sale. 
Partly Con-
firmed 
Learning accelerates in high price contexts.  
Male customers learn slightly faster. 
Customers choosing online channels tend to learn faster. 
Firm: 
Customer 
Loyalty 
H3 Customer loyalty depends on online versus offline point of 
sale choice. 
 
Contrary to what previous studies would predict, customer loyalty is high-
er in online channels compared with traditional channels. 
 H3a Customer loyalty varies across low- and high-price 
contexts. 
 
Loyalty is higher in high-price contexts. 
 H3b Customer loyalty varies across customer segments. Partly Con-
firmed 
Male customers are marginally more loyal than female customers. 
 H3c Customer loyalty varies with purchase decision quality.  Loyalty increases with decision quality. 
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7.1 Theoretical Implications 
Grewal and Levy (2009) argue that four topics will provide the greatest future contribution to 
retailing literature: the growth of the Internet and e-commerce, customer loyalty, service success 
strategies, and behavioral issues in pricing and patronage. By integrating these topics and study-
ing their overlap, we strive to provide some insights to multichannel research. Some of our find-
ings are contrary to what previous studies would predict. 
First, few studies have explicitly focused on how customer heterogeneity is related to online 
versus offline distribution (Hitt and Frei 2002; Tsai and Lee 2009; Varian and Shapiro 1998). 
We show how customer heterogeneity is related to either PoS and to subsequent purchase be-
havior. Second, although customer satisfaction with purchase decisions is extensively studied, 
decision quality is not, although it would complement satisfaction research by providing an 
objective and less volatile assessment of purchase advantageousness. Two-part pricing contracts 
offer a prime opportunity for such objective assessments. We study under what conditions cus-
tomers tend to make better buying decisions and offer some insights into the potential scope and 
the benefits of learning effects. Third, whereas previous studies have often focused on service 
experiences or (dis)satisfaction as driving outcomes in loyalty programs, we broaden the picture 
by highlighting linkages between consumer-inherent and contingent factors, decision quality, 
and PoS choice. Besides, to date, few studies investigate determinants of consumer responsive-
ness towards such programs, particularly, using large-scale datasets (Bolton, Kannan, and 
Bramlett 2000; Keh and Lee 2006; Kivetz and Simonson 2003). There is also a lack of research 
into two-part pricing systems, although such schemes are increasingly used and are particularly 
intended to create loyalty.  
7.2 Methodological Implications 
First, we advance the external validity of previous studies on multichannel distribution and loy-
alty programs by testing our hypotheses based on an extensive, proprietary, longitudinal dataset 
from one of the largest German loyalty programs. Thereby, we can offer robust insights into the 
directions and magnitudes of the effects under study. Second, since we examined an entire pop-
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ulation of travel service customers in the biggest European economy, we suggest that findings 
may be transferable to similar economic settings: Extending the focus beyond the current study 
context, results may help forecast customer behavior towards multichannel strategies for suppli-
ers of comparable services where consumers find it hard to quantify their future demand accu-
rately (e.g., financial/insurance/legal services, education services, club memberships, car-
sharing contracts), and may offer guidance for firms applying two-part pricing schemes in gen-
eral (e.g., concerning customer segmentation, channel responsiveness, decision quality and 
learning). Findings (e.g., demographic effects) may also apply to similar travel services contexts 
where both online and offline distribution are the norm (e.g., travel agents, hotels, rental cars).  
7.3 Managerial Implications 
The coordination of online and offline channels is of particularly compelling interest to both 
researchers and practitioners. First, identifying the selection criteria of Internet vis-à-vis counter 
purchase environments should help retailers design more effective strategies for customer ac-
quisition and customer retention, which is obviously strongly linked to profitability. Acquisition 
strategies in both channels are clearly more efficient if tailored to those customer segments that 
actually prefer the respective channel. For example, in high-price contexts older consumers 
prefer online purchases, which may be counterintuitive but next implies that resources invested 
at offline PoS into trying attract seniors to the offering could make more impact elsewhere. Sec-
ond, given that both Internet usage and population age are on the increase, the effect of pricing 
contexts on PoS choice indicates a decreasing importance of traditional channels for high-price 
offerings. This has implications for reorganizing and balancing the company mix of online ver-
sus offline purchase opportunities, particularly when introducing more expensive pricing 
schemes or additional quality services.  
Third, our results inform e-commerce strategy by establishing how the behavior of customers 
subsequent to PoS choice differs across the two most important channels. Our results affirm 
significant differences in terms of the initial quality of purchase decisions reached, of learning 
effects realized, as well as of loyalty displayed. Concerning decision quality, although the Inter-
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net is recognized as an ineffective means for communicating reliable and informative cues in 
various contexts (Berthon et al. 1999; Laroche et al. 2005), the results indicate that using online 
channels does not necessarily make the purchase of travel services, or of two-part pricing con-
tracts, any more difficult to evaluate for consumers. In fact, most customers are better off if 
engaging in Internet instead of counter purchasing. We provide a detailed record under what 
conditions which customer segments tend to make better purchase decisions. On the one hand, 
the analyses offer insights into the potential benefits consumers could generate by critical re-
evaluations of their individual purchase behavior and by striving for learning effects. Yet, deci-
sion quality is essential to both parties to the contract, i.e., consumers and retailers. As the anal-
yses show, the precision of customers’ demand forecasts and the resulting purchase decisions 
are quite often ‘off the mark’. On a first impulse, this ‘overconfidence’ of consumers in estimat-
ing their future needs may create an incentive for firms, monopolists and competitive firms 
alike, to offer tariffs that make use of this inability (Grubb 2009). However, firms may also 
benefit from enabling consumers to make better forecasts (e.g., due to better information provi-
sion by the retailer or opportunities to downgrade at regular intervals) in the long run, as the 
results suggest that customers reaching high decision quality are much more loyal to the firm.  
Fourth, as still many programs do not produce the outcomes desired by the firm and as manag-
ers and academics become increasingly interested in the ‘true’ value of customer loyalty pro-
grams (Ellinger, Daugherty, and Gustin 1997; Ellinger, Daugherty, and Plair 1999; Ramanathan 
2010; Steven 2012), we can offer some insights into customer responsiveness based on custom-
er segments, pricing contexts and decision quality. Consequently, optimizing communication 
efforts directed at consumers may be an effective means across channels to induce learning ef-
fects and thereby, increase customer loyalty. For example, in online settings, it might be profit-
able to offer customer testimonials to help develop a better understanding of the offering 
(Weathers, Sharma, and Wood 2007; Wind and Rangaswamy 2001), to personalize sites accord-
ing to customer segments and information needs, as well as to increase social interaction fea-
tures that promote social learning among customers and bind them to the firm. Based on the 
detailed documentation of linkages between consumer characteristics, PoS preferences, pur-
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chase decision quality, and customer loyalty, our results would help retail firms assess the po-
tential effects of promoting, re-developing, and fine-tuning their two-part pricing schemes on 
consumers’ subsequent purchase behavior, both initially and over extended periods. 
7.4 Limitations and Further Research 
The availability of electronic data sets that contain information about linkages between people 
and product or service sales provides researchers with an unprecedented microscopic view into 
the interdependencies and contingencies affecting consumers’ buying decisions (Oestreicher-
Singer and Sundararajan 2010). As limitations to this research, we could not study decision 
processes in detail. Apart from analyzing complementarities between, or the relative importance 
of, a combination of our demographic and other socio-economic variables (e.g., household 
wealth) and consumer traits (e.g., susceptibility to social influence, environmental conscious-
ness) during the evolution of purchase processes, further research could also focus on effects of 
the evolution of firms’ online and offline marketing practices and consumers’ choices. Second, 
we recognize that customers are to some extent intrinsically different in the predisposition to 
being loyal, as perceptions of costs and benefits vary among customers (Baltas, Argouslidis, and 
Skarmeas 2010). Future research could also study approaches that are specifically suited to 
counter disloyalty in online and in offline channels. Besides, our research is situated in the con-
text of travel services; other relevant settings can yield additional insights into aspects driving 
channel preferences, learning and customer loyalty (Brown and Dant 2011). An integrated anal-
ysis of such complex patterns of purchase behavior may warrant a combination of large-scale 
observational and survey data to offer greater detail on driving forces of what appears to be 
identical behavior. 
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II. COMPETING RISKS FOR TRAIN TICKETS – AN EMPIRICAL 
INVESTIGATION OF CUSTOMER BEHAVIOR AND PERFORMANCE IN THE 
RAILWAY INDUSTRY 
 
“Not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything 
that can be counted counts.” 
Albert Einstein (1879-1955) 
1. Abstract 
Based on a comprehensive data set of German railway customers we analyze consumers’ choic-
es and particularly subsequent changes of two-part pricing contracts (loyalty cards). In a com-
peting risks framework, we simultaneously estimate effects on three types of contractual events: 
cancellations, upgrades, and downgrades. Focusing on customer relationship management 
(CRM) practices, we find several factors affecting these events, some of which railway compa-
nies can influence to their advantage. Intuitively, installing auto-renewal procedures for loyalty 
cards decreases cancellation hazards. However, automated electronic mailings (e.g., reminders 
and account statements) and advertising (e.g., ticket offers) can be counterproductive and in-
crease the risk of cancellation. 
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2. Introduction 
Rail transportation has been the subject of increasing research in recent years because of its far-
reaching economic, social, and environmental impacts at multiple societal levels. Numerous 
methodological and empirical studies have profoundly elaborated ways of handling railway 
timetabling, modeling and optimization of operations, as well as capacity and pricing issues 
(e.g., Abril et al. 2008; Batley, Dargay, and Wardma 2011; Corman et al. 2010, 2012; Hansen 
2007; Lin et al. 2012). Another stream of research has focused on consumers’ selection criteria 
and usage preferences for railway travel or other means of transport (e.g., Bhat and Sardesai 
2006; Hess, Adler, and Polak 2007; Keumi and Murakami 2012). 
However, in environments like the transportation and logistics sectors marked by increasing 
competition, researchers and practitioners alike have emphasized a growing need for customer 
orientation and relationship management (Ganesan et al. 2009). Reinartz, Krafft, and Hoyer 
(2004) define CRM at the customer-facing level as a systematic process to manage customer 
relationship initiation, maintenance, and termination across all customer contact points to max-
imize the value of the relationship portfolio. Boulding et al. (2005) explain that CRM relates to 
firm strategy and centers on the development of appropriate (long-term) relationships with spe-
cific customers or customer groups, the acquisition of customer knowledge, and the intelligent 
use of data and technology, to enhance customer loyalty and organizational performance. 
Accordingly, interest in CRM practices in the transportation sector has grown considerably in 
recent years (see Daugherty et al. 2009; Ellinger, Daugherty, and Plair 1999; Grawe, Daugherty, 
and Dant 2012; Ramanathan 2010; Steven, Dong, and Dresdner 2012). However, research in the 
context of two-part pricing schemes is scarce. In addition, previous studies often neglect settings 
where travel decisions are not only based on consumers’ current preferences, but are also influ-
enced by previous contractual choices. As a consequence, a comprehensive approach towards 
understanding customers’ travel behavior, and particularly, the determinants of their contractual 
choices and changes therein and how such decisions can be influenced effectively, is lacking in 
the literature on (rail) transportation settings. 
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In various international markets for rail transport, and particularly in the German market, severe 
oil price increases and growing environmental consciousness have helped public transit and rail 
transport to achieve substantial and profitable growth over the last decade. In 2011, the light rail 
traffic and the heavy rail sector served more than 2.5 billion railway travelers, most of them 
traveling by the major German railway company Deutsche Bahn AG (DB) (Statista 2011, p. 16). 
DB offers passengers the option of purchasing in advance various loyalty cards that act to dis-
count ticket prices for 12 months from the date of issue. These contractual devices are common-
ly-known as BahnCards and are widely-used in German railway transportation. 
Schmale, Ehrmann and Dilger (2013) have studied the travel behavior of German BahnCard 
customers and found that a disproportionately high proportion of customers fall victim to the 
‘flat rate bias’ and underuse their BahnCards. Accordingly, based on the premise that customers 
strive to choose more suitable BahnCard contracts as time passes, in this study, we focus on 
analyzing the determinants (e.g., customer demographics, usage behavior, pricing, loyalty pro-
grams) of consumers’ choices of BahnCard contracts as well as changes to these contractual 
choices over time. We collated comprehensive travel history data spanning a timeframe of al-
most six years and applied a non-generic competing risks framework. Using a semi-parametric 
proportional hazards model stratified by failure type, we simultaneously estimated effects on 
three types of contractual events: cancellation, upgrade, and downgrade of a BahnCard. In addi-
tion to identifying reasons for terminating a BahnCard or substituting a different one (which 
translates into an upgrade or a downgrade scenario), we were also able to quantify the magni-
tude of effects. We studied these issues based on a large-scale, longitudinal data set comprised 
of more than four million individual transactions. Accordingly, we find several factors affecting 
contract choices, some of which railway companies can influence to their advantage. Our study 
contributes to the literature by offering both theoretical and practical implications. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe the characteristics of the loyalty 
cards studied (here: BahnCards), and describe our data. The third section explains the method-
ology. We briefly introduce the concept of survival analysis, describe approaches towards com-
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peting risks and apply a specific method developed for the context at hand. We then report our 
main results; the last section offers a discussion and conclusions. 
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3. Characteristics of Loyalty Cards and the Study Data 
Our analysis is based on proprietary customer data provided by DB. The data contain compre-
hensive information on customers’ demographic characteristics, BahnCard contract choices, 
individual transaction data in the form of ticket purchase behavior over time, and fine-grained 
information on DB’s CRM practices within its loyalty cards program. Based on these data we 
study the determining factors for consumers’ choices of BahnCard contracts. The sample period 
is December 2002 through July 2008. 
3.1 Contractual Options 
DB customers can basically choose between three contracts: the BahnCard25 (BC25), the 
BahnCard50 (BC50) and the BahnCard100 (BC100). Each contract is available for first and 
second class travel. The number of the BahnCard contract type signifies the discount it affords 
on the regular ticket price for a 12 month period from the date of issue. Thus a BC25 gives a 
25% discount, a BC50 means a 50% discount and a BC100 means a 100% reduction on stand-
ard domestic fares for a year. Currently, standard second class BahnCard contracts cost EUR 57 
for the BC25, EUR 230 for the BC50 and EUR 3800 for the BC100. First class variants cost 
EUR 114 for the BC25, EUR 460 for the BC50 and EUR 6400 for the BC100. In addition to 
standard contracts, there are some exceptional price offers made in promotions and concessions 
for family members, students and senior citizens. 
If they are not cancelled six weeks before the end date, BC25 and BC50 contracts are automati-
cally renewed. The contract period for a BC100 is not renewed automatically. For BC25 and 
BC50 customers, it is always possible to upgrade within the contract period. Then, the residual 
value of the previous card is refunded. Customers may not downgrade contracts during their 
operative period. 
3.2 Sample Construction and Key Variables 
The data were drawn from the members of DB’s customer loyalty programs “bahn.bonus” and 
“bahn.comfort” and include more than four million transactions conducted with any of the 
800,000 BahnCards in the sample. Our data encompass the entire travel history of over 300,000 
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customers. Some adjustments were made to enhance reliability of the database.
 
First, we ex-
cluded all loyalty program members whose overall lifetime sales did not exceed zero. Then, we 
dropped customers with inconsistent or not clearly assignable contracts (resulting from e.g., 
goodwill cancellations or registration errors). In addition, we concentrated on second class 
BahnCards to ensure contracts were comparable. Our final dataset features 200,851 BahnCards 
bought by 72,909 customers, with corresponding in-depth information on every single transac-
tion conducted by those customers over time, including purchase dates, prices paid, reductions 
obtained, travel departure and destination, and number of passengers traveling. We focus on the 
history of BC25 and BC50 customers. (As BC100 users do not purchase any tickets due to their 
flat rate travel advantage, their travel behavior cannot be monitored). Our data also provides 
information about changes to different contracts, that is, an upgrade from a BC25 or from a 
BC50 to a ‘higher’ card, as well as downgrades following the expiry of a contract. We focus on 
the following variables: 
begin and end (shows the validity period of each BahnCard), cause (represents the contract ter-
mination options, numbered 1 to 3; for BC25 customers: cancellation=1, upgrade to BC50=2, 
upgrade to BC100=3; for BC50 customers: cancellation=1, downgrade to BC25=2, upgrade to 
BC100=3), sex (female=0, male=1), age (measured in years, recorded at the time of purchase 
for each BahnCard), auto-renewal (defines the automatic renewal; default=1, if not terminated 
before the end of the cancellation period), travel insurance (indicates whether an insurance op-
tion has been used: no=0, yes=1), email-flag (marks a customer’s agreement to receive automat-
ed electronic customer mailings: no=0, yes=1), advertising ban (stops any kind of (electronic) 
promotional mailings: no=0, yes=1), comfort score (displays the historic record of points in the 
bahn.comfort program that had already been collected by a customer at the start of the data col-
lection period. “bahn.comfort” rewards customers who spend a certain sum on premium tickets 
with points that can then be spent on different products or services in return, e.g. other train 
tickets, first class upgrades or car rentals), bonus score (displays the score of points in the 
bahn.bonus program at the start of the data collection period. The bahn.bonus program awards 
points to customers based on the value of their ticket purchases; every euro spent on tickets 
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yields one point in this program), bonus account (the overall bonus account in the correspond-
ing customer lifecycle), points redeemed (the score of points previously exchanged for travel 
premiums), higher status (higher customer status in the bahn.bonus program: no=0, yes=1), 
point of purchase (purchase from a sales counter=0, purchase on the Internet=1), BC price 
(price of the particular BahnCard), main card (specifies whether the current BahnCard is a sole 
card or part of a group contract, e.g. for family members: no=0, yes=1), business customer (vs. 
private usage: no=0, yes=1); quarter1, …, quarter4 (aggregated ticket fees per quarter, respec-
tively); number of budget prices (number of tickets bought as special offers), suboptimal and 
beyond optimal (indicates the optimality of usage: no=0, yes=1; see the Appendix A for a de-
tailed explanation of the parameters suboptimal and beyond optimal.), comfort status (specifies 
whether the BahnCard has comfort status concerning the bahn.comfort program: no=0, yes=1), 
number of trips (counts the quantity of tickets bought with each BahnCard) and finally, the 
number of tickets bought via five possible channels represented by: # ticket machine, # ticket 
counter, # ticket internet, # ticket train conductor, # ticket call center (indicating the number 
and source of the tickets bought by BahnCard). 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
In the sample, 44.8% of contracts with transactional data are BC25 contracts, 55.2% are BC50 
contracts. Table 14 shows the descriptive statistics. On average, BC25 customers paid an initial 
fee of EUR 46.90, and BC50 customers paid EUR 137.81. The average BahnCard user spends 
the most on tickets in the first quarter of the validity period, whereas this amount continuously 
decreases in the following quarters for both regimes, BC25 and BC50. On average, total in-
vestments in tickets per BahnCard add up to EUR 99.61 for BC25 customers and EUR 221.38 
for BC50 customers. Note that this usage behavior is beyond any rational optimality boundaries 
which should be a central driver of selecting a particular BahnCard (see also, Schmale, Ehr-
mann, and Dilger 2013; for a similar ‘flat rate bias’ concerning sports club memberships, see 
Della Vigna and Malmendier 2004, 2006). 
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The average BC25 customer buys 2.14 tickets per BahnCard, mostly from the counter, whereas 
a BC50 customer purchases an average of 6.96 tickets per BahnCard predominantly from the 
counter, as well as from ticket machines. Other purchasing options (the Internet, call centers, 
train conductors) are not widely adopted. Table 13 presents additional descriptive statistics on 
the customer level and reveals that the typical BC25 customer was around 43 years old, 58% of 
customers were female, and that they held 2.45 BahnCards during the sample period. A typical 
BC50 customer held 2.42 BahnCards over the period, is almost 42 years old, and 45% of them 
were men. 
 
Customers BC25  BC50  
Number of customers 31,780  41,129  
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Number of contracts  2.450811 1.477269 2.419579 1.365894 
Sex (percentage male) 0.415739 0.4928517 0.4480613 0.4972973 
Age 43.33092 17.35089 41.61757 19.82028 
Table 13. Descriptive Statistics: Customers 
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Contracts BC25  BC50  
Number of contracts 90,071  110,780  
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Auto-renewal 0.5841725 0.4928668 0.6120238 0.4872913 
Travel insurance 0.1043399 0.3057027 0.125492 03312774 
Email-flag 0.1339047 0.3405518 0.2133924 0.4097043 
Advertising ban 0.0545402 0.2270818 0.0542036 0.2264201 
Comfort score 142.7053 259.2779 312.802 470.5833 
Bonus score 354.1909 525.4675 674.9599 868.4722 
Bonus account 186.5099 270.1563 403.6948 489.7701 
Points redeemed 7.768871 109.2736 37.42327 271.8575 
Higher status 0.0037576 0.061184 0.0206322 0.1421504 
Point of purchase 0.6797055 0.4665923 0.6373804 0.4807585 
Price (initial fee) 46.89751 16.04926 137.8064 49.40856 
Main card 0.8842136 0.3199704 0.9434104 0.2310579 
Business customer 0.0057843 0.0758349 0.0190377 0.1366582 
Total spending on tickets     
Quarter 1 31.23767 74.83283 71.6577 136.0392 
Quarter 2 26.68095 68.11442 60.65741 119.524 
Quarter 3 22.91953 63.0167 52.83188 110.8378 
Quarter 4 18.77275 60.15871 36.23423 90.6738 
Suboptimal 0.7409266 0.4381284 0.6084583 0.4880913 
Number of budget prices 0.661856 1.958315 - - 
Beyond optimal 0.0699559 0.255074 0.003367 0.0579286 
Comfort status 0.0069279 0.0829455 0.0337787 0.1806598 
Number of trips 3.669538 7.926 9.585142 17.692 
Number of tickets ordered via     
Ticket machine 0.4373328 2.520237 2.521294 7.786647 
Ticket counter 1.490891 3.543353 3.836848 8.089226 
Internet 0.0540018 0.526244 0.0198321 0.3152776 
Train conductor 0.1107349 0.7818407 0.4452248 2.21877 
Call center 0.0086709 0.1551538 0.0113739 0.2960557 
Table 14. Descriptive Statistics: Contracts 
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4. Model 
4.1 Background and Basic Hazard Model 
Survival analysis has been a vital research objective in medical studies for several decades. Its 
techniques have, however, increasingly been adopted in social studies (Blossfeld, Hamerle, and 
Mayer 1986), technological fields, and (business) economics (Fan 2009; Iliescu, Garrow, and 
Parker 2008; Jain and Vilcassim 1991; Lee and Timmermans 2007; Light and Omori 2012; 
Sarstedt et al. 2010). What are termed hazard models are employed for the investigation of time 
duration until the occurrence of a specific event (see Cox 1972). The historical background of 
implementing survival time models explains the somewhat negative connotation of the event of 
interest, usually described as failure (event) or as death. In this paper, we are interested in ana-
lyzing changes in customer relationships. The point of time when a contract with a customer 
    changes is represented by a random variable with the density function  (  ) and a corre-
sponding distribution function  (  )  For every particular time within the time interval   (sur-
vival time), the term  (     ) expresses the likelihood that there might be a change in the con-
tract, in that, an event occurs. We can redefine: 
 (     )     (        )    ∫  (       )  
  
 
 .     (1) 
Its complement is given by the survival function that is defined as the probability by which cus-
tomer   ‘survives’ time   :  (     )   (       )      (     ). Now, it is possible to 
assess the risk for the occurrence of the event of interest at any specific time    for any customer 
 . Calculating this failure rate (also called hazard rate) results in the hazard function: 
 (     )           
 (                  )
   
.      (2) 
The hazard rate represents the instantaneous change rate for a customer relationship enduring up 
to time    and provides full characterization of the distribution of   (see Collett 2003). Hazard 
rate and survivor function are closely related, described by (see Allison 1995, p. 16): 
 (     )   
 (      )
 (      )
 ( 
 (      )
    (      )
 ).       (3) 
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In this context, the cumulative hazard is a commonly used term, which is defined by: 
 ( )  ∫  ( )  
 
 
,         (4) 
and accordingly applies to 
 ( )      (  ( )).         (5) 
The constitutive elements of hazard models are formed by the baseline hazard and the covari-
ates. Semi-parametric approaches allow for the inclusion of covariates. The latter are parameter-
ized in these models, but not the baseline hazard. This is particularly relevant when the key re-
search study not only seeks to determine whether an event occurs, but also on what the occur-
rence of an event depends. A corresponding hazard regression model exhibits the form below 
(Cox 1972): 
 (    )     ( )      (  ),        (6) 
where   consists of the customer-related measurements    (         ) and   is a     
vector of unknown parameters.   ( ) describes the baseline hazard that is an unknown function 
giving the hazard function for the standard set of conditions    . If the measured covariates 
of two individuals display identical values, the hazard functions will be the same. This model 
specifies distributions for the covariates without requiring any assumptions about the time-
dependencies of the baseline hazards. It is also known as the Cox (proportional hazards) model 
(for a more detailed description, see Hosmer and Lemeshow 1999, p. 90 et seq.). The identical 
baseline hazard (for all individuals) and the time-independent covariates result in constant haz-
ard ratios between individuals. 
4.2 Competing Risks Framework 
In our case, the subjects under investigation face three different scenarios at the end of the valid-
ity period of their respective contracts. This translates into a situation where a BahnCard con-
tract is at risk of different types of mutually exclusive events (which are typically numbered 
from 1 to  ) and constitutes a context of competing risks. Figure 7 illustrates this situation for 
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BC25 and BC50. The current BahnCard represents the initial state, that is, either a BC25 or a 
BC50 contract. In the first competing risks model, the endpoints “Cancellation”, “Upgrade to 
BC50” or “Upgrade to BC100” are the three possible kinds of ‘failure’ for a BC25 customer. A 
BC50 contract is at risk of “Cancellation”, “Downgrade to BC25” as well as “Upgrade to 
BC100”, as modeled in the second competing risks framework. 
  
Figure 7. Competing Risks Framework for the Two Regimes of our Sample 
 
With each BahnCard customer   we associate a pair (   ), where   is the time-to-event (surviv-
al or failure time, as described above) and   refers to one of the kinds of failures for this cus-
tomer, that is, the ‘risk set’. The purpose of analyzing competing risks data can be interpreted to 
gain insights into the joint distribution of (   ). In our model, each customer   is assumed to 
have an event time    and a censoring time   , meaning the end of our observations of  . Only 
the minimum of these failure times       (     ) and its corresponding cause of failure are 
observed, whereas     (     ) indicates whether an event was observed at    (  =1) or not 
(  =0). For censoring caused by the end of the sample period, we assume that the censoring 
mechanism is independent of the distribution of contract changes (conditional on the covariates 
included in our model). Equally, the hazard to the customers who remain in the follow-up is 
assumed to be equal to the hazard of the censored customers (at each point in time). Given a 
certain time point, two different perspectives may be adopted when analyzing competing risks 
(Putter, Fiocco, and Geskus 2007; Vach 2005) and are explained below. 
4.3 Models on Cause-Specific Hazards 
One approach starts with the following questions: How does the risk of failure attributable to 
various causes change over time? What will happen around this particular time point when an 
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event occurs? The probability to ‘fail’ from ‘cause’   when a customer   has reached the time 
point    is in the focus of this perspective that leads to the so-called cause-specific hazard func-
tions. 
According to the conditions above, the cause-specific hazard function in the competing risk 
model is the hazard of failing from a given cause   in the presence of competing events: 
  ( )          
 (               )
  
,        .     (7) 
Allowing the baseline hazard to be different across subgroups (strata), the regression model on 
cause-specific hazards with cause   for a subject with covariates   is given by: 
  (   )       ( )    (   
   ) .        (8) 
Another perspective on cause-specific hazards considers how many customers changed their 
contract (at its end) in a specific way and what had happened up until that point in time. There-
fore, we consider the probability of failure from cause   up to this point, which is reflected in 
the (cause-specific) cumulative incidence function (CIF). For this purpose, we define the cumu-
lative cause-specific hazard by 
  ( )  ∫   ( )  
 
 
,          (9) 
and accordingly, as in the intercept, above 
  ( )      (   ( )).         (10) 
Note that this term can be interpreted as the marginal survival function, that is, the survival 
probability for the     risk, only if competing event time distributions and censoring time dis-
tribution are independent. This describes a situation where all other risks have been hypotheti-
cally removed (see Putter, Fiocco, and Geskus 2007). In addition, we propose 
 ( )      ( ∑   ( )
 
   )        (11) 
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to model the probability of not having experienced any events before time  . The CIF is then 
given by: 
  ( )    (        )   ∫   ( ) ( )
 
 
  ,        .    (12) 
The latter expression obviously indicates that the cumulative incidence of a specific cause   is a 
function of both the probability of not having experienced the event up to time  ( ( )) and the 
cause-specific hazard at this time   ( ) (see also, Kalbfleisch and Prentice 2002). 
Lunn and McNeil (1995) provide methods for a joint estimation of parameters in models for 
competing risks by fitting a Cox proportional hazard model via a duplication method. We ap-
plied their first approach (Method A) and introduced two variables: a failure type indicator 
(cause) and a status parameter which is a numeric representation of the competing risk variable 
cause, indicating whether the corresponding event occurs (status=1) or not (status=0). Any co-
variates are then replicated according to the total number   of events, whereas the time varia-
bles begin and end are identical over the   replications. In our case, the three different causes, 
or types of events, translated into a triplication of the data. Then, the hazards of all causes were 
assumed to be additive, so the total hazard equals the value of the sum of its corresponding haz-
ard functions. Thus, the hazard of failure is the sum of   component risk processes, and the 
failure time of either type is considered the minimum of these (Lunn and McNeil 1995). Apart 
from the aspect of flexibility (the stratified method permits distinct baseline hazards for each 
event type, see also, Jeong and Fine 2007), the alternative approach (Method B) by Lunn and 
McNeil (1995) requires a constant ratio of the baseline hazard functions. However, Grambsch 
and Therneau’s (1994) test of the proportional hazards assumption based on Schoenfeld residu-
als reveals that this assumption does not hold for most of the variables (of either population). 
Additionally, the global test is highly significant for both customer groups (p < 0.001). The 
same result can be traced in Figure 8, which shows plots of    (   ( ( ))) against    ( ): the 
absence of adequate parallelism between the graphical representation of the three failure types 
justifies the stratified version of the approach by Lunn and McNeil (1995) (Method B). Hence, 
we employed a semi-parametric proportional hazards model (see (9)) stratified by failure type. 
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This is done by comparing the covariate values of customers when they move to state   with the 
covariates of those customers still event-free and in the follow-up. Customers who move to 
another state are censored at the point of their transition. 
  
BC25 population BC50 population 
Figure 8. Relationship of the Baseline Hazard Functions between Different Failure Types 
 
The advantage of this approach is its ability to simultaneously fit cause-specific hazard models 
for all causes, and to investigate the equality of the effects of covariates on different causes of 
failure, that is, changes of BahnCard contracts (see also, Andersen and Borgan 1985; Lunn and 
McNeil 1995; Putter, Fiocco, and Geskus 2007). 
4.4 Models on Subdistribution Hazards 
Another approach to analyzing competing risks data is based on the ideas of Fine and Gray 
(1999). They propose a semi-parametric regression model for the subdistribution of a competing 
risk that aims to establish direct effects of covariates on the cumulative incidence probabilities, 
which essentially helps avoid highly nonlinear effects of covariates on the CIFs when modeling 
is done on cause-specific hazards (Putter, Fiocco, and Geskus 2007). Fine and Gray (1999) de-
fine a subdistribution hazard so that the covariate effect directly relates to the CIF: 
  
 ( )         
 (                (       ))
  
    
    (    ( ))
  
.   (13) 
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Thus, the CIF for cause   depends on the hazard of cause   as well as on the hazards of all other 
possible causes. Contrary to the cause-specific hazards, every customer who experienced an 
event from another cause remains in the risk set, whereas for the cause-specific hazard, the risk 
set decreases with every event. Similarly to the regression model on cause-specific hazards rep-
resented by equation 9         this can be expressed by following regression model: 
  
 (   )      
 ( )    (   
   ).        (14) 
Cause-specific hazards as well as subdistribution hazards, i.e. the cumulative incidence as a 
function of the cause-specific hazard, can be predicted from the data. With the latter method all 
possible events are taken into account and the censoring mechanism is assumed to be independ-
ent of the change progression of BahnCard contracts. We complement our analysis by graphical 
evaluations based on Fine and Grey’s (1999) approach using the subdistribution hazards. It may 
be added that these competing risks models do not allow investigation of potential associations 
between causes. Therefore, the interpretation of results requires a combined view of data in-
sights and theoretically based, logical reasoning. Concerned with the question of which factors 
determine consumers’ changed contractual choices, and to suggest how their decisions could be 
influenced effectively by the firm, we also strive to quantify each factor’s effects in the compet-
ing risks framework. 
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5. Results 
The empirical results of our competing risks models for BC25 customers are presented in Table 
15. The corresponding results for BC50 customers are displayed in Table 16. Hazard ratios are a 
measure of relative risks over time, and results higher than 1 indicate a higher probability of the 
corresponding event caused by the relevant covariate (accordingly, a result of less than 1 indi-
cates a lower risk). Table 17 outlines the goodness-of-fit for the different model scenarios illus-
trated above (see Figure 7) according to O’Quigley, Xu, and Stare (2005) who propose a modi-
fied version of the Nagelkerke R
2
 in which the number of observations is replaced by the num-
ber of uncensored observations (events). 
To ascertain appropriate model fit, we employed Cox-Snell residuals and show that these resid-
uals have an approximate standard censored exponential distribution with hazard ratio 1 (Bloss-
feld, Golsch, and Rohwer 2007, p. 219 et seq.). Based on the Kaplan and Meier (1958) estimat-
ed survivor function, we calculate an empirical estimate of the cumulative hazard function, us-
ing the Cox-Snell residuals as the time variable and the data’s original censoring variable. If the 
model fits the data, the plot of the cumulative hazard versus the Cox-Snell residuals results in an 
approximation of a straight line of slope 1. The results of these graphical validations of our 
model are displayed in Figure 9. In the following section, we focus on presenting the most sig-
nificant results. 
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 Hazard Ratio 95% Conf. Interval P>|z| 
Sex 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation .9831377 .9521172    1.015169 0.299 
Upgrade to BC50 * .9158966 .8512729    .9854262 0.019 
Upgrade to BC100 1.53856 .4753589    4.979749 0.472 
Age     
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** .9880395 .986978    .9891021 0.000 
Upgrade to BC50 * .9970026 .9945128    .9994986 0.019 
Upgrade to BC100 * .9700497 .9415085    .9994561 0.046 
Auto-renewal 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** .1005775 .0956211    .1057907 0.000 
Upgrade to BC50 *** .1671777 .1533873    .182208 0.000 
Upgrade to BC100 .4418717 .1022061    1.910361 0.274 
Travel insurance     
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation * .9416153 .8964317    .9890764 0.016 
Upgrade to BC50 1.050223 .9329413    1.182249 0.417 
Upgrade to BC100 .1520467 .0049468    4.673409 0.281 
Email-flag 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** 1.404874 1.251889    1.576554 0.000 
Upgrade to BC50 *** 1.233397 1.101353    1.381272 0.000 
Upgrade to BC100 .1970921 .0269256    1.442689 0.110 
Advertising ban 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation .9480582 .868083    1.035401 0.236 
Upgrade to BC50 *** 1.69879 1.486557    1.941324 0.000 
Upgrade to BC100 0 . . 
Comfort score     
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** .9944637 .994008    .9949197 0.000 
Upgrade to BC50 *** 1.001387 1.001209    1.001564 0.000 
Upgrade to BC100 1.00131 1.00069     1.00193 0.000 
Bonus score 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** .9982089 .9980081    .9984098 0.000 
Upgrade to BC50 *** 1.000297 1.000196    1.000397 0.000 
Upgrade to BC100 ** 1.000239 .9997356    1.000742 0.352 
Bonus account     
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** 1.001532 1.001162    1.001903 0.000 
Upgrade to BC50 * .9996683 .9993716     .999965 0.028 
Upgrade to BC100 * .9973597 .9947434    .9999828 0.049 
Points redeemed 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation 1.00019 .9998186    1.000561 0.316 
Upgrade to BC50 .9998613 .9995455    1.000177 0.390 
Upgrade to BC100 1.113334 . . 
Higher status 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** 4.268563 1.841921    9.892191 0.001 
Upgrade to BC50 *** .0427814 .0235811    .0776151 0.000 
Upgrade to BC100 4.07073 .0923593    179.4171 0.467 
Point of purchase      
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** .4021331 .3775837    .4282786 0.000 
Upgrade to BC50 *** .3745662 .3294605    .4258473 0.000 
Upgrade to BC100 .5227959 .1351563    2.022218 0.347 
BC price 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** .9739082 .9714177    .9764052 0.000 
Upgrade to BC50 † 1.050394 1.028074    1.073199 0.000 
Upgrade to BC100 1.099604 .8807148    1.372896 0.402 
Main card     
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** 4.305562 3.782397    4.901088 0.000 
Upgrade to BC50 .0839336 .0287988    .2446235 0.000 
Upgrade to BC100 .0161338 9.00e-07    289.0938 0.409 
Business customer 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation 1.072379 .895533    1.284147 0.447 
Upgrade to BC50 * 1.351647 1.011831    1.805589 0.041 
Upgrade to BC100 0 . . 
Quarter 1 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** .9989969 .9984495    .9995446 0.000 
Upgrade to BC50 1.000511 .9998375    1.001185 0.137 
Upgrade to BC100 1.001401 .9917035    1.011193 0.778 
Quarter 2     
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** .9988826 .9983182    .9994473 0.000 
Upgrade to BC50 1.000298 .9996668    1.000929 0.355 
Upgrade to BC100 † 1.008613 1.002591    1.014671 0.005 
Quarter 3 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** .9988446 .998241    .9994486 0.000 
Upgrade to BC50 † 1.000338 .9996567    1.001021 0.331 
Upgrade to BC100 .997232 .9876978    1.006858 0.572 
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Quarter 4    [Continued] 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** .9976247 .996959    .9982907 0.000 
Upgrade to BC50 † 1.000479 .9999132    1.001045 0.097 
Upgrade to BC100 1.001804 .9953191    1.008331 0.586 
Number of budget prices     
 Cancellation * .9809367 .9661835    .9959152 0.013 
    Influence on event Upgrade to BC50 *** .9400421 .9129409    .9679479 0.000 
 Upgrade to BC100 1.480314 .8871466    2.470088 0.133 
Suboptimal 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation * .9317008 .8820177    .9841825 0.011 
Upgrade to BC50 1.076839 .9682574    1.197596 0.172 
Upgrade to BC100 .5602439 .2782977    1.127833 0.105 
Beyond optimal 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation † 1.110313 .9937514    1.240548 0.064 
Upgrade to BC50 .8750105 .723879    1.057695 0.168 
Upgrade to BC100 .135992 .0109309    1.691883 0.121 
Comfort status     
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation † .7186443 .5052614    1.022143 0.066 
Upgrade to BC50 *** 2.289067 1.768406    2.963024 0.000 
Upgrade to BC100 *** 82.24907 7.696763    878.9291 0.000 
Number of trips 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation 1.005963 .9964567    1.015561 0.220 
Upgrade to BC50 *** .9708735 .955802    .9861827 0.000 
Upgrade to BC100 * .6520072 .4649859      .91425 0.013 
Ticket device variables (ticket machine, counter, Internet, train conductor, call center) are included in the regressions, yet they are of minor 
importance. For readability, results are omitted from the tables but can be obtained upon request. 
*** p≤0.001, ** 0.001<p≤0.01, * 0.01<p≤0.05, † 0.05<p≤0.10 
Table 15. Estimation Results for the BC25 Customers 
 
 Hazard Ratio 95% Conf. Interval P>|z| 
Sex 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation 1.019445 .9930353    1.046557 0.150 
Downgrade to BC25 *** .7543554 .6686753     .851014 0.000 
Upgrade to BC100 .8544644 .4997539    1.460938 0.565 
Age     
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** .9888792 .9880751     .989684 0.000 
Downgrade to BC25 *** 1.006655 1.003394    1.009926 0.000 
Upgrade to BC100 *** .9456529 .9218819    .9700367 0.000 
Auto-renewal 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** .0802754 .0763434      .08441 0.000 
Downgrade to BC25 *** .1012532 .0865317    .1184793 0.000 
Upgrade to BC100 *** .0703011 .0341526    .1447108 0.000 
Travel insurance     
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation 1.012378 .9740886    1.052172 0.532 
Downgrade to BC25 .8989318 .7489946    1.078884 0.252 
Upgrade to BC100 1.21479 .5909328    2.497264 0.597 
Email-flag 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** 1.194953 1.125873    1.268272 0.000 
Downgrade to BC25 *** 1.437945 1.194849      1.7305 0.000 
Upgrade to BC100 .7423887 .4585261    1.201984 0.226 
Advertising ban 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation * .9058221 .8338909    .9839581 0.019 
Downgrade to BC25 *** 1.514794 1.195787    1.918905 0.001 
Upgrade to BC100 1.078664 .3880323    2.998502 0.885 
Comfort score     
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** .9948439 .9945933    .9950946 0.000 
Downgrade to BC25 * .9995745 .9993051    .9998439 0.002 
Upgrade to BC100 *** 1.000663 1.000384    1.000941 0.000 
Bonus score 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** .999469 .9993988    .9995393 0.000 
Downgrade to BC25 .9999417 .9997861    1.000097 0.462 
Upgrade to BC100 ** .9999827 .9998208    1.000145 0.834 
Bonus account     
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** 1.000875 1.000748    1.001003 0.000 
Downgrade to BC25 .9998358 .9993258    1.000346 0.528 
Upgrade to BC100 .9997125 .9993314    1.000094 0.139 
Points redeemed 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation .9999654 .9998759    1.000055 0.449 
Downgrade to BC25 1.000045 .9997815    1.000308 0.740 
Upgrade to BC100 † 1.000377 .999978     1.000777 0.064 
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Higher status [Continued] 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** 1.940388 1.347588    2.793959 0.000 
Downgrade to BC25 .7907622 .3829959    1.632667 0.526 
Upgrade to BC100 *** 917.0298 154.6894    5436.336 0.000 
Point of purchase      
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** .7075465 .6724928    .7444274 0.000 
Downgrade to BC25 ** .7309667 .5783598    .9238408 0.009 
Upgrade to BC100 .8908078 .4442946    1.786064 0.745 
BC price 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** 1.001705 1.0014     1.00201 0.000 
Downgrade to BC25 † 1.005927 1.004645    1.007211 0.000 
Upgrade to BC100 1.00141 .9956273    1.007226 0.633 
Main card     
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation 1.039908 .9742235    1.110022 0.240 
Downgrade to BC25 *** .5991031 .4828535    .7433406 0.000 
Upgrade to BC100 .9643917 .2105621    4.416992 0.963 
Business customer 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** 1.227075 1.111289    1.354924 0.000 
Downgrade to BC25 *** .2748114 .1464893    .5155413 0.000 
Upgrade to BC100 .9863642 .3320596    2.929939 0.980 
Quarter 1 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** .9996295 .9994016    .9998575 0.001 
Downgrade to BC25 * .9986077 .9976208    .9995957 0.006 
Upgrade to BC100 .9996038 .9981728    1.001037 0.588 
Quarter 2     
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** .9992629 .999012     .999514 0.000 
Downgrade to BC25 † 1.000986 .9999708    1.002002 0.057 
Upgrade to BC100 † 1.000079 .998072    1.002091 0.938 
Quarter 3 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** .9992312 .9989291    .9995335 0.000 
Downgrade to BC25 † 1.000271 .9992739     1.00127 0.594 
Upgrade to BC100 † .9981224 .996014    1.000235 0.082 
Quarter 4     
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** .9985786 .9982318    .9989254 0.000 
Downgrade to BC25 * 1.000944 1.000089      1.0018 0.030 
Upgrade to BC100 * .9981153 .9964004    .9998331 0.032 
Number of budget prices            Note that a BC50 cannot be combined with any discounts. 
Suboptimal 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** .8733237 .836787    .9114558 0.000 
Downgrade to BC25 1.047645 .8781074    1.249916 0.605 
Upgrade to BC100 † 1.037439 .4701544    2.289206 0.927 
Beyond optimal 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation 1.196737 .5288381    2.708161 0.666 
Downgrade to BC25 .7676126 .1344961    4.381014 0.766 
Upgrade to BC100 * .7648551 .1611634    3.629877 0.736 
Comfort status     
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation *** .8179429 .728032    .9189577 0.001 
Downgrade to BC25 ** 1.772347 1.204349    2.608224 0.004 
Upgrade to BC100 * 2.03037 1.089155    3.784954 0.026 
Number of trips 
 
    Influence on event 
Cancellation .9990129 .9954039    1.002635 0.593 
Downgrade to BC25 † 1.00799 .9989977    1.017063 0.082 
Upgrade to BC100 1.005172 .9961178    1.014308 0.264 
Ticket device variables (ticket machine, counter, Internet, train conductor, call center) are included in the regressions, yet they are of minor 
importance. For readability, results are omitted from the tables but can be obtained upon request. 
*** p≤0.001, ** 0.001<p≤0.01, * 0.01<p≤0.05, † 0.05<p≤0.10 
Table 16. Estimation Results for the BC50 Customers 
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 Scenario No. 
Events 
Adj. R
2 
Boot. SE 95% conf. interval 
BahnCard25 
 
     
 Cancellation 12099 0.753757 0.004215 0.745860 0.762878 
 Upgrade BC50 3003 0.609709 0.012973 0.588089 0.639157 
 Upgrade BC100 71 0.797490 0.003787 0.790461 0.806983 
BahnCard50       
 Cancellation 15290 0.821689 0.002791 0.816400 0.827487 
 Downgrade BC25 1188 0.586956 0.020110 0.555061 0.633349 
 Upgrade BC100 264 0.788934 0.003991 0.780065 0.798986 
Table 17. Goodness-of-Fit of the Employed Model Framework 
 
 
 
 
Cancellation of BC25  Upgrade to BC50 
 
 
 
BC25: Upgrade to BC100  Cancellation of BC50 
 
 
 
Downgrade to BC25  BC50: Upgrade to BC100 
Figure 9. BC25-Model-Fit and the BC50-Model-Fit based on Cox-Snell Residuals
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Demographics. 
As regards demographics, gender has a relatively small influence on changes in BC contracts. 
However, concerning the choice of downgrading a BC50 to a BC25, we observe that men are 
nearly 25% less likely to downgrade a BC50 than women. Given that most BahnCard owners 
underuse their cards, men seem to have even less ability to recognize inappropriate contract 
choices or to take appropriate action than women (which might indicate that men are even more 
susceptible to status quo bias and loss aversion than women). 
Age is a very significant factor, but the strength of its influence is rather small. Older people, 
possibly due to more conservative decision-making, cancel less often and are reluctant to up-
grade a BC25 to a BC50, yet they are more likely to downgrade a BC50 to a BC25. 
CRM practices. 
Turning to DB’s practices that may help develop and maintain customer relationships within the 
BahnCard framework, auto-renewal greatly reduces cancellation risk (by around 90% for both 
BC25 and BC50). Although auto-renewal as the default option upon contract expiry seems intu-
itively beneficial for the firm, it is detrimental to upgrades. The probability of a customer up-
grading decreases by 83% for BC25 holder and by 93% for a BC50 holder. On the other hand it 
does at least reduce the risk of a customer downgrading from a BC50 considerably (by 90%). 
To summarize, auto-renewal is a most effective way to bind in BahnCard owners. 
Interestingly, the email-flag, indicating that a customer agreed to receive automated mailings 
from DB, increases the cancellation hazards of both BC25 (40%) and BC50 (20%) cards. It also 
enhances BC25 upgrade (23%) and downgrade (44%) hazards (Figure 11 and 12). Thus, auto-
mated mailings may be difficult to implement in a way that predictably affects firm perfor-
mance. Similarly, advertising bans, indicating that customers rejected electronic advertising 
being sent to their mail accounts, lower the cancellation rate of BC50 customers by 9%. Yet, 
their downgrading risk rises by 51%. Nevertheless, the upgrading of a BC25 becomes 70% 
more probable. 
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Hence, there might be a need to re-develop and fine-tune CRM practices as regards email poli-
cies. Customers who do not object to receiving emails are more likely to cancel and downgrade 
their BahnCards, yet this factor simultaneously fosters opportunities for BC25 upgrades. Simi-
larly, reducing electronic advertising activity to BC25 customers should not only save money, 
but also facilitate retaining customers and enhance the probability of a BC25 upgrade. Yet, an 
advertising ban significantly increases the risk of downgrading a BC50. A more detailed exami-
nation and maintained monitoring of not only how, but particularly whom to address (via which 
channels), seems advisable to exploit the potential and increase the effectiveness of electronic 
customer contact initiated by the firm. 
With respect to distribution strategies for BahnCards, another interesting result is that the point 
of purchase seems to affect stability in DB customer contracts in comparison to purchase over 
the counter as a reference point. Internet purchase reduces cancellation, upgrade and downgrade 
risks (in the case of BC25 by about 60% in each case, and for BC50 by about 30%). This find-
ing raises the question of how different consumer segments might be directed to ‘more promis-
ing’ points of sale to enhance customer retention and upgrading activity, and how purchases via 
the Internet could be promoted in future. 
Concerning the customer loyalty programs, we observed some counterintuitive results as well. 
Bonus score and comfort score are significant in most scenarios. Surprisingly, a score increase 
slightly raises the cancellation hazard for both BC25 and BC50 cards. Point redemption is not 
significant in any of the scenarios and subgroups (Table 13 also documents that many DB cus-
tomers never redeem their points). However, the amenities offered by comfort status proved a 
very useful ‘reward’ for BahnCard owners since they strongly escalated upgrade hazards and 
decreased cancellation risks. Yet, for BC25 customers, becoming a status customer enhances 
the cancellation hazard by a factor of four and lowers the probability of upgrading by 95%. 
Thus, offering a bahn.bonus program in the BC25 customer segment seems very disadvanta-
geous; although it is advantageous in the BC50 segment, where it is (despite, unfortunately, 
doubling the cancellation hazard) a highly relevant indicator for BC100 upgrades. Accordingly, 
Competing Risks for Train Tickets 
 
108 
a central question is why customers who have acquired a higher status in the loyalty program, 
and are therefore frequent travelers, are more likely to abandon their relationship with DB. Po-
tential explanations might include that this reaction is either caused by an increase in DB’s au-
tomated customer mailings, which repel customers, or by temporal effects; perhaps even long-
standing customers cancel their contract at some time (on average, after 2.5 contracts). In addi-
tion, the more a customer travels, the more familiar they will become with pricing schemes and 
alternative ways of obtaining price reductions (e.g., early bird offers, special promotions), so 
that the perceived advantage of holding a BahnCard may decrease with increasing knowledge 
about the company’s pricing strategy (this may also explain that with an increase in collected 
loyalty scores, derived from high travel frequency, cancellation hazards of both BC25 and BC50 
customers rise). In conclusion, it seems reasonable to adjust the loyalty program particularly to 
increase retention rates for the BC25 customer segment and redesign pricing strategies in a way 
that emphasizes the BC advantages. 
  
Event type: upgrade to BC50 Event type: cancellation 
Figure 10. Cumulative Incidence (BC25) with Respect to Sex and Email-Flag 
 
  
Event type: downgrade to BC25 Event type: cancellation 
Figure 11. Cumulative Incidence (BC50) with Respect to Sex and Email-Flag
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Pricing and usage. 
Concerning changes in the price of a BahnCard, all hazards appear more pronounced for the 
BC25 population. A higher price for the original BC25 reduces the cancellation risk, which 
could be triggered by the fact that BahnCards bought for a lower price during promotional cam-
paigns by DB are less likely to be renewed. The cancellation risk of a BC50 hardly changes 
with increasing BahnCard prices. Business customers with a BC50 are 23% more likely to can-
cel their cards, but 73% less likely to downgrade than private users. Furthermore, a BC25 busi-
ness customer is 35% more likely to upgrade to a BC50 than a private user. The total sum of 
ticket fees per quarter reduces the probability of cancellation in all quarters for both types of 
cards. Higher fees (significant only in the third and fourth quarter) tend to increase the probabil-
ity of upgrading from a BC25 to a BC50. 
Contrary to expectations, a suboptimal use of a BahnCard in terms of its ‘under-usage’ reduces 
the cancellation hazards for both BC25 and BC50 segments. For customers whose travel behav-
ior is beyond the optimality boundaries (‘over-usage’), the risk of cancellation rises. Moreover, 
the number of trips turns out to be of moderate importance in explaining the competing risks in 
the context of BahnCard contracts. Each additional trip by rail decreases the upgrade probabili-
ties from a BC25 to a BC50 by 3% and to a BC100 by 35%. Besides, a BC25, but not a BC50, 
can be used in combination with otherwise (other than BC-related) reduced tickets (‘budget 
prices’). Here, each ticket combined with an additional discount reduces the cancellation hazard 
by 2% and the upgrade hazard to a BC50 by 6%. In addition, we studied the devices used to buy 
a ticket. Ticket device variables have a slight effect on contractual changes but, particularly for 
cancellation events, they are of minor importance. 
Finally, another interesting finding is that competing risks models based on subdistribution haz-
ards illustrate that cancellation as well as upgrade and downgrade proportions are influenced by 
the time passed since the (initial) BahnCard purchase. Accordingly, our results support observa-
tions made by Iliescu, Garrow, and Parker (2008) in the airline industry, who found that higher 
cancellation rates are often observed for recently purchased tickets. Our results document that 
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change rates of all types of events in our study (and especially cancellation rates) decrease with 
a growing number of contract extensions (Figure 10 and 11). 
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6. Discussion and Conclusion 
This study demonstrates how hazard models combined with data multiplication methods can be 
used in a context of competing risks to model railway travelers’ choices of two-part pricing 
contracts in terms of contract cancellation, upgrade and downgrade behavior. Specifically, we 
estimate an ‘initial-change’ model for annual train ticket contracts (BahnCards) based on the 
occurrence of cancellation events or loyalty card changes in a large-scale sample from Deutsche 
Bahn AG. In comparison to other models of this type described in the literature or used in prac-
tice, the proposed model takes a customer-centric approach, as it captures the underlying behav-
ior of train passengers. We extend the conventional cancellation risks framework by applying 
competing risks models to the specific context of customer loyalty cards, which provides a 
broader perspective on customer retention in the railway sector. Our method originates from 
survival analysis and has not been transferred to transportation studies on consumer travel be-
havior before. The model is appropriate to examine consumers’ contractual choices across dif-
ferent segments of the population (male vs. female, young vs. old, business customers vs. con-
sumers etc.) and across varying usage intensities (low, medium, high). Therefore, it could help 
transportation firms assess the potential effects of developing and optimizing two-part pricing 
schemes and of adopting and redesigning various relationship management practices on con-
sumers’ subsequent (inter-temporal) contractual choices and usage decisions. 
To our knowledge, this study is the first to be based on an extensive and unique longitudinal 
dataset (more than four million individual customers’ transactions) in the railway market that 
explicitly considers contractual decisions within two-part travel pricing schemes. Based on this 
study approach, we can develop some interesting reflections for the field of customer relation-
ship management. The value and the efficiency of diverse forms of customer programs have 
been the subject of controversial discussions among researchers. For example, Leenheer et al. 
(2007), Meyer-Warden (2008), Noordhoff, Pauwels, and Odekerken-Schröder (2004) and Vesel 
and Zabkar (2009) study the characteristics of such programs and contribute to our understand-
ing of the effectiveness and economic outcomes of loyalty programs. Despite the considerable 
proliferation of loyalty programs, Berman (2006) observes that many have not produced the 
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desired results. According to Allaway et al. (2006), little is known about the responsiveness of 
different customer segments and about differences in the behavior patterns of customers includ-
ed in such programs. In addition, in recent years the awareness of the need to improve our un-
derstanding of the outcomes of CRM practices in the transportation sector and also of the result-
ing opportunities to influence consumer choices more effectively has grown considerably (see 
Ellinger, Daugherty, and Gustin 1997; Ellinger, Daugherty, and Plair 1999; Ramanathan 2010; 
Steven, Dong, and Dresdner 2012 on various aspects of customer services and loyalty in logis-
tics and transportation settings). As managers and academics become increasingly interested in 
the ‘true’ value of CRM practices, based on the evidence provided here we point out some sys-
temic flaws in one of the biggest loyalty programs in Germany, and we can highlight some criti-
cal leverage points relevant to improving the effectiveness of loyalty programs in rail travel. 
Our results may suggest a direction for relationship management to take in similar transporta-
tion contexts as well. 
We have highlighted the customer demographics, CRM practices, pricing strategies and BC 
usage factors that are most influential on consumers’ upgrading, downgrading and cancellation 
events, and quantify their relative importance, to assist transportation firms to select the factors 
to focus on when trying to affect either kind of behavior among customers. Specifically, we 
show that on the one hand, firms might take a stronger segment-specific approach to customers 
with low usage (BC25) and medium usage intensity (BC50). On the other hand, results also 
suggest that it could pay to differentiate between customers on a demographic basis when it 
comes to activities targeted at reducing downgrading events. We point out opportunities to re-
think CRM practices, particularly in terms of electronic mailing policies (e.g., automated mail-
ings, and special offers), as in some circumstances, they have counterproductive effects and 
inhibit customer relationships. We also highlight opportunities to redesign customer loyalty 
programs to increase retention and upgrading behavior. We have also revealed the effects of 
pricing and consumers’ previous contract decisions that led to optimal or suboptimal usage of 
their loyalty cards. Further, we observe that neither cancellation nor upgrade and downgrade 
hazards are ‘memoryless’, since change proportions of these events are affected by the track 
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record a customer has with the firm, that is, by the time passed since the (initial) BahnCard pur-
chase. 
The contributions of the paper to the literature are: First, it adds to the recent literature on trans-
portation and logistics management that emphasizes the growing need for customer orientation 
and relationship management (e.g., Ganesan et al. 2009; Grawe, Daugherty, and Dant 2012; 
Ramanathan 2010; Steven, Dong, and Dresdner 2012) by systematically exploring how such 
approaches can be managed in practice, as well as highlighting their specific effects on 
(un)desired business outcomes in the context of rail travel. Second, consumers’ contractual 
choices and changes therein have not as yet been studied in the railway literature, although two-
part pricing arrangements have become widespread in recent years in transportation and other 
sectors. The literature on (rail) transportation does not yet provide a comprehensive approach to 
understanding consumers’ travel behavior, and particularly, the determinants of their contractual 
choices and usage decisions over time. Accordingly, little is known of how such decisions may 
effectively be influenced. A better understanding of such linkages is essential when discussing 
the effectiveness of CRM practices, especially in the context of customer loyalty programs, and 
if proposing business strategies matched to future market development in the transportation 
sector. We shed light on these issues and provide new theoretical insights by integrating previ-
ous research on CRM and two-part pricing schemes for the transportation sector. Third, semi-
parametric proportional hazards models stratified by failure type have not previously been de-
veloped to study consumers’ contractual choices in a travel behavior (competing risks) context. 
Based on this unconventional methodological approach (see also, Li et al. 2012; Smith 2012; 
Wen, Wang, and Fu 2012, for recent methodological contributions in the rail sector), our results 
would help transportation firms assess the potential effects of promoting, re-developing, and 
fine-tuning their two-part pricing schemes on consumers’ subsequent contractual choices and 
usage decisions, both initially and over an extended period. Therefore the current research offers 
some practical implications for railway companies, particularly, concerning the creation and 
management of customer loyalty programs and customer relationship management practices 
when using two-part pricing schemes. Fourth, since we examined an entire population of rail-
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way passengers in Western Europe based on extensive longitudinal data, we suggest that find-
ings should be sufficiently robust to be transferable to similar cultural and economic settings. 
Then, extending the focus beyond the current study context, results may also help forecast per-
formance outcomes and have implications for policy (e.g., on CRM practices and pricing strate-
gies) for suppliers of comparable transportation services, as well as strategic guidance for firms 
applying two-part pricing schemes in general (e.g., concerning customer segmentation, and 
effects of demographics and varying usage intensities). 
However, the study is not without limitations. Future studies could potentially enhance the 
model framework applied here by adding insights into the consumer perspective by modeling 
preferences towards alternative means of travel as they relate to contractual choices. A worth-
while focus may be on underlying consumer characteristics and motivations, on cultural aspects, 
habits, or lifestyle choices (including for example, consumers’ cultural heritage, environmental 
consciousness, susceptibility to social influence, household income etc.). Of course, broader 
changes of lifestyles and attitudes within the population would change our results as well. Nev-
ertheless, environmental consciousness and sensitivity towards oil prices have been steadily 
increasing throughout the last decade, so that the factors driving consumers’ travel behavior are 
not expected to be reversed anytime soon (Statista 2011). Still, our model could also be extend-
ed to include aspects related to the market environment and competition among infrastructure 
providers, thereby assessing contractual choices against the background of economic and re-
gional equity issues in a wider context. From a methodological viewpoint, the adaption of our 
model towards a multi-stage approach might also prove an interesting variation in future re-
search. 
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III. LEARNING EFFECTS IN LOYALTY PROGRAMS: PERFORMANCE 
IMPACTS OF DECISION-MAKING BEHAVIOR AND PRICING 
 
“Knowledge would be fatal. It is the uncertainty that charms 
one. A mist makes things wonderful.” 
Oscar Wilde (1854-1900) 
1. Abstract 
The success of customer loyalty programs enhances customer loyalty. Their success assumably 
depends on how consumers accept, use, and particularly learn to use their corresponding loyalty 
cards. Based on a comprehensive data set of German railway customers we analyze the structure 
of consumer learning curves in low- and high-price contexts. Further, this research illustrates 
the linkages of loyalty card usage, learning, and pricing issues to cancellation behavior, and 
highlights multiple effect changes over time. It is shown that learning effects and pricing strate-
gies do have an impact on cancellation rates and their influence changes with ongoing contract 
duration. For structuring customer loyalty programs, the implication for marketing managers is 
to consider behavior patterns as a result of tariff arrangements and to facilitate learning how to 
correctly use the loyalty cards, thus leading to associated higher retention rates, and firm per-
formance. 
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2. Introduction 
The concepts of customer loyalty and retention have been intensively discussed from a plurality 
of perspectives. Predominantly, customer satisfaction, price, presence of competition, switching 
costs, and variables describing the customer service experience are considered in this context. 
Kotler (1994), for instance, regards customer satisfaction as the ‘key to customer retention’, 
whereas Hennig-Thurau and Klee (1997) even more explicitly describe the link between cus-
tomer satisfaction and long-term retention of customers as the ‘starting point’ rather than the 
core question of the analysis. Several research attempts delve into other specific determinants of 
customer behavior and attitudes in terminating customer relationships, at this, the role of con-
sumer learning in connection with loyalty card usage and its interrelationship to price (percep-
tions) remains completely unexplored. Our study addresses this research gap by analyzing the 
following questions: how can learning (and also unlearning) in loyalty programs be described? 
Is learning in such programs related to pricing issues? How do learning effects impact loyalty? 
Do these effects change over time? 
We argue that understanding a loyalty card system during the usage process (and particularly 
adopting a more appropriate way of usage) can play a significant role in constituting customers’ 
lifecycles and hence involve useful performance implications for firms employing such loyalty 
programs. Accordingly, we try to provide evidence about the nature of learning curves in a rail-
way two-part pricing context, and the impact of learning effects, (non-) optimality of choice and 
pricing issues on cancellation activities from customer perspective, and subsequently derive 
practical recommendations for marketers. 
As many costumer products, a loyalty card entails (physical) usage to derive benefits. The way a 
costumer interacts with and learns to use these products are said to be critical in product adop-
tion (Robertson and Gatignon 1986; Shih and Venkatesh 2004) and in defining the customer 
experience (Dahl and Moreau 2007; Moreau and Dahl 2005). We assume that product usage, i.e. 
product experience, and the subsequent adaptability throughout the customer lifecycle is neatly 
connected to the assessment of quality and thereby satisfaction, which is associated with the 
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initially unknown usage intensity. At this, in many industries customers are confronted with 
two-part pricing schemes (e.g., in the context of customer loyalty cards), and supposed to 
choose the tariff most appropriate to their expected usage behavior. Often they run the risk of a 
selection bias, i.e. tariff choice and consumption differ. Drawing on empirical evidence, Nunes 
(2000) explains how customers integrate usage expectation into the decision process when 
choosing between paying per use and paying a flat fee for unlimited access. They tend to com-
pare the subjective likelihood of using more than the break-even volume with the subjective 
likelihood of using less. In this connection, he finds that costumers habitually overestimate the 
likelihood of using enough to justify the flat-rate and thus falsely favour this payment plan. The 
perceived range of usage thereby strongly affects the costumers’ misperceptions. Other famous 
examples of studies examining flat rate biases are provided by Thaler (1999), Della Vigna and 
Malmendier (2006), Lambrecht and Skiera (2006), Goettler and Clay 2011, and Schmale, Ehr-
mann, and Dilger (2013). However, customers can learn over time how to correctly use their 
loyalty cards which we assume, is connected to enhanced customer satisfaction, and hence posi-
tively influences retention rates. Of course, customers can also unlearn optimal, i.e. rational, 
usage which should have contrary effects on customer retention. For example, Narayanan, Chin-
tagunta, and Miravete (2007) analyze the usage of a local telephone service and find that cus-
tomers learn about their own usage patterns and switch plans to save costs where necessary. Our 
context is also one where customers make a decision under uncertainty and thus end up making 
choices that are potentially non-optimal ex post.
8
 We investigate the structure of (un)learning 
curves in low and high-price contexts, study (un)learning effects concerning the usage of loyalty 
cards as well as the rationality of buying decisions in the context of two-part tariff systems and 
explore the relationship to cancellation behavior empirically. 
                                                     
 
8
 Concerning the outcomes of consumer choice, we also refer to Levav, Kivetz, and Cho (2010). They 
show that compatibility with more than one attribute arouses acute decision conflict and evokes decision 
processes that result in a pronounced tendency to make “counter-normative choices”, whereas incompati-
bility with a product’s attributes leads to choosing extreme alternatives, which suggests the presence of a 
“pick‐your‐poison” effect. 
Learning Effects in Loyalty Programs 
 
124 
This paper is structured as follows: after a brief introductory note on (organizational and cus-
tomer) learning, we describe the characteristics of our dataset, the key variables used, and define 
customer learning in the context of loyalty card usage. Our research is tripartite. The layout of 
studies is depicted in Figure12. In study 1, we first analyze the structure of learning and ‘un-
learning’ curves for the use of loyalty cards in both low- and high-prize contexts. Study 2 is 
based on the cancellation event: we illustrate the connection to learning and constitute its link-
ages towards pricing issues, point of usage (PoU)
9
 and usage behavior. In study 3, we empirical-
ly investigate how the above-mentioned impact factors (particularly learning) affect cancellation 
events, and how their effect changes over time, using a sequential logit model. 
 
 
Figure 12. Conceptual Overview and Layout of Studies 
 
  
                                                     
 
9
 We denote the contact point, i.e. ticket purchases via the Internet or from the counter, with the term 
‘point of usage’. 
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The research described here contributes to extant knowledge in three ways. First, we outline a 
different assessment of learning – in terms of rational decision making, i.e. optimality of prod-
uct choice – and contrast it with the traditional views of (consumer) learning. Our research sug-
gests that consumers’ ability (or willingness) to adopt appropriate usage behavior depends on 
the price-context. At this, we disprove that the structures of learning and unlearning curves are 
characterized by an inverse relationship. Second, we draw on cancellation events and their link-
ages to the way and point of usage, as well as learning and pricing aspects to explicate 1) their 
role for the success of loyalty card programs (two-part pricing schemes), 2) the importance of 
product adoption over time, and 3) corresponding behavioral consequences, e.g. concerning the 
perception of prices or the relevance of different distribution channels. Our findings suggest that 
learning facilitates a prolongation of contracts (most important in the first three years). Also 
point of usage and current (and not past) usage explain loyal behavior, and especially in the 
low-price context the concept of perceived price-fairness by Xia, Monroe, and Cox (2004) 
proves of value. Third, this research is the first in marketing to investigate the development of 
learning effects and pricing issues related to customer loyalty in the context of two-part pricing 
schemes for railway customers. Analyzing a comprehensive longitudinal dataset, we shed light 
on the impact of customer learning over time, and provide evidence about its relevance for cus-
tomer relationships. 
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3. Concept of Learning and the Gateway to the Data at Hand 
3.1 (Un)Learning to Use Loyalty Cards 
The impact and interdependency of organizational learning on customer satisfaction and loyalty 
has been intensively analyzed for several decades.
10
 In this connection, the discussion predomi-
nantly focused on intra-corporate perspectives (e.g. intra- and inter-organizational learning 
curves). Levitt and March (1988), Brown and Duguid (1991), Huber (1991), March (1991), or 
Argyris (1999) explore the fundamental theory and provide first empirical evidence on organi-
zational learning. In this study, we choose a customer-centric approach towards learning. 
Babutsidze (2011), for instance, discusses two sources of consumer skill acquisition, learning 
by consuming and consumer socialization process. Latter was initiated by Ward (1974) and – 
inter alia – has been considered, extended and further discussed by Moschis and Churchill 
(1978), and Churchill and Moschis (1979). The former is comprised by the concept of consumer 
learning. A comprehensive overview of this research field is provided by Lakshmanan and 
Krishnan (2011). Here, predominant focus of the considered approaches is on isolating and 
quantifying consumer learning (usually of quality of a product) as a factor in purchase behavior 
change time. In the course of this study, we interpret consumer learning as a factor in usage 
behavior change time in the context of two-part pricing schemes. Assigning this type of (adap-
tive) learning primarily to procedural knowledge (primarily related to how to do things; Squire 
1986), and to a lesser degree to declarative roots (e.g., benefit associations or knowledge of 
product attributes; Van Osselaer and Janiszewski 2001), we simply measure a consumer’s (dis-
continuous) learning and unlearning by recording a change of states between usage categories. 
This is related to the findings by Miravete (2002) who finds evidence for learning by consumers 
about their usage levels. 
Our dataset exhibits different usage patterns – between different customers as well as within the 
contract duration of particular loyalty card owner owners. Based on demographical characteris-
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 In the following we will use the term ‘customer’ and ‘consumer’ interchangeably, since the consump-
tion of the underlying product in this study is implicitly characterized by (repeat) purchases of railway 
tickets. 
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tics like sex and age, the price paid for a loyalty card and the way of handling it, we analyze the 
nature of learning curves of low and high-price contexts concerning the loyalty card usage, in-
vestigate how a customer’s adaptability and learning aptitude affects the cancelling behavior 
and particularly study how these learning effects change over time. We interpret customer learn-
ing as the capability to adapt the way of usage of a loyalty card in terms of changes towards an 
‘optimal’, i.e. rational, usage behavior (accordingly unlearning as a change to irrational usage 
behavior)
11
 and subsequently examine its linkage to customer loyalty and its effects changes 
throughout the contract duration time. 
3.2 Contractual Options and Key Variables 
We analyze data provided by the major German railway company Deutsche Bahn AG (DB) 
which contain a comprehensive travel history of the railway customers taking part in its cus-
tomer loyalty program and capture the space of time from December 2002 till July 2008. This 
large-scale, unique longitudinal dataset comprises more than four million transactions of over 
300,000 customers, each being related to one of approximately 800,000 loyalty cards 
(‘BahnCards’). These BahnCards enable railway customers to travel at discount prices for an 
up-front fee during the contract period. DB customers can basically choose between three con-
tracts: BahnCard25 (BC25 in the following), BahnCard50 (BC50) and BahnCard100 (BC100), 
providing price reductions of 25%, 50% and 100% on fares, respectively. Each contract is avail-
able for the 1
st
 or the 2
nd
 class. However, some adjustments were necessary to enhance reliabil-
ity of the data base. First, we excluded all loyalty program members whose overall lifetime sales 
volume did not exceed zero. Furthermore, we dropped all customers with inconsistent, defec-
tive, or not clearly assignable contracts.
12
 Overall, we concentrate on customers with 2
nd
 class 
BahnCards to achieve a maximum comparability between contracts. Our final sample features 
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 This formulation is in line with previous current research defining learning as a regular shift in behavior 
or knowledge informed by prior action (Argote, 1999; Bingham and Davis 2012; Cyert and March, 1963; 
Levitt and March1988; Mine, Bassoff, and Moorman, 2001). 
12
 Possible reasons for deficiencies in the dataset might be goodwill cancellations, accounting or registra-
tion errors. 
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the history of BC25 and BC50 customers.
13
 Particularly, the following variables are employed: 
cancel1, …, cancel5 indicating whether a customer terminated her contract in the respective 
year of usage, demographical information sex and age, indicator variables counter1, …, coun-
ter5 and internet1, …, internet5, defining whether tickets were bought from the counter or via 
the Internet in the respective year of usage. The numerical variables price1, …, price5 determine 
the price of the particular BahnCard in its respective year of usage. The variables discount1, …, 
discount5 indicate, whether tickets were combined with special offers in the respective year of 
usage. Latter is only implemented for BC25 customers, since budget prices cannot be combined 
with a BC50. 
The binary variable usage is calculated according to optimality boundaries (see Appendix A), 
comprising two parameters: the first indicating suboptimal, the second indicating beyond opti-
mal usage. For the implementation of learn variables, we differentiate between learning and 
unlearning effects: a change from suboptimal or beyond optimal BahnCard usage towards an 
optimal card usage from one year of usage to another is marked with 1 in the category ‘learn’ 
(and 0 otherwise), and accordingly, a reverse change (from optimal to beyond or suboptimal 
usage in two successive years) is incorporated with 1 in the category ‘unlearn’ (and 0 other-
wise). Both effects ‘learn’ and ‘unlearn’ are captured in the variables learn1, …, learn5 
(learn3=(0,0), for instance, describes that there were neither learning nor unlearning effects 
from year 3 of usage in comparison to year 4). According to the definition of customer learning 
(and respective scaling) used here, which predominantly refers to the adoption of rational usage 
behavior, learning is monitored in a rather discontinuous way. Against this background, collec-
tive learn rates and their delineation over time constitute the following analysis. 
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 Since BC100 users do not purchase any tickets, their travel behavior cannot be monitored. Discussing 
how efficiently BC100 contracts are used is not an issue of this paper. 
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4. Study 1: The Structure of Collective Learning and Unlearning Curves for Loy-
alty Cards 
The consideration of unlearning complements the large body of work emphasizing learning 
from success and contributes to the further development of the emerging experiential learning-
from-failure perspective (Baum and Dahlin 2007; Chuang and Baum 2003; Denrell 2003; 
Haunschild and Rhee 2004; Haunschild and Sullivan 2002; Kim 2000; Miner et al. 1999). 
Learning to optimally use a loyalty card might be driven by other factors than unlearning it 
(e.g., usage experience, willingness to adopt, rational mind-set,… vs. misjudgment, over-
estimation bias, irrationality,…).14 Hence, we think that the structure of the learning curve can 
be distinguished from the unlearning curve in its corresponding price-segment. Further, we as-
sume that realizing an ‘optimal’ usage behavior is somewhat easier in a low-prize (versus high-
prize) context, although the same should apply for unlearning to optimally use a BahnCard. 
Combining the preceding two expectations, formally, we hypothesize the following: 
H1a: The structure of the average learning curve for loyalty card usage dif-
fers from the structure of the average unlearning curve. 
H1b: The structures of (un-)learning curves for loyalty card usage vary 
across low- and high-price contexts. 
4.1 Method 
We analyze how the share of those customers who learn and of those who unlearn (according to 
the scheme described above) develops during the contract duration. For each year of usage we 
identify the share of customers who ‘learn’ to optimally use their BahnCard in comparison to 
the preceding year. The same is done for the ‘unlearners’. In doing so, we treat BC25 and BC50 
customers separately. Finally, we use an unpaired, two-sample mean-comparison test (t-test) to 
compare the values of the different years for both low- and high-price context (i.e. BC25 and 
BC50). Based on the t-test results we provide empirical evidence on the structure of learning 
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 It might be worth noting that in our study an illustration of learning curves seems more useful at the 
collective level. 
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and unlearning curve in this railway context, and compare the outcomes between the two cus-
tomer segments. 
4.2 Results 
The learn rate in the low-price segment, i.e. among the BC25 customers, slightly decreases over 
time, although it remains on a similar level throughout contract duration. We observe an average 
share of learners of 8.90 % (n = 1,684) in the second usage period in comparison to the first, 
which declines to a share of 6.98 % (n = 193) at the end of the sixth year of usage in comparison 
to the fifth. The corresponding test results (MLearn_i vs. MLearn_i+1; t-value; p-value) are: (MLearn1 = 
.1042079 vs. MLearn2 = .0907122; t = 3.6689; p < 0.001), (MLearn2 = .0907122 vs. MLearn3 = 
.088785; t = 0.4578; p < 0.05), (MLearn3 = .088785 vs. MLearn4 = .0770071; t = 2.4189; p < 0.01), 
(MLearn4 = .0770071 vs. MLearn5 = .0697506; t = 1.1848, p < 0.05). The development of the un-
learn rate exhibits a u-shaped structure. The share of unlearners after two years amounts to 
16.07 % (n = 2,771). This value decreases until the end of the fourth usage period (9.10 %, n = 
722) and slightly grows again to 10.31% (n = 296) in the end of the sixth usage period. The 
corresponding t-test results are as follows: (MUnlearn1 = .1606656 vs. MUnlearn2 = .1105421; t = 
11.9448; p < 0.0001), (MUnlearn2 = .1105421 vs. MUnlearn3 = .0909664; t = 4.4115; p<0.0001), 
(MUnlearn3 = .0909664 vs. MUnlearn4 = .0922113; t = -0.2472; p > 0.1), (MUnlearn4 = .0922113 vs. 
MUnlearn5 = .1031359; t = -1.6153; p < 0.05). The t-tests reveal different structures of learning 
and unlearning curves among the BC25 customers, providing direct support for H1a concerning 
the low-price segment. 
For the BC50-customers the learn rate turns out to be u-shaped (but on a relatively stable level), 
whereas the t-test reveals a slightly decreasing unlearn rate over contract duration. The share of 
learners decreases from 10.14 % (n = 2,157) slightly decreases to 8.95 % (n = 681) at the end of 
contract year four and raises to 10.00 % (n = 433) in the subsequent year. Corresponding t-test 
results are given by (MLearn1 = .1014438 vs. MLearn2 = .0991457; t=0.6823; p < 0.05), (MLearn2 = 
.0991457 vs. MLearn3 = .0894758; t=2.2715; p < 0.05), (MLearn3 = .0894758 vs. MLearn4 = 
.1000231; t= -1.9051, p < 0.05). From the second year of usage the share of unlearners continu-
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ously decreases from 15.51 % (n=2964) to 9.80 % (n=382). The corresponding t-tests provide 
(MUnlearn1 = .1551345 vs. MUnlearn2 = .1248477; t = 7.3192; p < 0.0001), (MUnlearn2 = .1248477 vs. 
MUnlearn3 = .1079365; t = 3.4415 ; p < 0.001), (MUnlearn2 = .1079365 vs. MUnlearn3 = .0980493; t = 
1.6150; p < 0.05). Also in the high-price segment (BC50), we detect different structures of 
learning and unlearning curve. 
Thus, the structure of the average learning curve differs from the structure of the average un-
learning curve in both costumer segments BC25 and BC50, and the structure of learning curves 
as well as of the unlearning curves varies across low- and high-price contexts, providing full 
support for the hypotheses H1a and H1b. 
4.3 Discussion 
The results of this study indicate that learning, in terms of the adoption of rational usage behav-
ior, is deeply connected to the price context. The willingness to learn seems considerably 
stronger in the high-price context. Especially in the low-price segment, the share of unlearners 
always exceeds the share of learners. This is not the case in the high-price segment: since the 
learn rate remains on a relatively stable level, the unlearn rate reaches a level below the learn 
rate after more than 5 years of contract duration. Apart from the influence of price levels on 
usage adoption, we find another interesting aspect concerning the nature of learning curves. 
According to our scaling of parameters, a learning customer can be regarded as the opposite of 
an unlearning customer. But we find that learning and unlearning curves are not described by an 
inverse relationship. The reason might be different drivers that facilitate learning in comparison 
to unlearning. 
Still, it has to be mentioned that about 75-85 % of the customers do not exhibit any learning or 
unlearning effects in the respective years of usage. Those keep on using their BahnCard in the 
same way as the preceding year – either non-optimally or optimally. 
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The next study examines the role of this subgroup concerning the determinants of contract can-
cellations. We also lay out and test our expectations regarding the linkages to BahnCard prices 
and usage behavior in this loyalty program context. 
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5. Study 2: Learning, Usage and Pricing Issues and Their Linkage to Customer 
Loyalty 
A general assessment of the linkages of learning, pricing aspects, the point of usage and cus-
tomer loyalty card usage to customer cancellation behavior is in the focus of this study. Hence 
study 2 picks up the findings of study 1 and links them to cancellation events. We analyze the 
customer termination rate during contract duration and provide further empirical evidence how 
learning impacts customer loyalty. In this connection, we also examine how PoU and pricing 
issues, e.g. low- or high-prize context or price elasticity, drive the risk of cancellation. 
First, we examine the annual development of churn rates over contract duration. According to 
the observations made by Iliescu, Garrow, and Parker (2008) concerning the airline industry, 
that higher cancellation rates are generally realized for recently purchased tickets, we assume 
that this should apply for the customer railway sector. Formally, 
H2a: The share of contract cancellations decreases with the duration of loy-
alty card contracts. 
One main objective of this study is to establish the dependency between customer learning and 
customer loyalty in the railway context. Iyengar, Ansari, and Gupta (2007) conduct several poli-
cy experiments to capture the effects of customer learning, pricing, and service quality on cus-
tomer lifetime value and find that customer leaning can result in a win-win situation, identifying 
the change in retention rate with and without learning as a key driver. Extending their findings 
to unlearning, we hypothesize the following: 
H2b: The retention rate of loyalty card contracts is higher (lower) for learn-
ers (unlearners) than for ‘non-learners’. 
Here, interpret ‘non-learning’ customers as those customers who do neither learn nor unlearn in 
the respective contract period under investigation. 
Researchers have identified various determinants of customers’ disloyalty (see also above). The 
role of learning has not yet been considered in a loyalty program context. According to the find-
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ings by Iyengar, Ansari, and Gupta (2007) and as a consequence from hypothesis H2b, the learn-
ing effects are assumed to contribute significantly towards an explanation of the termination 
behavior. Thus: 
H2c: Learning effects influence the cancellation of a loyalty card. 
Additionally, we assume that the contact point, from which customers choose to buy railway 
tickets, could have an effect on cancellation events. Particularly, Grewal and Levy (2009) high-
light the coordination of online and offline channels as an emerging issue of compelling interest 
to (e-tailing) research which is expected to continue to grow. We examine the cases of counter 
and Internet purchase, and expect that the usage of the BahnCard both in online as well as of-
fline channels should affect its contract termination. 
H3a: The counter activity during the usage period(s) has an impact on the 
cancellation of a loyalty card contract. 
H3b: The Internet purchases during the usage period(s) have an impact on 
the cancellation of a loyalty card contract. 
Another objective of this study is to elucidate the role of price, price sensitivity and perceived 
price fairness in the context of customer retention in loyalty programs. Choi et al. (2006) pro-
vide evidence for the effect of customer (dis-)loyalty on customer price sensitivity and find that 
price sensitivity is negatively influenced by an increase in loyal behavior. We expect to approve 
this observation, and thus hypothesize: 
H4a: Price sensitivity has an impact on the cancellation of a loyalty card 
contract. 
We also assume that the price of a BahnCard impacts the cancellation of a contract. Here, we 
refer to the concept of price fairness (e.g. Bolton, Warlop, and Alba 2003) which involves a 
comparison of a price (or procedure) with a pertinent standard, reference, or norm, i.e. the initial 
price of a BahnCard. In their conceptual framework of price fairness Xia, Monroe, and Cox 
(2004) formulate two perceptions concerning transaction similarity and choice of comparison 
party: First, given a perceived price discrepancy between two transactions, a high degree of 
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transaction similarity leads to a high perception of price unfairness. Second, given a perceived 
price discrepancy and two transactions with similar characteristics, when available, has a greater 
effect on price unfairness judgments than does the buyer’s self-reference. We assume that this 
can be applied to the loyalty cards context. Thus: 
H4b: The initial price of a loyalty card has an influence on its cancellation. 
H4c: The subsequent annual fees to prolong the existing contract have an 
impact on the cancellation of a loyalty card contract as long as they 
exceed the initial price paid for it.
15 
Apart from motivational aspects of pricing issues, customer experience over time should also 
provide a breeding ground for the adaption of the way of usage, and thus, learning (or unlearn-
ing) effects. The way of current usage could be the result of path- dependencies, but does not 
necessarily have to be. Hence, current way of usage could be triggered by foregoing ways of 
usage or by other contingent factors. Accordingly, we expect the past, and particularly the cur-
rent way of usage of a loyalty card (in terms of rational decision making) to be a key driver for 
contract cancellation in this learning context. This is formulated in the following two hypothe-
ses: 
H5a: Current way of usage of a loyalty card influences contract cancellation. 
H5b: Past way of usage of a loyalty card influences contract cancellation. 
5.1 Method 
We calculate collective annual cancellation rates of all customers (BC25 and BC50), and for the 
subsegments of the learning as well as the unlearning customers, being in their n
th
 year of 
BahnCard usage respectively. For the comparison of cancellation rates between the different 
usage periods, we use unpaired, two-sample mean-comparison tests (t-tests) (H2a and H2b). 
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 In the following periods after initial purchase, the customers in our sample cannot influence the price of 
the subsequent loyalty card (here: BahnCard). In case of non-termination the up-to-date standard price is 
charged respectively. 
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To describe the linkages of learning effects, PoU, pricing issues and usage quality to cancella-
tion events over time, we use chi-square tests of independence for each year of BahnCard con-
tract duration and show which parameters can be statistically associated with contract cancella-
tion activities and where applicable, how some effects change over time (H3a - H5b). Particularly 
concerning hypothesis H4a, we measure price sensitivity in the following way: Since a 
BahnCard25 can be combined with special offers we mark customers who make use of discount 
prices as ‘price sensitive’ and analyze the link of price sensitive customers to contract duration. 
In order to achieve an acceptable sample size for all contract periods we only consider four con-
tract periods in the cancellation context. 
5.2 Results 
This study seeks to establish several linkages to contract cancellation events. Hypothesis H2a 
refers to the question how the cancellation rate changes over time. We find that the share of 
terminating customers decreases with the duration of the BahnCard contract – for both low- and 
high-prize contexts. In the BC25 customer segment the cancellation rate falls from 17.0 % (n = 
26,952) to 9.72 % in the end of contract year four (n = 8,820). The corresponding t-tests yield 
(analogously to study 1) (MCancel1 = .1700059 vs. MCancel2 = .1597366; t = 2.9286; p < 0.01), 
(MCancel2 = .1597366 vs. MCancel3 = .1174732; t = 10.5347; p < 0.0001), (MCancel3 = .1174732 vs. 
MCancel4 =.0971655; t = 4.6884; p < 0.0001). For the BC50 customers the cancellation rate ex-
ceeds the rate in the low-price context. In this segment, the cancellation share continuously de-
creases from 23.01 % (n = 28813) after contract year one to 12.64 % (n = 7737) after contract 
year four. Testing whether the difference of the cancellation shares of two subsequent years is 
positive, results in (MCancel1 = .2301063 vs. MCancel2 = .1679201; t = 17.1421; p < 0.0001), (MCan-
cel2 = .1679201vs. MCancel3 = .133968; t = 8.4353; p < 0.0001), (MCancel3 = .133968 vs. MCancel4 = 
.1264056; t = 1.5585; p < 0.05). Thus, hypothesis H2a is fully supported. 
We ascertain that the retention rate is significantly higher for learners than for ‘non-learners’ in 
both low- and high-price contexts. (MLearn = .1027316 vs. MNoLearn = .1644791; t = -6.5829; p < 
0.0001), (MLearn = .0527363 vs. MNoLearn = .1244789; t = -6.7364; p < 0.0001), (MLearn = .0739687 
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vs. MNoLearn = .1013167; t = -2.3192; p < 0.01), (MLearn = .0401891 vs. MNoLearn = .0881657; t = -
3.4118; p < 0.001) are the test results for the BC25 customers. For the BC50 customer segment 
we achieve (MLearn = .0908669 vs. MNoLearn = .1634246; t = -8.7662; p < 0.0001), (MLearn = 
.0671937 vs. MNoLearn = .1313252; t = -6.5308; p < 0.0001), (MLearn = .26417 vs. MNoLearn = 
.1315108; t = -6.0449; p < 0.0001). Surprisingly, the inverse relationship only accounts for the 
high-price segment: the cancellation rate is significantly higher for the unlearners in comparison 
with the ‘non-learners’ (MUnlearn = .26417 vs. MNoUnlearn = .1634246; t = 13.2087; p < 0.0001), 
(MUnlearn = .2264808 vs. MNoUnlearn = .1313252; t = 9.6651; p < 0.0001), (MUnlearn =.1737968 vs. 
MNoUnlearn = .1315108; t = 3.1877; p < 0.001). This is also the case for unlearners in the first two 
BC25 contract years (MUnlearn =.1833273 vs. MNoUnlearn = .1644791; t = 2.4344; p < 0.01). After 
that, we do not find any significant differences between cancellation rates of unlearners and 
‘non-learners’ (even at 0.1-level). In sum, we find full support for hypothesis H2b in the high-
prize context and mixed support in the low-price context. 
We do not find full support for H2c that learning effects influence the cancellation of a 
BahnCard, regardless when (during the customer life cycle) and how (learn, unlearn) they ap-
pear. They do have an impact on cancellation, but the impact changes over time. As the chi-
square test results show, learning and unlearning effects are of particular importance in the first 
three years of usage (BC25: Pearson               
         ,               
         , 
              
         , p < .001 respectively; BC50: Pearson               
         , 
              
         ,               
         , p < 0.01 respectively)16. ‘Late’ learning 
effects, i.e. (un-)learning after more than three years of contract duration, play a minor role to 
determine cancellation events. Hence the hypothesis H2c is only partially supported. 
The examination of the linkage between PoU and contract cancellation reveals to some extent 
surprising results. Confirmative to hypothesis H3a we find that counter activity, i.e. buying tick-
ets via a counter, can be statistically associated with cancellation behavior for both low- and 
                                                     
 
16
                 
  represents the Pearson chi-square value associated with a learning effect after i+1 years 
of contract and a cancellation event after j years. 
Learning Effects in Loyalty Programs 
 
138 
high-price contexts in every year of contract duration (BC25 (Pearson                   
 , p-
value):     
          ,     
          ,     
          ,     
         , p < 0.001 re-
spectively; BC50:     
         ,     
         ,     
         ,     
         , p < 
0.001 respectively). But we find no support for hypothesis H3b. The Internet purchase of railway 
tickets is independent from contract cancellation for both BC25 and BC50 customers at any 
time (p > .05 for both segments in any year of contract). 
Testing our hypotheses on pricing issues leads to a clear result: all hypotheses (H4x) are fully 
supported. Price sensitivity plays a highly significant role for the cancellation context in any 
year of usage for BC25 customers (Pearson                     
 :     
         ,     
  
        ,     
          ,     
         , p < .001 respectively). The same applies for the 
initial price and cancellation events, again for BC25 (Pearson                  
 :     
       
  ,     
          ,     
          ,     
        , p < .05 respectively) and BC50 
(    
          ,     
          ,     
          ,     
         , p < .001 respectively) 
customer segments. Analyzing the relationship between up-to-date standard price and cancella-
tion over time, the initial price paid indeed seems to be a kind of reference point. For the BC25 
customers, the price paid for ongoing contracts in any year of usage proves to be independent of 
customer cancellation when this price is below the price paid for the initial BahnCard (even at 
0.1-level). Once the subsequent price exceeds the initial price of the BahnCard, we find a highly 
significant connection to customer cancellation (Pearson                        
 :     
  
        ,     
          ,     
          , p < .001). Latter also applies for the BC50 
customers (    
          ,     
          ,     
          , p < .001), but the initial 
reference price seems to be less important: up to contract year three the current price also has an 
impact on cancellation (    
         ,     
         , p < .001) when it is below the initial 
price. After that, time up-to-date prices cannot be associated to customer cancellation (p > .5). 
Finally, the chi-square tests of independence reveal that the way of usage of a BahnCard, in 
terms of a rough categorization into suboptimal, beyond optimal and optimal, is associated with 
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its cancellation (as intuitively expected). Particularly, the way of usage of the current BahnCard 
turns out to be connected to customer cancellation in any year of usage for both low- and high-
prize contexts (BC25 (Pearson                  
 ):     
         ,     
          ,     
  
        ,     
         , p < .001 respectively; BC50:     
         ,     
          , 
    
          ,     
          , p < .001 respectively). Concerning past way of usage, this 
effect is mixed. Several elapsed contract periods exhibit statistically significant connections to 
cancellation events, but particularly early periods of relatively long contract durations do not (p 
> 0.05). Hence, the hypotheses H5a and H5b are fully supported. 
5.3 Discussion 
Study 2 connects learning, point of usage, price and way of usage to cancellations of customer 
loyalty programs. Cancellation rates are found to decrease over time. This should not only apply 
to the airline industry (Iliescu, Garrow, and Parker 2008) or the railway sector, but also be rele-
vant in various sectors repeatedly dealing with customers, particularly in the context of other 
loyalty programs. Then, it is shown: Learning effects do have an impact on cancellation behav-
ior and their influence decreases over time. Particularly, we find that customer learning fosters 
customer retention (in accordance with the findings of Iyengar, Ansari, and Gupta 2007), and 
complementary, unlearning facilitates the cancellation of customer loyalty programs, although 
latter effect holds only for the high-price context. At this, the significance of effects changes 
over time and (un-)learning affects cancellation more likely in ‘early’ years of contract. This 
circumstance further signifies the relevance of (un-)learning effects in loyalty programs, and 
hence for customer retention and firm performance. Further, our findings concerning the point 
of usage have important consequences on the development and coordination of different distri-
bution channels. In our case, the Internet purchase of railway tickets proves to be more advisa-
ble, since it cannot be associated to contract cancellations. This could imply that in the railway 
sector, online buyers are more loyal than counter customers. In this context, the implementation 
of appropriate pricing strategies for subsequent fees is found to be a crucial factor for control-
ling customer churn. The next study examines how the drivers of contract cancellation identified 
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here contribute to cancellation of loyalty programs in low- and high-price contexts. Employing 
a sequential logistic regression model, we quantify corresponding (learning) effects and detect 
changes over time. 
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6. Study 3: Learning and Price Effects on Cancellation and Changes over Time 
In studies 1 and 2, we focused on outlining the nature of collective (un-)learning curves in both 
low- and high-price contexts of customer loyalty programs, and illustrate the linkage of learn-
ing, usage and price issues to contract cancellation. In the following, we take a dynamical ap-
proach, analyzing (learning) effect changes over time. As Bingham and Davis (2012) develop a 
concept of learning sequences for organizational processes, they find that learning sequences 
exist and analyze their effects and evolution. Applying the idea of learning sequences to cus-
tomer behavior, we assume that there might be several underlying learning processes throughout 
contract duration (e.g. experimental, trial-and-error, vicarious learning, learning from external 
advice) which add up to a learning sequence, and apart from changing contingent factors might 
justify effect changes over time: In study 2 we find that the influence of learning effects on can-
cellation changes through the different contract periods, particularly in different price contexts. 
We assume, that this could be coherent with a change of the direction of the effects, and thus 
formulate: 
H6: The direction of the influence of learning effects on loyalty card cancel-
lation changes over time. 
As shown in study 2, initial and current price affect the risk of cancellation in any year of con-
tract. Referring to the concept of perceived price fairness (Bolton, Warlop, and Alba 2003; Xia, 
Monroe, and Cox 2004), we consider a constant direction of price effects, and eventually hy-
pothesize: 
H7: The direction of the influence of initial and current price on loyalty card 
cancellation does not change over time. 
 
To assess the impact of size and direction of effects we choose a rather technical approach, 
opening with the following question: Can a cancellation event simply be predicted on the basis 
of a relatively rough categorization of the current usage behavior, a customer’s (in-)ability to 
learn how to use her loyalty card, and only a few information about demographics, price and 
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point of usage? For each year of contract duration we employ a logistic regression model and 
determine and discuss the impact of price and learning. We detail these procedures in the next 
section. 
6.1 Design and Procedure 
We forecast cancellation events in the context described above, using a sequential logit model. 
Our aim is to quantify learn and price effects, and to identify changes of the direction of effects 
during contract duration in low- and high-price contexts. We re-employ the variables usage, 
learn, sex, age, counter, discount (BC25), initial price and current price (see also study 2) and 
arrange our dataset separately for each year of contract duration. For validation purposes we 
split our dataset into train and test data and then logistically regress on the cancellation events at 
the end of each BahnCard validity period in the contract duration, using the train data. Figure 13 
depicts this procedure. 
 
 
Figure 13. Sequential Logit Model 
 
This sequence can be formalized with the following expressions:
17
 
 (           )  
 
      
 ,        (1) 
where   defines the end of the respective contract year and 
                                                     
 
17
 This formula applies to both customer segments BC25 and BC50, but for latter            . 
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        (for    ).       (2) 
                (                       )                     
                                                       
   (for    ).       (3) 
Subsequently, we score the test dataset with the obtained parameter estimates to validate our 
model and to verify the appropriateness of this approach. The procedure is done for both the 
BC25 and BC50 customer segment. 
6.2 Results 
Examining the impact of learning (and unlearning) effects provides the following results: they 
do have an impact on contract cancellation (see also study 2), but effect directions and their 
significances vary over time, giving full support to hypothesis H6. For example, in case of the 
BC25 customers unlearn exhibits a significant positive influence on cancellation in the first two 
years of contract duration (as it could be expected) but thereafter tends to decrease the probabil-
ity of terminating the contract. Generally, unlearning effects seem to be relevant for cancellation 
events predominantly in the first contract period. Learning effects are less important. The corre-
sponding direction of effect changes in early contract stages, but counter-intuitively tends to 
exhibit a positive impact on the cancellation probability in the low-price segment. In contrast, 
for the BC50 customers learning effects tend to decrease the probability of cancellation (as ex-
pected). In this segment, the unlearning effect also is significant in the first two years of contract 
duration. It is remarkable, that unlearning effects only contribute significantly to cancellation 
events in the last period of contract duration. At this, they always increase the cancellation risk. 
In summary, learning effects tend to foster long contract duration in the high-price context, 
whereas unlearning effects shorten it. In the low-price context, the direction of learning effects 
changes several times and tends to increase cancellation probabilities of contracts of more than 
two years length (which is counter-intuitive). Furthermore, unlearning effects positively impact 
cancellation probabilities in the first two years of contract, and then surprisingly decrease them. 
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Here, learning and unlearning effects seem to be more important in the first two years of con-
tract duration, whereas in the high-price context only predominantly the last unlearning effects 
contribute to the cancellation events. In comparison of these two effects, unlearning effects 
seem to be of greater explanatory value in this context. 
When it comes to explaining the impact of BahnCard prices on the contract cancellation, we 
find considerable differences between BC25 and BC50 customers. In both segments the current 
prize of any year of contract proves to have a statistically significant influence on the cancella-
tion event, but for the low-prize segment we surprisingly find a negative impact on the cancella-
tion probability, and in the high-price segment the current price increases it in each contract 
period. The initial is price also a relevant indicator in this context. It significantly decreases the 
probability of contract cancellation in both low- and high-price context (only exception is the 
first contract year in the BC50 segment, where the current and the initial price are the same). 
Concerning the variable usage, the category describing suboptimal usage behavior proves to be 
statistically significant in the first three years of contract duration of BC25 customers. Among 
the BC50 customers this parameter contributes significantly in any year of contract duration 
towards an explanation of cancellation events. In both regimes it exhibits a positive effect on the 
cancellation probabilities. If a BahnCard is characterized by beyond optimal usage, this tends to 
reduce the risk of cancellation, although not always (BC25) or rather not (except 2
nd
 year, 
BC50) significant. 
The demographical information used in this application provide the following result: the cus-
tomer’s age significantly contributes to the explanation of contract cancellation in both low- and 
high-prize segments and in each year of contract duration. The rule is ‘the younger, the higher 
the affinity to cancellation’. Sex only proves to significantly explain cancellation in the first 
three years of the BC25 customers, and in the 2
nd
 and 4
th
 of the contracts of BC50 customers. 
Generally, a male customer is less likely to cancel his contract. 
In the BC25 customer segment we measured price sensitivity via the indicator variable discount, 
constituting whether a customer combined his BahnCard25 with any discounts or not. This vari-
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able comes out as statistically significant in predicting cancellation. Surprisingly, we obey a 
change of the direction of effects: hence, it positively affects the risk of cancellation in the first 
year, and thereafter the use of discounts decreases it. The same applies for counter activities: 
they significantly increase the probability of a contract cancellation in the first year of contract, 
and lowers it in the subsequent contract periods. 
Full regression results for the respective years of contract duration are displayed in table 18-21 
(BC25) and 22-25 (BC50). 
 
Train Data       
       
Predictor variable: 
Cancel1 
Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
0  (base outcome) 
1 Usage1       
 Sub_opt *** .2673795 .0485753 5.50 0.000 .1721737 .3625854 
 Byo_opt *** -.4704787 .0918828 -5.12 0.000 -.6505657 -.2903917 
 Sex * -.0940982 .0382737 -2.46 0.014 -.1691132 -.0190832 
 Age *** -.0197221 .0012541 -15.73 0.000 -.0221801 -.0172642 
 Counter *** .4978051 .0452635 11.00 0.000 .4090902 .58652 
 Discount .0608621 .043798 1.39 0.165 -.0249804 .1467047 
 Price1 *** -.0295995 .0018707 -15.82 0.000 -.0332659 -.025933 
 _cons .3276857 .1063901 3.08 0.002 .119165 .5362064 
 Number of obs  =  20732     LR chi2(7)  = 763.91     Prob > chi2 =  0.0000     Pseudo R2  =  0.1395 
 
Test Data 
 
       
Predictor variable: 
Cancel1 
Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
   
(base outcome) 0  
1 Score1 *** -5.298325 .4444654 -11.92 0.000 -6.169462 -4.427189 
 _cons 2.763311 .3610806 7.65 0.000 2.055606 3.471016 
 Number of obs  = 5192     LR chi2(1)  = 142.09     Prob > chi2  = 0.0000     Pseudo R2  = 0.1296 
  *** p≤0.001, ** 0.001<p≤0.01, * 0.01<p≤0.05, † 0.05<p≤0.10 
Table 18. BC25: Logistic Regression Results Year 1 
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Table 19. BC25: Logistic Regression Results Year 2 
 
 
Train Data       
       
Predictor variable: 
Cancel3 
Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
0  (base outcome) 
1 Usage3       
 Sub_opt * .5126922 .2138309 2.40 0.017 .0935913 .931793 
 Byo_opt † -.5525483 .2871131 -1.92 0.054 -1.11528 .0101829 
 Learn1       
 Learn -.0916818 .171519 -0.53 0.593 -.4278529 .2444892 
 Unlearn ** .2923039 .095267 3.07 0.002 .1055841 .4790238 
 Learn2       
 Learn -.302301 .2571228 -1.18 0.240 -.8062524 .2016503 
 Unlearn † .1938775 .143792 1.35 0.078 -.0879496 .4757045 
 Sex * -.1449627 .065908 -2.20 0.028 -.27414 -.0157854 
 Age *** -.0211077 .0020914 -10.09 0.000 -.0252069 -.0170086 
 Counter *** -.3804803 .0874149 -4.35 0.000 -.5518104 -.2091503 
 Discount * -.2698443 .1097479 -2.46 0.014 -.4849463 -.0547424 
 Price1 *** -.0321867 .0076579 -4.20 0.000 -.0471959 -.0171775 
 Price3 *** -.2733622 .0297071 -9.20 0.000 -.331587 -.2151374 
 _cons 14.45308 1.813562 -9.20 0.000 10.89857 18.0076 
 Number of obs  = 9758     LR chi2(7)  = 414.49     Prob > chi2  = 0.0000     Pseudo R2  = 0.1582 
Train Data       
       
Predictor variable: 
Cancel2 
Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
0  (base outcome) 
1 Usage2       
 Sub_opt *** .5790542 .1213919 4.77 0.000 .3411304 .816978 
 Byo_opt -.2430255 .1635224 -1.49 0.137 -.5635235 .0774725 
 Learn1       
 Learn .1488668 .1439758 1.03 0.301 -.1333204 .4310541 
 Unlearn *** .2339516 .0655672 3.57 0.000 .1054422 .362461 
 Sex † -.1293224 .0472778 -2.74 0.006 -.2219853 -.0366595 
 Age *** -.0229216 .0015103 -15.18 0.000 -.0258817 -.0199615 
 Counter *** -.202611 .0580594 -3.49 0.000 -.3164053 -.0888167 
 Discount *** -.2548946 .0712091 -3.58 0.000 -.3944618 -.1153274 
 Price1 -.0002564 .004578 -0.06 0.955 -.0092291 .0087163 
 Price2 *** -.2761223 .0191792 -14.40 0.000 -.3137129 -.2385317 
 _cons 13.07305 1.103427 11.85 0.000 10.91037 15.23573 
 Number of obs = 14865     LR chi2(7) = 776.40     Prob > chi2 = 0.0000     Pseudo R2  = 0.1594 
 
 
Test Data 
 
       
Predictor variable: 
Cancel2 
Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
   
(base outcome) 0  
1 Score2 *** -7.539727 .5207613 -14.48 0.000 -8.5604 -6.519053 
 _cons 4.675882 .4218643 11.08 0.000 3.849043 5.502721 
 Number of obs  =  3721     LR chi2(1)  =  220.23     Prob > chi2  =  0.0000     Pseudo R2  =  0.1627 
  *** p≤0.001, ** 0.001<p≤0.01, * 0.01<p≤0.05, † 0.05<p≤0.10 
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Test Data [Continued] 
       
Predictor variable: 
Cancel3 
Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
   
(base outcome) 0  
1 Score3 *** -8.358625 .9051236 -9.23 0.000 -10.13263 -6.584616 
 _cons 5.28122 .7758297 6.81 0.000 3.760622 6.801818 
 Number of obs  = 2383     LR chi2(1)  = 85.93     Prob > chi2  = 0.0000     Pseudo R2  = 0.1486 
  *** p≤0.001, ** 0.001<p≤0.01, * 0.01<p≤0.05, † 0.05<p≤0.10 
Table 20. BC25: Logistic Regression Results Year 3 
 
 
Train Data       
       
Predictor variable: 
Cancel4 
Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
0  (base outcome) 
1 Usage4       
 Sub_opt ** 1.07016 .3754394 2.85 0.004 .3343122 1.806008 
 Byo_opt .2507131 .4378062 0.57 0.567 -.6073714 1.108798 
 Learn1       
 Learn * -.3515801 .2374953 -1.48 0.039 -.8170623 .1139021 
 Unlearn .0009643 .1340184 0.01 0.994 -.2617069 .2636355 
 Learn2       
 Learn .0742739 .3166385 0.23 0.815 -.5463262 .694874 
 Unlearn .2346243 .1889822 1.24 0.214 -.135774 .6050226 
 Learn3       
 Learn † .7694433 .4031464 1.91 0.056 -.0207092 1.559596 
 Unlearn -.1653782 .2818142 -0.59 0.557 -.7177239 .3869676 
 Sex † .1435939 .0850454 1.69 0.091 -.0230919 .3102797 
 Age *** -.0203129 .0027098 -7.50 0.000 -.0256241 -.0150017 
 Counter ** -.3127357 .1191712 -2.62 0.009 -.5463071 -.0791644 
 Discount *** -.5157693 .1493044 -3.45 0.001 -.8084005 -.2231381 
 Price1 *** -.0544689 .0102242 -5.33 0.000 -.0745079 -.0344298 
 Price4 *** -.5623422 .0561347 -10.02 0.000 -.6723641 -.4523202 
 _cons 30.16949 3.278696 9.20 0.000 23.74336 36.59561 
 Number of obs  =  6797     LR chi2(7)  =  305.60     Prob > chi2  =  0.0000     Pseudo R2  =  0.1702 
 
 
Test Data 
 
       
Predictor variable: 
Cancel4 
Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
   
(base outcome) 0  
1        
 Score4 *** -8.782198 1.173456 -7.48 0.000 -11.08213 -6.482267 
 _cons 5.64092 1.029995 5.48 0.000 3.622166 7.659673 
 Number of obs  =  1672     LR chi2(1)  =  54.61     Prob > chi2  =  0.0000     Pseudo R2  =  0.1493 
  *** p≤0.001, ** 0.001<p≤0.01, * 0.01<p≤0.05, † 0.05<p≤0.10 
Table 21. BC25: Logistic Regression Results Year 4 
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Table 22. BC50: Logistic Regression Results Year 1 
 
 
Train Data       
       
Predictor variable: 
Cancel2 
Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
0  (base outcome) 
1 Usage2       
 Sub_opt *** .7431805 .0659105 11.28 0.000 .6139982 .8723628 
 Byo_opt * -1.607647 .7238119 -2.22 0.026 -3.026292 -.1890019 
 Learn1       
 Learn -.0898962 .0990393 -0.91 0.364 -.2840097 .1042173 
 Unlearn *** .3693834 .055955 6.60 0.000 .2597136 .4790533 
 Sex .0248277 .0429621 0.58 0.563 -.0593765 .1090319 
 Age *** -.019732 .0011794 -16.73 0.000 -.0220436 -.0174204 
 Counter * -.1250003 .0495949 -2.52 0.012 -.2222045 -.0277962 
 Price1 *** -.0048165 .0010069 -4.78 0.000 -.0067901 -.002843 
 Price2 *** .0058672 .0009812 5.98 0.000 .0039441 .0077903 
 _cons -1.500894 .0927014 -16.19 0.000 -1.682586 -1.319203 
 Number of obs  =  16759     LR chi2(7)  =  802.92     Prob > chi2  =  0.0000     Pseudo R2  =  0.1521 
  
Train Data       
       
Predictor variable: 
Cancel1 
Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
0  (base outcome) 
1 Usage1       
 Sub_opt *** .4756355 .0374122 12.71 0.000 .4023089 .5489621 
 Byo_opt -.7668171 .531948 -1.44 0.149 -1.809416 .2757818 
 Sex *** -.1374213 .0331062 -4.15 0.000 -.2023083 -.0725343 
 Age *** -.0239629 .0009613 -24.93 0.000 -.025847 -.0220787 
 Counter *** .5254999 .0382934 13.72 0.000 .4504462 .6005536 
 Price1 *** .0018916 .0003343 5.66 0.000 .0012363 .0025468 
 _cons -1.169138 .0650967 -17.96 0.000 -1.296725 -1.041551 
 Number of obs  =  22319     LR chi2(7)  =  933.98     Prob > chi2  =  0.0000     Pseudo R2  =  0.1386 
 
 
Test Data 
 
       
Predictor variable: 
Cancel1 
Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
   
(base outcome) 0  
1 Score1 *** -5.494056 .3921509 -14.01 0.000 -6.262657 -4.725454 
 _cons 3.013052 .296428 10.16 0.000 2.432064 3.59404 
 Number of obs  =  5589     LR chi2(1)  =  206.82     Prob > chi2  =  0.0000     Pseudo R2  =  0.1338 
  *** p≤0.001, ** 0.001<p≤0.01, * 0.01<p≤0.05, † 0.05<p≤0.10 
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Test Data [Continued] 
       
Predictor variable: 
Cancel2 
Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
   
(base outcome) 0  
1 Score2 *** -6.29703 .484187 -13.01 0.000 -7.246019 -5.348041 
 _cons 3.58395 .391392 9.16 0.000 2.816836 4.351065 
 Number of obs  =  4156     LR chi2(1)  =  172.08     Prob > chi2  =  0.0000     Pseudo R2  =  0.1448 
  *** p≤0.001, ** 0.001<p≤0.01, * 0.01<p≤0.05, † 0.05<p≤0.10 
Table 23. BC50: Logistic Regression Results Year 2 
 
 
Train Data       
       
Predictor variable: 
Cancel3 
Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
0  (base outcome) 
1 Usage3       
 Sub_opt *** .7188157 .1030873 6.97 0.000 .5167684 .920863 
 Byo_opt -.6704568 .7370258 -0.91 0.363 -2.115001 .7740872 
 Learn1       
 Learn -.1371264 .1152719 -1.19 0.234 -.3630553 .0888024 
 Unlearn ** .2679592 .0935053 2.87 0.004 .0846922 .4512263 
 Learn2       
 Learn -.2179856 .1568131 -1.39 0.164 -.5253335 .0893624 
 Unlearn *** .5422147 .0957284 5.66 0.000 .3545905 .7298389 
        
 Sex -.0972741 .0612856 -1.59 0.112 -.2173917 .0228434 
 Age *** -.0222946 .0016085 -13.86 0.000 -.0254473 -.0191419 
 Counter † -.1423367 .0731626 -1.95 0.052 -.2857329 .0010594 
 Price1 *** -.0044596 .0013008 -3.43 0.001 -.0070091 -.0019102 
 Price3 ** .0036534 .0012311 2.97 0.003 .0012405 .0060663 
 _cons -1.306495 .1380299 -9.47 0.000 -1.577028 -1.035961 
 Number of obs  =  10103     LR chi2(7)  =  497.34     Prob > chi2  =  0.0000     Pseudo R2  =  0.1615 
 
 
Test Data 
 
       
Predictor variable: 
Cancel3 
Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
   
(base outcome) 0  
1        
 Score3 *** -6.194752 .6689345 -9.26 0.000 -7.505839 -4.883664 
 _cons 3.416759 .5622968 6.08 0.000 2.314678 4.51884 
 Number of obs  =  2524     LR chi2(1)  =  83.22     Prob > chi2  =  0.0000     Pseudo R2  =  0.1415 
  *** p≤0.001, ** 0.001<p≤0.01, * 0.01<p≤0.05, † 0.05<p≤0.10 
Table 24. BC50: Logistic Regression Results Year 3 
  
Learning Effects in Loyalty Programs 
 
150 
Train Data       
       
Predictor variable: 
Cancel4 
Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
0  (base outcome) 
1 Usage4       
 Sub_opt *** 1.017672 .1562682 6.51 0.000 .711392 1.323952 
 Byo_opt -.6089508 1.039108 -0.59 0.558 -2.645565 1.427663 
 Learn1       
 Learn .1201663 .1561639 0.77 0.442 -.1859093 .4262418 
 Unlearn .0916433 .1339734 0.68 0.494 -.1709397 .3542264 
 Learn2       
 Learn -.0857325 .184297 -0.47 0.642 -.4469481 .2754831 
 Unlearn .2061346 .1465425 1.41 0.160 -.0810834 .4933525 
 Learn3       
 Learn -.1274749 .2369625 -0.54 0.591 -.5919129 .336963 
 Unlearn † .1698037 .1505395 1.13 0.059 -.1252483 .4648557 
 Sex ** -.212289 .0821682 -2.58 0.010 -.3733356 -.0512423 
 Age *** -.0108393 .0020326 -5.33 0.000 -.0148231 -.0068554 
 Counter *** -.3438612 .1003146 -3.43 0.001 -.5404743 -.1472482 
 Price1 *** -.0067795 .0015135 -4.48 0.000 -.009746 -.0038131 
 Price4 *** .0053729 .0014224 3.78 0.000 .0025852 .0081607 
 _cons -1.842428 .2147087 -8.5 0.000 -2.263249 -1.421606 
 Number of obs  =  6075     LR chi2(7)  =  273.62     Prob > chi2  =  0.0000     Pseudo R2  =  0.1579 
 
 
Test Data 
 
       
Predictor variable: 
Cancel4 
Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|Z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
   
(base outcome) 0  
1        
 Score4 *** -8.174239 1.141897 -7.16 0.000 -10.41232 -5.936163 
 _cons 5.04223 .967529 5.21 0.000 3.145908 6.938552 
 Number of obs  =  1480     LR chi2(1)  =  52.32     Prob > chi2  =  0.0000     Pseudo R2  =  0.1476 
  *** p≤0.001, ** 0.001<p≤0.01, * 0.01<p≤0.05, † 0.05<p≤0.10 
Table 25. BC50: Logistic Regression Results Year 4 
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6.3 Discussion 
At this juncture, we do not focus on the development of a prediction model for cancellations, as 
for example famously done by Coussement and Van den Poel (2008), Hadden et al. (2007) or 
Neslin et al. (2006), although our model obviously outperforms random models. This approach 
is supposed to illustrate the impact of learning and basic customer information on cancellation 
behavior, the interdependency with the intensity or quality of usage, and pricing issues and their 
changes over time. It complements the findings of study 1 and 2, and outlines temporal effects 
in terms of usage, learning and pricing (price perception) in a cancellation context. We find that 
unlearning effects tend to increase contract cancellation probabilities in the high-price context, 
whereas learning effects tend to lower cancellation risks. Counter-intuitively learning tends to 
make cancellations more likely in contracts of more than two years in the low-price segment 
(within the first two years of contract duration those effects are mixed). Unlearning fosters can-
cellation in the first two years of a contract, and surprisingly tends to reduce the cancellation 
risks afterwards. These observations concerning the low-price segment seem to be irrational. 
The low price of the BahnCard indicates that it is less important for the way of usage whether a 
customer learns, unlearns or neither learns nor unlearns. Still, the question remains why the 
impact of learning (and unlearning) on cancellation exhibits unexpected effects in the first two 
years of a contract (and from contract year three)? Learning theories suggest that decision mak-
ers’ patterns of learning and action depend on the extent to which their organizations’ perfor-
mance differs from their aspiration levels (Cyert and March 1963; Greve 2003). Aspiration-
performance feedback models emphasize how perceptions of success and failure motivate 
change: satisfactory outcomes that meet aspirations foster local search of old certainties that 
reinforce and refine lessons drawn from earlier experience; outcomes that fail to meet or exceed 
aspirations stimulate nonlocal search for new possibilities to correct or further enhance perfor-
mance (Cyert and March 1963; Levitt and March 1988; March and Shapira 1992). We assume 
that a certain level of price induces rational behavior. Below this, other (contingent) factors 
seem to be of greater importance. 
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Another interesting outcome is the following: the higher the subsequent prices of ongoing annu-
al contracts, the lower is the risk of a contract cancellation in the low- price segment, and the 
higher the corresponding risk in the high-price segment. This finding has important implications 
on the pricing of two-part tariff systems. Accordingly, the company implementing loyalty cards 
based on a two-part tariff-system should set the initial prices relatively high and in the following 
contract periods reduce it in the high-price segment, and increase it in the low-price segment. 
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7. General Discussion 
This study’s purpose is to shed light on the nature of customers’ learning and unlearning curves 
and point out linkages between learn and price effects and customer retention (in general as well 
as concerning change over time). Table 26 summarizes the main findings. 
Learning and unlearning of loyalty card usage in two-part pricing system is not characterized by 
an inverse relationship but substantially involves the price context (Study 1). From firm per-
spective, learning and unlearning, as well as point of usage and pricing issues can be significant-
ly associated with contract cancellation in loyalty programs (Study 2). Knowledge on effect 
changes over time and variations on the price context (Study 3) can be used by firms to re-
develop, communicate and fine-tune their loyalty card systems. Thus, understanding the nature 
of (un)learning and its interrelationship with pricing issues contribute to a successful employ-
ment of loyalty programs. 
Field  Hypothesis Result Addendum to Findings 
Learning Curve H1a Curve structures differ (learn vs. unlearn).  In low- and high-price context. 
H1b Curve structures vary across price contexts.  – 
Learning (and 
 Cancellation) 
H2a Cancellation rate decreases over time.  In low- and high-price context. 
H2b Cancellation rate is lower for learners and 
higher for ‘unlearners’. 
Partly 
confirmed 
Full support in the high- and 
mixed support in the low-price 
context. 
H2c (Un)Learning effects affect cancellation.  But: not regardless when (during 
the customer life cycle) and how 
(learn, unlearn) they appear. 
PoU (and  
Cancellation) 
H3a Ticket purchases via counter affect cancella-
tion. 
 In low- and high-price context. 
H3b Ticket purchases via Internet affect cancella-
tion. 
Rejected No support in low- and high-price 
context. 
Price (and  
Cancellation) 
H4a Price sensitivity affects cancellation.  In low- and high-price context. 
H4b Initial price affects cancellation.  In low- and high-price context. 
H4c Current price affects cancellation.  In low- and high-price context. 
Usage (and  
Cancellation) 
H5a Current usage affects cancellation.  In low- and high-price context. 
H5b Past usage can affect cancellation. Partly 
confirmed 
In low- and high-price context, 
but not in any period. 
Learning Effect H6 Effect direction changes over time.  Effect direction varies across low- 
and high-price context. 
Price Effect H7 Effect direction does not change over time.  Effect direction is constant across 
low- and high-price context. 
Table 26. Summary of Results 
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7.1 Theoretical Implications 
This research adds to theory how customers learn in loyalty programs, and how behavioral as-
pects and price structures affect customer loyalty. Analyzing customer data of a satellite televi-
sion firm, Jamal and Bucklin (2006) find significant links between churn rates and variables 
capturing customer service experience, failure recovery efforts, and payment equity. Our results 
extend their finding concerning service experience in terms of usage, learning and unlearning to 
the railway sector, which are relevant most likely in various other customer loyalty program 
contexts, particularly in two-part tariff systems. 
The present work likewise complements a recent literature on choice and consumption under 
multi (two and more)-part tariffs (Ascarza, Lambrecht, and Vilcassim 2012; Bagh and Bhargava 
2007; Grubb 2009; Grubb and Osborne 2011; Iyengar, Ansari, and Gupta 2007; Jensen 2006), 
which has so far abstracted from potential effects of the tariff structure on usage and customer 
retention. As an exception, Iyengar et al. (2011) explore how tariff structure affects customer 
retention, usage and profitability of access services on pay-per-use versus two-part tariffs, and 
find that customers’ marginal utility of consumption is lower on latter tariff. We integrate cus-
tomer learning and unlearning into this context and highlight their temporal effects in a longitu-
dinal approach. More broadly our work contributes to research that explores behavioral effects 
of pricing and customer relationship management (CRM). This includes the insight that attrib-
utes of a price or a tariff structure can affect behavior beyond their direct cost implications (Ber-
tini and Wathieu 2008), systematic effects of price endings on customers' purchase decisions 
(Anderson and Simester 2003; Thomas and Morwitz 2005), or contractual change (particularly 
termination) that follows specific price adjustments (Study 2). Analyzing methodological fac-
tors in the contribution to the accuracy of customer churn predictive models Neslin et al. (2006) 
find that logistic approaches perform “relatively well”. However, they can also help to deter-
mine the importance and direction of learn and price effects over time within a tariff system 
(Study 3). Eventually, the definition of customer learning in this paper is categorized in terms of 
change in rational decision making and supplements conventional economic learning concepts 
(of product usage). Still, in learning curve research the role of organizational (Baum and Dahlin 
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2007) as well as behavioral performance (in terms of contractual behavior) is implicit (Study 1). 
So our approach demonstrates the role of learning on loyalty program performance. 
Past research in psychology and marketing suggests that the pricing structure a firm chooses can 
alter customers’ value for a product or a service (Iyengar et al. 2011). Our results motivate a 
more extensive study of how different tariff structures (e.g., three-part tariffs and flat fee pric-
ing), customer learning and usage adaption affect the stability of customer contracts. For exam-
ple, future research could examine the effect of other tariff structures, such as bucket pricing 
that strictly limit consumption to the usage allowance (Schlereth and Skiera 2012), on custom-
ers’ valuation of a service and their willingness to adopt and change tariffs. Future work could 
also address customer acquisition and market expansion effects of introducing two- or more-
part tariffs and could examine how a firm can optimally combine different tariff systems. Be-
sides, an examination of the validity and robustness of this approach including other products 
and service industries (at later stages in the life-cycle that operate in a competitive environment) 
seems promising. 
Of course, our analysis does not come without limitations. For example, we did not control for 
income effects, nor did we consider the possibility to switch between tariff regimes. A compre-
hensive (multi-stage) approach which integrates the competing risks of upgrade or downgrade 
scenarios as well as switching costs could also be an interesting issue for future research. Alt-
hough data from CRM databases are more realistic, they suffer from consumer self-selection 
issues and limited variability in prices over time as compared to field experiment data (Iyengar 
et al. 2011). Finally, we considered a huge customer loyalty program offered by the major Ger-
man railway company. 
7.2 Managerial Implications 
An emerging question is how firms should make marketing mix choices when customers exhibit 
various types of bounds on rationality. As Ellison (2005) notes, if customers exhibit various 
biases relative to rational choice, from the firm’s point of view, such biases will have the same 
practical importance as product differentiation, though an identical product might be differenti-
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ated by idiosyncrasies in consumer cognition rather than in tastes. This study suggest a possibil-
ity to model adaption of usage and learning in order to appropriately re-develop and optimize 
operative tariff-systems. 
Our findings have important implications. First, they suggest that companies should make use of 
CRM databases for assessing the impact of (new) tariff structures, and hence to better under-
stand how (new) tariffs affect customer behavior. This is important to set optimal prices (and 
switching fees) and implement segment-specific approaches and adequate CRM-strategies. 
Thereby, our approach considers the concept of perceived price fairness (Bolton, Warlop, and 
Alba 2003; Xia, Monroe, and Cox 2004), at this, the result being consistent with prospect theory 
and mental accounting, which suggests that consumers tend to perceive multiple prices as more 
punishing than a single price of equal amount (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Thaler 1985; Tha-
ler and Johnson 1990) – in our case, not least when the subsequent prices exceed the initial 
price. Additionally, these specific aspects of customer knowledge are applicable for the compo-
sition and configuration of customer loyalty programs. Second, they outline the importance of 
customer learning in loyalty card systems as a driver of customer retention and emphasize the 
need to conceptualize and foster learning by providing transparency and support in company 
communications, incentives to learn, and other motivational aspects in customer relationships. 
Third, they add to existing issues in e-tailing research (Grewal and Levy 2009) pointing on how 
to coordinate online and offline distribution channels in the context of two-part pricing systems. 
Here, Wallace, Giese, and Johnson (2004) conclude that multiple channel strategies are useful in 
satisfying multiple channel customers’ high expectations and retaining customers. However, our 
results provide explicit indication for differences in loyalty in different distribution channels of 
the railway setting and can help to develop preliminary concepts and strategies to approach this 
issue. 
Altogether, our findings emphasize the relevance for an integrative treatment of usage, usage 
adoption (learning), and perceptional price policies and strategies in the development and appli-
cation of CRM strategies and concepts.  
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IV. THE SUCCESS OF ART GALLERIES: A DYNAMIC MODEL WITH 
COMPETITION AND INFORMATION EFFECTS 
 
“We have art to save ourselves from the truth.” 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) 
1. Abstract 
An intrinsic characteristic of cultural goods is the unpredictability of their economic success. 
Arts goods in particular share characteristics with credence, inspection and experience goods. 
Accordingly, art collectors rely on the experience and the reputation of art galleries when in-
vesting in artwork. Some qualitative sociological studies have found that only a few very suc-
cessful galleries represent the bulk of the most visible and most successful artists (e.g. Crane 
1989; Currid 2007). This paper investigates the success of art galleries in a dynamic model 
which elaborates different statistical processes that allow us to analyze the development of dif-
ferent types of success distributions in the market for art galleries. Instead of applying standard 
economic analysis only, we employ methods form statistical physics to construct a model of 
gallery investment and competition. Our model entails information, competition and innovation 
effects. Subsequently, art market data are used to test which version of the model fits best. We 
find the lognormal distribution provides the best fit and conclude that the data generating pro-
cess is compatible with the version of the model which entails an inhomogeneous geometric 
Brownian motion. Hence the success of art galleries depends strongly on information and inno-
vation effects, but is hardly affected by competition effects. We argue that the superstar effect in 
the case of art galleries can be understood as an appropriation of search and entrance costs 
which emerge whenever consumption requires special knowledge and social inclusion. 
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2. Introduction 
From an economic perspective, the art market (in a ‘nutshell’) displays the pivotal problems of 
markets with high quality uncertainty and considerable innovation intensity. New artists enter-
ing the market are unknown and the products they manufacture require a lot of explanation and 
evaluation. On the other side of the market, collectors and investors know neither the artist nor 
her or his work. It is the task of galleries to close the gap between artists and collec-
tors/investors. Entering the market of galleries is also a highly risky enterprise since it entails 
specific investments, particularly in knowledge of arts, i.e., human capital. This specific human 
capital does not command high returns outside galleries (and museums). Moreover, with estab-
lished galleries already in the market, it is difficult to establish a new gallery as a newcomer. 
This structure of the market seems to be well suited for an investigation of its evolutionary dy-
namics. First of all, the market is clearly defined and separated from other markets as, e.g., the 
secondary market for known art work. Moreover, ‘success’ in this market is easily observed by 
the ranking of new artists, introduced by the respective gallery. Although galleries are certainly 
not in the main interest of economics, we believe they may serve as a model-market for inter-
mediaries in markets with high quality uncertainty and innovation. That is why we consider it 
well suited for an application of our methodology which can presumably be transferred to simi-
lar markets. 
To understand art markets in greater detail, it is to be recognized that an intrinsic characteristic 
of cultural goods is the unpredictability of their economic success.
 
Arts goods share characteris-
tics with credence, inspection and experience goods. These characteristics create problems for 
uninformed customers because of the uncertainty about quality that goes hand in hand with art-
works. Additionally, it is obvious that art is taste-driven and thus needs an intense, subjective 
evaluation. A buyer therefore has to overcome this information problem that is inherent in the 
characteristics of works of art. Some of the studies which examine the evaluation of cultural 
goods are discussed by Frey (1997), Ginsburgh (2003) as well as Hutter and Throsby (2008). 
Reputational approaches in this context are provided by Canals-Cerdá (2012) and Schönfeld and 
Reinstaller (2007). 
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Uncertain subjective quality evaluations trigger the emergence of institutions in a market econ-
omy intended to reduce this uncertainty. Referring to this fact, a whole industry of experts has 
evolved, which helps to overcome quality uncertainty by actively evaluating and distributing 
information on works of art (Becker 1982; Caves 2000; Currid 2007). Particularly gallery own-
ers like Monika Sprüth have become very important because they decide which artists they will 
show, which works they will present and how much they will invest in the development of the 
artist and the style she or he represents. 
In a world centered on stardom and hits we assume that the glamorous business of arts should 
not only have superstars on the side of artists, but also winners on the side of galleries. Some 
qualitative sociological studies have found that only a few very successful galleries represent 
the bulk of the most visible and most successful artists (e.g. Crane 1989; Currid 2007). Never-
theless, despite the fact that the superstar effects are analyzed in mass markets (e.g. Franck and 
Nüesch 2007), deep-pocket markets like the market for art galleries are still hardly ever ex-
plored. Heretofore, researchers have paid more attention to the economics of museums. For 
instance, Camarero, Garrido, and Vicente (2011) provide empirical evidence on innovations in 
museums and their impact on museums’ economic, market and social performance, whereas 
Frey and Meier (2006) reflect upon the functioning of museums in general, and particularly 
address the evolution of ‘superstar museums’. Moreover, Frey (1998) investigates the impact of 
superstar status of museums on museum policy and its consequences for human resource man-
agement. 
In this context, Adler’s (1985) and Rosen’s (1981) theories of superstars have been applied to 
various markets. Ehrmann et al. (2009), for instance, analyze superstar effects in the market for 
quality restaurants, Walls (2010) analyzes weekly DVD sales revenues in North-America, Pitt 
(2010) emphasizes a new understanding of the music industry from a performing rights organi-
zation, Filimon et al. (2011) explore stardom and popularity of musical artists in Spain concern-
ing their purchase of CDs, and Nelson and Glotfelty (2012) examine the relationship between 
movie star power and box office revenues. 
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In this paper, we examine the success of galleries in the German art market. For instance, when 
Monika Sprüth opened her first gallery in Cologne in February 1983, she was advocating the 
talents of the emerging artists Jenny Holzer, Barbara Kruger, Cindy Sherman and Rosemarie 
Trockel. Sprüth countered an art market dominated by male artists with a gallery focused on 
female artists. Her efforts brought these female artists to international prominence. By doing so 
she also helped previously underappreciated female artists with an entirely new style to estab-
lish a reputation. Monika Sprüth made very uncertain, but highly innovative long-term invest-
ments in some artists with new styles. Her gallery (now Sprüth & Magers) subsequently became 
highly successful. 
The main objective of our paper is to analyze quantitatively whether superstar effects exist in 
this particular market and if so, to find an adequate approximation of the underlying mechanism 
for the evolution of art galleries. The paper contributes in three ways to the growing literature 
on superstar effects. First, we take up ideas from statistical physics to model processes that al-
low us to analyze the development of different types of distributions of success in the market for 
art galleries. Second, we apply new methods of empirical testing to determine which distribu-
tion best fits our data. Our data reveals lognormal distribution (as the consequence of a geomet-
ric Brownian motion) constituting the underlying stochastic process. Third, we offer an eco-
nomic meaning for this process. In doing so, we hypothesize that the art marketing process is 
not inherently rudderless, and we propose a reversed version of Baumol’s (1986) assumption 
and suggest that the imperfection of the available information on prices and transactions does 
matter (in the sense that better information about the behavior of the market could help to make 
decisions more effectively). 
The rest of our paper is organized as follows: First we describe the deep-pocket market of art 
galleries. Then we outline a theoretical model with different versions for the development pro-
cess of this market. By combining characteristics of the market for art galleries with well-known 
stochastic processes, the paper offers several theoretical probability density functions which 
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would result from the underlying processes. Thereafter, we empirically test which distribution 
best fits the data. The last section concludes. 
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3. Methodological Approach 
In this paper, we combine economic analysis with methods from ‘econophysics’ (see, for in-
stance, the textbook of Sinha et al. 2011). Because such a procedure is rather uncommon, some 
explanatory remarks seem necessary. Our main research question – as stated above – is a dy-
namic one: What kind of dynamic economic process takes effect such that a small, inconsequen-
tial firm (here an art gallery) becomes dominant in a field? From a purely economic point of 
view, three main effects are to be expected: ‘information’ provided by the respective gallery for 
actual as well as potential art buyers, ‘specific investments’ in the artists a particular gallery 
represents and ‘competition’ from other galleries which are also active in the particular (two-
sided) market. Specific investments are tools to gain comparative advantage in the market 
whereas competition among firms tends to destroy all comparative advantages a particular firm 
may gain. In short, a Schumpeter (1934, 1942) process of ‘creative destruction’ is to be ex-
pected economically. In economics, the method to check the Schumpeter hypothesis is to con-
struct an economic model and to solve it by comparative static or comparative dynamic meth-
ods. An econometric analysis with an estimation equation based on the results of the compara-
tive static or comparative static results would then follow suit.
18
 
However, the disadvantage of this conventional approach is that it says almost nothing about the 
dynamic process that governs the empirical results, i.e., the process is a ‘black box’. As is well-
known, economic processes over time are not deterministic and, hence, one cannot be sure that 
the results of the process are due to economic variables or pure chance. Instead of applying 
standard economic analysis only, we employ methods form statistical physics (also called ‘eco-
nophysics’) to construct a model of investment and competition for two-sided markets, based on 
the case of galleries. In contrast to economics, in econophysics dynamic processes can be speci-
fied by a number of rather well-known stochastic processes. Most interestingly, these stochastic 
processes lead to different distributions of the variable under investigation (here the success of 
art galleries). The empirical distribution of the success variable can be tested as to which theo-
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 A Schumpeterian perspective is also taken by Etro and Pagani (2012) who analyze the determinants of 
the prices of paintings. 
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retical distribution fits best the empirical one. If the result is coherent, it is possible to draw a 
conclusion on the dynamic process that generated the distribution. In such a way the stochastic 
process can be identified. Having identified the dynamic process, the economic mechanism of 
interaction between galleries’ investments and competition can be determined. 
The method applied in this paper is as follows: First, the ranking of galleries with respect to 
their success of promoting artists is formalized. Second, several specified dynamic approaches 
from statistical physics are employed to model the development of success of art galleries over 
time. These specified dynamic processes possess well-defined distributions for the success vari-
able of the paper. Third, it is tested which of these distributions fits best the empirical distribu-
tion of the success variable. 
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4. The Market for Art Galleries 
Worldwide there are about 18,000 art galleries, 22,000 museums or art collections, 1,500 auc-
tion houses and 500 fairs, quite recently spanning a market of a double-digit billion dollar vol-
ume (Artprize 2011).
19
 We use the German art market as a pars pro toto for the global art indus-
try. According to BMWi (2009a) and BMWi (2009b), with an annual turnover of nearly €2 
billion in 2008, this art market is one of the smallest branches of the creative industry.
20
 This 
volume is more or less equally distributed among artists (39%), exhibitions (31%) and the art 
trade (e.g. auctioneers, galleries; 30%). The dominant galleries and art dealers generate a signif-
icant percentage of their turnover abroad. Most of the approximately 1,900 German galleries are 
single person firms or at least very small enterprises. At most 40 to 50 galleries compete suc-
cessfully in the international art market. 
Artists who intend to sell their works attempt to do so by using art galleries as middlemen. Gal-
leries are the intermediaries between artists and both art investors and art collectors. The ever-
growing demand for the information services of intermediaries should have a positive impact on 
the likelihood of success for ‘qualified’ art dealers. But do the economics of the gallery sector 
support the long-term success of individual actors? 
Concerning market entry, no specific qualification such as a degree in arts, art history or in eco-
nomics, is necessary to open a gallery. Other relevant barriers to entering the art market appear 
to be predominantly absent. Neither economies of scale nor extraordinary capital requirements 
can be detected from the outset. Switching costs appear to be relatively low and in terms of the 
concept of Porter’s ‘five forces’, only moderate threats – apart from the threat of entry – affect 
the market. Galleries choose and promote particular artists who represent the ‘supplier side’ in 
this model framework. The corresponding bargaining power of the individual artist only rises 
with growing reputation and success in the art market, but initially it is very low. 
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 In the course of the worldwide economic crisis of 2008, the art market collapsed, but it has been gradu-
ally recovering since 2009. 
20
 This means 1.5% of the creative industry and 0.04% of the overall economy. Aside from any economic 
figures, the importance of the art market in terms of reputation building (e.g. for cities) should be empha-
sized. 
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In contrast, the bargaining power of the ‘buyer side’ (e.g. private collectors) has recently tended 
to grow (Artprize 2011). However, successful galleries serve a specific wealthy clientele whose 
purchases of works of art are supposedly price inelastic. 
In addition, ‘rivalry’ among galleries is not such an issue as it obviously is in other economic 
sectors. Keeping in close contact with other galleries as well as with collectors, artists and mu-
seums is essential for successfully communicating the galleries’ visions and realizing their stra-
tegic ambitions. Because credence, inspection and experience are central characteristics of art-
dealing, art galleries play a key role in determining the development of a whole industry. 
Although barriers to entry do not exist to any great extent, the most surprising empirical fact is 
perhaps the control of this large sector by only a hundred persons. This emphasizes the rele-
vance of a reputation building process in the market for artworks. 
Investing in the most recent contemporary art is a very risky endeavor. At the point of a first 
investment in an artist, it is almost impossible to predict the likelihood of success. One of the 
reasons, is that this kind of art needs to be subjected to the test of time, i.e., people will have to 
determine whether an artwork has intrinsic aesthetic value or not.
21
 So it could well be, that the 
value creation of an artwork is a process in which the work creates its own success, based on an 
information cascade (Bikhchandani et al. 1992; Chamley 2004, pp.58; Watts 2002) triggered 
somewhere in the world of arts. A gallery that was successful in the past may have the ad-
vantage of having gained an expert reputation in the selection of future trends compared to less 
successful galleries. The success of such a gallery suggests expertise in predicting future trends, 
which will lead to creating those trends. Taking the selection of a successful gallery as a signal 
for a future trend, investors and collectors will invest in the works and artists represented by that 
gallery which, as a consequence, will become even more successful. In this way a successful 
gallery could create self-fulfilling prophecies about future trends through its own selections. 
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 In a sense, this kind of value creation resembles the pricing processes in the stock market or the selec-
tion of a new restaurant whose quality is unknown up to that point (Banerjee 1992; Becker 1991; Karni 
and Levin 1994). 
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The economic question therefore remains: How can a gallery that was successful in the past 
gain an ever increasing reputational advantage as an expert in the selection of future trends 
compared to less successful galleries? 
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5. Model 
As the most crucial empirical aspect of the arts market, the dominance of a few galleries (ranked 
by their success in promoting previously unknown artists) in the market is taken for granted. 
Since art galleries are in the middle between unknown artists and ignorant potential art buyers, 
this is a version of a two-sided market. (For a definition and the conceptual background of the 
latter see, e.g., Rochet and Tirole 2003, 2004, 2006; Rysman 2009.) Rather than analyzing pric-
ing of gallery services and art works, the objective is here to model ‘success’ of art galleries in 
the above sense. As in most markets – whether one-sided or two-sided – competition, innova-
tion and information are among the usually expected success factors. However, it is not at all 
clear how the dynamics of success are to be determined in a market that is prone to high-level 
quality uncertainty. Instead of employing a purely (more or less static) economic model, it 
seems more adequate here to use economic ideas of competition, innovation and information 
and combine them with known dynamic processes of statistical physics.
22
 In such a way it 
seems possible to integrate economic knowledge of markets and their underlying evolutionary 
dynamics. 
To analyze the success of galleries in a two-sided market, its success has to be defined quantita-
tively. Let    be the number of points a gallery   (       ) gains by representing artists who 
have recently become highly esteemed. For instance, take the top-ten ranking of artists and allo-
cate a certain number of points to each of the places in the ranking, with the largest number of 
points to be allocated to the highest-ranked artist and so on in descending order: 
            .         (1) 
Obviously,   is the rank of gallery   . According to Stanley et al. (1995) the ranking can be for-
malized as follows: 
 
 
    (  )          (2) 
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 For a representative sample of research in this field see the papers in the Journal of Dynamics and Con-
trol 32(1), 2008: 1-320: “Applications of statistical physics in economics and finance”. 
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or equivalently: 
      [   (  )]     ,        (3) 
with  (  ) as the cumulative distribution function of   . 
The question is what kind of distribution the observations    of the gallery success performance 
measure will follow. 
First of all, there is competition among galleries for success with the artists they represent. It is 
well known that competition has an equalizing effect on the relative success of competitors. 
This actually is one of the main effects of competition. Therefore, the relative success of galler-
ies will have a tendency to the mean success, μ: 
   ( )     (      ( ))        (4) 
with: 
   ( ): the change of   ( ) over time t, 
μ: mean value of success   ( ) with    , 
θ: parameter for the speed of reversion to the mean,    , and 
λ: parameter with which the state of   ( ) enters the mean-reverting process,      . 
In (4), θ is a parameter that measures the speed with which deviations from the mean return to it 
again. This speed of convergence may be interpreted as the degree of competition intensity on 
the respective market. Put differently,   ⁄  could be defined as a measure of market failure. 
With this interpretation, μ would be the long-term equilibrium success value for galleries in a 
competitive market. 
The parameter λ measures the influence of the state variable    in the mean-reverting process. 
Since it is assumed to be in the range between zero and unity, even large states of    may have a 
small influence on the mean-reverting process. Economically this may mean that highly suc-
cessful galleries support the mean-reverting effect of the competition between galleries to only a 
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minor extent. A reason for this may be that the galleries undertook long-term investments in 
some artists (with new styles) that later became highly successful and that this investment is 
unique, or at least well-nigh impossible to imitate. A good example of both a very successful 
and a very innovative gallery is the above mentioned gallery, Sprüth & Magers. Advocating 
female artists with a new style, Monika Sprüth gave birth to several star artists of international 
reputation. 
In a sense, λ may be interpreted as a measure of the degree of innovation in arts23 which was 
triggered by high-risk investments in some artists. The innovation is the greater the smaller λ is. 
A first model for the success of galleries (or even success in two-sided markets with high quali-
ty uncertainty), particularly for the achievements of galleries, can be formalized as follows. Let 
the dynamics of Xi be described by the following stochastic differential equation: 
   ( )    (    ( ))        ( )   ( )      (5) 
with: 
σ: variance of   ( ),    , and 
  ( ): a standard Wiener process with zero mean and standard deviation (  )  ⁄ . 
In (5) – the dynamic process constitutes an inhomogeneous geometric Brownian motion (Bhat-
tarchaya 1978; Zhao 2009) – the innovation effect λ is set to unity.24 In this case, there is a 
mean-reversion effect of competition which depends on the parameter θ; in (5) this effect is 
independent of the innovation effect that is assumed to be a normally distributed random varia-
ble. Moreover, as already indicated above, θ depicts the speed with which the variable Xi con-
verges to its mean, μ. A high θ signals economically a very quick convergence, and vice versa. 
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 Here innovation only means that, e.g., some new style is chosen which is substantially different from 
the prevailing style. 
24
 This dynamic process for    is an adaptation of the model of Wyart and Bouchaud (2003, p. 248) – 
which is analyzed more rigorously in Bouchaud and Mézard (2000). See also Bouchaud (2001, pp. 107, 
110) for the dynamics of the distribution of wealth. However, the economic interpretation of the process 
is quite different from their interpretation. See Appendix D for a further explication of the derivation of 
(5) from Wyart and Bouchaud (2003). 
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For art galleries (and presumably various other intermediary platforms in two-sided markets), it 
is to suspect that θ may not be very high. The reason is that there are specific investments re-
quired and there are economies of scale and scope: An established gallery may use its expertise 
and connections to find and promote new artists easier and at lower costs than potential compet-
itors. Hence, even if there is competition between galleries, the speed of mean-reversion of their 
success might be rather slow. 
As shown by Wyart and Bouchaud (2003), referring to Bouchaud and Mézard (2000), the sta-
tionary distribution for this process is  ( )     (     
 ⁄ ) (with  ( ) as the probability density 
of   ) which has a power-law tail. Hence, if (5) was the correct model for art galleries, one 
should find a power-law distribution as the best fit for the distribution of   .
25
 
However, besides the competition effect measured by θ and the innovation effect measured by 
λ, there might be an additional effect associated with art galleries. This group of effects is 
formed by the information cascades mentioned above. Suppose that art investors consider    as 
a signal for the success of gallery   in predicting the value of an artist it represents. To have an 
influence on the investors’ behavior,    must contain information that overrules the personal 
information investors may already have (Chamley 2004). Because the intrinsic value of art-
works is a matter of aesthetic taste, and because aesthetic taste is at the market level, a collective 
rather than a personal matter, only success of a gallery above the mean success level contains 
information that is more valuable than the investors’ privately-held information (i.e., their per-
sonal aesthetic taste). Hence, for being a signal that contains information on the ability of a gal-
lery to predict the collective aesthetic value of artworks,      is required. Therefore it might 
be the case that: 
   ( )   
  ( )
 
.          (6) 
Relation (6) implies that ‘success breeds success’. This may be interpreted as the consequence 
of a very high ambiguity with respect to the aesthetic value of most contemporaneous artworks. 
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 See also Power-Law Distribution in Appendix B. 
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In a sense, processes of the ‘success breeds success’ kind create the value of the works they 
represent. In the theory of networks, this effect is attributed to ‘preferential attachment’: because 
some nodes in a network are better linked than others, they attract even more new links.
26
 In this 
paper, the final reason for success is the – perhaps accidental – information cascade triggered by 
the initial success which is taken as a signal of expertise in forecasting profitable art develop-
ments. 
Combining the competition, innovation and information effects in (4) and (6) as well as taking 
into account accidental further effects, the process that describes the evolution of the success 
variable Xi over time may be given by the following stochastic differential equation: 
   ( )    (      ( ))  (
  ( )
 
)       ( )  ( )    (7) 
which can be written as: 
   ( )    (  (
 
 
)    ( ))    ( )       ( )  ( )    (8) 
with: 
σ: variance of   ( ),    , and 
  ( ): a standard Wiener process with zero mean and standard deviation (  )  ⁄ . 
The evolution equation in (6) can be interpreted as follows: 
(a) For     a geometric Brownian motion with     results (e.g. Dixit and Pindyck 
1994, p. 71; Metcalf and Hassett 1995): 
   ( )      ( )       ( )  ( ).     (9) 
In this stochastic process, there is no force that drives the success of galleries back 
to the long-term mean. In economic terms, this means that there is no effective 
                                                     
 
26
 This aspect of networks is a big topic in the physics literature on the statistical mechanics of network 
development; see, for instance, Krapivsky and Redner (2001); Berger et al. (2004). 
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competition effect. Put differently, there might even be strong competition, e.g. 
measured by sizeable market entry and exit, but the level of innovation of some 
leading galleries may be of such importance that their success advantage cannot be 
competed away. 
(b) For       a mean-reverting geometric Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process emerges 
from (6) (Dixit and Pindyck 1994, p.161; Metcalf and Hassett 1995). In this ver-
sion of the model, competition might be effective to a certain extent. As a conse-
quence, all three kinds of effects are effective: information, competition and inno-
vation. 
(c) The expected percentage change of the success variable Xi is for     given by θ 
and for       by   (  (
 
 
)    ( )). Moreover, the expected absolute 
change is defined by     ( ) for     and by   (  (
 
 
)    ( ))    ( )    
  ( )  (
  
 
)  (  ( ))
 
 (10) 
for      .27 
First, the stochastic process without the competition effect, the geometric Brownian motion 
(   ) in (7) is examined.28 The probability density of the geometric Brownian motion at a 
fixed time is formulated by Reed and Jorgensen (2004): 
 (  ( ))  (
 
(  ( ) √    )
)     [(
 (
   ( )
  
  (   
 
   
)  )
 
    
)]    (11) 
Hence, the probability density function originates a lognormal distribution with a mean θ.29 This 
result is important for the empirical investigation below: If the success of galleries is best de-
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 See also for this interpretation Epstein et al. (1998, p. 158). 
28
 For a solution of the stochastic differential equation (7), see also Appendix C. 
29
 See also the definition of the lognormal distribution in Appendix B. 
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scribed by a lognormal distribution, the underlying stochastic process may be a geometric 
Brownian motion. In the interpretation of the stochastic process adopted here, it implies that 
galleries are extremely innovative (   ); competition among galleries under these circum-
stances only has the effect of driving up or down the average success of galleries to θ instead of 
μ (θ may or may not be larger than μ). With respect to intermediary platforms in general, the 
value which is to be expected in this case for θ is not clear. If competition among platform in-
termediaries induces a business creation effect (i.e., increasing the number or value of complet-
ed deals between buyers and sellers) which is larger than the business stealing effect (i.e., reduc-
ing the number or value of deals completed by the single platforms), the success variable will 
increase over the former mean value, and vice versa. Hence, it is the interaction of these two 
effects which is decisive. 
Second, the result of the stochastic process with a competition effect (     ), the mean-
reverting geometric Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process in (6), is analyzed.
30
 
(a) A non-trivial solution exists if and only if       and it is a Gamma density:31 
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(b) For     a Dirac Delta distribution results whose mass is concentrated in    . 
(c) For     , the Gamma density function has a maximum at    
 (    )
(  )
 and for 
   (    )the maximum is 0. 
As a consequence, for       a Gamma distribution of the success measure of galleries is to 
be expected empirically. Based on the economic reasoning in this paper, this result would be in 
accordance with a geometric Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model for gallery success which implies that 
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 For a solution of the stochastic differential equation (6), see also Appendix C. 
31
 See also the definition of the Gamma distribution in Appendix B. 
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galleries could be considerably more innovative. Moreover, the more the parameter λ approach-
es unity, the lower the level of innovation would be. 
In the following empirical analysis we will test which distribution function for  (  ) in equa-
tion (3) above will fit best. 
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6. Empirical Analysis 
In an annual procedure undertaken since 1970, the world’s most in-demand artists have been 
issued (and honored) in ranking lists under the title of Kunstkompass. This success and reputa-
tion barometer excludes any monetary measure,
32
 but considers the number of (single and 
group) exhibitions in internationally prestigious museums and reviews in famous art magazines. 
Analyzing the top 100 entities of the Kunstkompass-rankings for the years 2001, 2004 and 2008, 
we corroborate Crane’s discovery from 1989, that only a few galleries represent almost all of 
the most visible and most successful artists.
33
 We cover an investigation period of seven years. 
This restriction is not expected to affect considerably the results in comparison to examining 
other years. It may also be added that the conjoined study of gallery success and its change over 
time is not intended in this paper but is an issue for ongoing research. As indicated above, we 
consider three particular years (2001, 2004 and 2008), assess the galleries’ ranking according to 
the success of artists they promote and analyze empirically the distribution of the galleries’ 
rankings.  
To start with, in Figure 14 the accumulated scoring points per gallery, which we interpret as a 
measure of the galleries’ success/reputation, are plotted against their rank.34 
  
                                                     
 
32
 To check the relation between a gallery’s reputation according to the Kunstkompass score value (X) of 
the year 2004 and the average price per piece of art promoted by the respective gallery, a correlation test 
was performed. To do this, the (gallery wise) sum (Y) of the average price per artwork for every single 
artist promoted was calculated with the assumption that all artists are approximately equally productive. 
The outcome of the correlation test of X and Y shows a strong relation, but not a perfect one (Kendall’s 
Tau 0,441; Spearman’s Rho 0,633 – both at 0.01 level). Although there is a number of ways to model 
gallery success, we suppose that it seems reasonable to focus on an evaluation based on this type of 
measurement. 
33
 The Kunstkompass-ranking was deliberately chosen as a metric for gallery success. Despite the fact that 
it contains 100 galleries only, a more complete list of galleries would distend the tail of the distribution 
without changing significantly the results or interpretations of our analysis. 
34
 For each gallery we added up the achieved score points of every promoted artist among the top 100 
ranks. 
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Figure 14. Rank-Score Plots of the Success of Galleries 
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This depiction suggests a distribution which seems to be similar to a power law. Referring to the 
geometric Brownian motion in (9), another probability distribution intrinsically related to the 
power law, is the lognormal distribution; e.g., only a small deviation in a multiplicative pro-
cess
35
 decides whether it yields a power law or a lognormal distribution (Champernowne 1953; 
Gibrat 1930, 1931; Kesten 1973; Simon 1955; Steindl 1965). Displaying the gallery data in log-
log plots (see Figure 15), we observe that each year forms what is nearly a straight line, which is 
a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the existence of a power-law distribution. In partic-
ular Mitzenmacher (2004) emphasizes that this property is also valid for lognormally distributed 
data, at least approximately, if the variance is large enough. 
 
 
Figure 15. Log-Log Plots of the Success of Galleries 
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 Multiplicative processes are commonly used to describe the growth of organisms or networks. 
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The previous considerations concerning the inhomogeneous geometric Brownian motion, the 
geometric Brownian motion and the geometric Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, lead us to the fol-
lowing hypothesis: 
Success of art galleries follows a power law, a lognormal distribution or a Gamma distribution. 
To exclude other similar, potentially competing distributions, a one-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test (KS-test) is applied; the result is that the assumption of an exponential, a Poisson, 
as well as of a normal distribution is not statistically significant for each of the years 2001, 2004 
and 2008 (at a significance level of .05). Then a KS-test is applied again to the data in order to 
test for a lognormal distribution. For the years 2008 and 2001 our hypothesis of logarithmic 
normality turns out to be statistically significant, but not for 2004. Eliminating the four galleries 
with the lowest accumulated score values from the 2004 data, a significant test result for this 
year (significance level .05) is found, too. The fitted parameters are shown in Table 27. Figure 
16 displays a probability plot comparing this distribution (dashed line) with the actual distribu-
tion in the gallery data. 
Year 2001 2004 2008 
µ 9.9179 10.2788 10.8408 
σ 0.6952 0.6842 0.7494 
Scaling parameters of the lognormal distribution 
μ: mean 
σ: standard deviation 
Table 27. Fitted Parameters According to the Lognormal Distribution 
 
Year 2001 2004 2008 
α 2.1965 2.2465 2.0869 
α: scaling parameter of the power-law distribution 
Table 28. Fitted Parameters According to the Power-Law Distribution 
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Figure 16. Probability Plot for Lognormal Distribution of the Success of Galleries
36 
 
To test the power-law hypothesis more rigorously, we employ the recent algorithm developed 
by Clauset et al. (2009) for analyzing power-law distributed data: First we fit the datasets to 
power-law configurations. Particularly we obtain the following maximum likelihood estimates 
of the scaling exponent α shown in Table 28.37 After this the KS-statistics for each of the da-
tasets from 2001, 2004 and 2008 are computed. 
For the further analysis, again following Clauset et al. (2009), 1000 synthetic power-law da-
tasets (with n = 300 observations each) are constructed for each of the three datasets from 2001, 
2004 and 2008, respectively selecting the scaling parameter α (see Table 28) and the minimum 
threshold value equal to those of the distribution that best fits the observed data. After running 
the same fitting-procedure from above for the synthetic power-law datasets, we compute their 
corresponding KS-statistics. Eventually, the p-value is defined as the ratio of the synthetic KS-
statistics which exceed the KS-statistic of the empirical data. We get a clear result for all three 
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 The ordinate axis’ scale depicts the success probability based on a lognormal distribution; the axis of 
abscissae has a log scale. 
37
 See also Power-Law Distribution in Appendix B. 
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datasets indicating that the power-law hypothesis has to be ruled out. It is worth noting that this 
result is obtained with the relatively lenient rule p ≤ 0.05. 
Finally, the data are fitted with the maximum-likelihood method according to the assumption of 
a Gamma distribution; the parameters are presented in Table 29. A chi-square goodness-of-fit 
test at the .05-significance level is carried out with the result that the assumption of a Gamma 
distribution can be ruled out for each of the datasets of 2001, 2004 and 2008. 
 
Year 2001 2004 2008 
α 1.9785 2.0566 1.6760 
β 1.3482e+004 1.8400e+004 4.2255e+004 
α, β: Scaling parameters of the Gamma distribution 
Table 29. Fitted Parameters According to the Gamma Distribution 
 
Put briefly, our observations are consistent with the hypothesis that the data are drawn from a 
lognormal distribution. In Figure 17, the estimated (lognormal) complementary cumulative dis-
tribution functions (CCDFs) for the years 2001, 2004 and 2008 are contrasted with the respec-
tive empirical CCDF. 
Concerning distributions connatural to power laws, the CCDF is linearly related to size: 
    (    )        (  ),       (13) 
where c is a constant and α the scaling parameter.38 
This means, (12) becomes an exact approximation as      and therefore indicates Figure 17 
to be a convenient depiction to assess the fit of data to power-law related distributions (Dinardo 
and Winfree 2010). We choose this display to highlight the fit of our data to the lognormal dis-
tribution for all three years examined (globally and particularly in its tail). 
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 See above, and also Power-Law Distribution in Appendix B. 
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Figure 17. Log-Log Plot of Complementary Cumulative Distribution Functions of the Success of 
Galleries 
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7. Conclusions 
In this paper, the evolutionary dynamics of economic processes that are driven by competition, 
innovation and information are formalized by combining economic knowledge with dynamical 
methods of physics. The information aspect is of special interest here since the dynamic success 
of galleries (and other platform intermediaries) is investigated whose main task is to reduce 
quality uncertainty and to promote deals between suppliers and demanders. The emphasis of the 
paper is put on identifying and separating competition, innovation and information effects. Fur-
thermore, it is shown how the most likely dynamic process (among the potential processes) can 
be identified empirically. Galleries as platform intermediaries in the two-sided market of con-
temporary art are a good example in this respect. 
Galleries are central to the promulgation of new works of art to investors and collectors, because 
they operate at the customer’s interface of the cultural value chain. In a certain sense, the artistic 
decisions and financial investments of gallery owners promote the reputation of both works and 
artists. Hence, galleries deem to be good examples for intermediary platforms in two-sided mar-
kets. The method applied as well as the results gained may be extendable to other intermediary 
platforms in two-sided markets with a high level of quality uncertainty and innovation. 
The success of galleries is expected to depend crucially on three determinants: an information 
effect, an innovation effect and a competition effect. Employing the above mentioned methods, 
it is demonstrated theoretically that these determinants may support different empirical charac-
teristics of the measurable success of art galleries. 
Empirically, we find the success of galleries to be best described by a lognormal distribution 
which means that the underlying stochastic process is most likely a geometric Brownian motion. 
In the interpretation of this stochastic process given here, this implies that galleries are very 
innovative. Moreover, it seems that the (loosely defined) degree of innovation of a few leading 
galleries is supported over time by information cascades in such a way that their success ad-
vantage cannot be eroded by competition. This means that there is no force which drives the 
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success of galleries back to the long-term mean. Even if there was strong competition, e.g. 
measured by sizeable market entry and exit, the degree of innovation of some leading galleries 
may have been of great importance. In fact, very successful galleries start building up a reputa-
tion by being very innovative in the first place.
39
 As the case of the acclaimed gallery owner 
Monika Sprüth has illustrated, she has helped to establish a reputation for previously underap-
preciated female artists with a new style. Her efforts brought those female artists to international 
prominence and success for her new gallery too. 
This initial innovation can become a starting-point for information cascades: reputable galleries 
are followed by experts, collectors and museums (Crossland and Smith 2002). Prominent galler-
ies can even have an impact on artists, persuading them to reshape their creative style towards 
works which may have higher commercial potential (Currid 2007). In a certain sense, experts in 
other fields that are prone to high levels of quality uncertainty may be considered as intermedi-
ary platforms, even if there is no institutionalized connection between the intermediary and the 
suppliers and demanders on these markets. Having established a high reputation for quality sen-
sitivity, experts for technical systems as well as restaurant or travel guides may gain a market 
position that is not contestable. In a similar way, financial intermediaries as, e.g., banks with 
specific knowledge about firms and their investment projects may also gain uncontestable posi-
tions with respect to firms and investors. More generally, two-sided markets with high quality 
uncertainty or information deficits on the one hand and high levels of specific investments of 
the respective intermediary on the other hand seem to function in a similar way as art galleries 
with respect to artists and collectors or investors. 
Investments in works of art cannot be separated from their social context, i.e., the exclusive art 
world in a wider sense. By choosing the most notable and respected art galleries, customers 
minimize the search costs of gaining endorsement by discussion partners in that world (Adler 
1985). Robinson’s (1961, p. 398) remark that “…fashion serves as a means of demonstrating 
                                                     
 
39
 We cannot exclude the problem that by examining the survivors, we are really only looking at those 
gallery ‘strategies’ that were ex post successful (see Brown et al. 1992). However, we do not consider this 
a considerable effect because of the absent barriers to entry that characterize the industry. 
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command over current, as opposed to former, output”, seems to be directly applicable to the 
arts, too. As art investors and collectors cannot be equally well informed about each and every 
gallery, they will choose a limited number of preferred galleries whose exhibited works are 
innovative according to the public discourse, which means that they are ‘demonstrating com-
mand over current’ (Robinson 1961, p. 398). Following Adler (1985), Star galleries absorb part 
of consumers’ savings in search costs – including the ‘entrance fees’ to exclusive art circles – by 
demanding high prices and receiving public reputation for their products. Thus, the superstar 
effect in the case of galleries can be understood as an appropriation of search and entrance costs 
which emerge whenever consumption requires special knowledge and social inclusion. 
In a continuous process, a few star galleries develop and seem to be able to establish an uncon-
testable market position. This result is in line with the findings of Salganik et al. (2006) and 
Salganik and Watts (2008) that social influence contributes very strongly to the inequality of 
outcomes in cultural markets. Contrary to the finding by de Vany and Walls (1999) that past 
success does not predict future success in the movie industry,
40
 forecasts of expected gallery 
success are not completely meaningless: the underlying stochastic processes of success may 
help to improve our understanding of the evolution of superstar effects in the art markets. It is 
neither supposed nor claimed that the identified/hypothesized process is fixed and that it will 
never change, but it seems to provide a useful (first) approximation. 
In addition to these results, we find that also economic peculiarities may be main drivers of the 
evolution of success (not only) in cultural markets when quality uncertainty is high for the final 
customers and when on the side of the intermediary platform specific investments are required 
to build up a sustainable reputation with both artists as well as art collectors and investors. Hav-
ing established such a reputation, competition among intermediary platforms plays hardly any 
role. It seems very likely that this result could be generalized for other two-sided markets with 
high quality uncertainty. 
                                                     
 
40
 De Vany and Walls (1999) argue that when the audience makes a movie a hit, no amount of “star pow-
er” or marketing can alter that, because movies’ box-office possibilities are Lévy-distributed, i.e. their 
means and variances are not finite. 
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With a growing number of two-sided markets with platform intermediaries, the methods applied 
in this context may be suitable to differentiate between competition, innovation and information 
effects in these markets. The detailed adoption of the approach considered here to other indus-
try-specific platforms and the examination of differences concerning transferability, limitations 
and empirical evidence is a topic of further research. 
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APPENDIX A 
EXPLANATION OF THE PARAMETERS SUBOPTIMAL AND BEYOND OPTIMAL 
To assess the optimality of customers’ contract choices ex post, we set up the following frame-
work of BahnCard choice and usage: Let (     ) be a contract where    stands for different 
fixed fees that result in different variable fee rebates   on ticket price p. This contract enables 
customers to use a train for a fee   , once the flat fee    is paid. There are two extreme cases: 
the flat rate (   ), which corresponds to the BC100 and the pay-per-mile tariff (   ), which is 
equivalent to not using a BahnCard at all. The BahnCards under consideration in our analysis 
have either rebates α of 25% or 50% on  . Let   be the total amount spent on rail travel during 
the validity period of a BahnCard (based on the regular fare), then the lower optimality bounda-
ries of the examined BahnCard contracts are given by 
                                  (A1) 
and thus     
            ,        (A2) 
   
    (         )             (A3) 
and      
    (          )    .       (A4) 
The binary parameters suboptimal and beyond optimal are calculated according to this scheme. 
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APPENDIX B 
RELEVANT DISTRIBUTIONS 
Power-Law Distribution 
A quantity   obeys a power law, if it is drawn from a probability distribution 
 ( )                (B1) 
where      is a constant scaling parameter. 
(In practice, only a few empirical phenomena follow a power-law distribution for all values of 
 , but often the power law can be applied for values above a certain threshold     .) 
 
Lognormal Distribution 
A random variable   obeys a lognormal distribution, if its logarithm is normally distributed. 
The probability density function of a lognormal distribution is described as 
 ( )  
 
√    
   ( 
(      ) 
   
),       (B2) 
where      is the mean and      the standard deviation (    and     ). 
 
Gamma Distribution 
A Gamma distribution is defined by the probability density function 
 ( )   [
  
 ( )
]        (   ),        (B3) 
where      ,      (        and     ). 
  
Appendix 
 
202 
APPENDIX C 
RELEVANT PROCESSES 
Brownian Motion 
(See (7))    ( )    (      ( ))  (
  ( )
 
)       ( )  ( ) 
with: 
 : variance of   ( ),    , and 
  ( ): a standard Wiener process with zero mean and standard deviation (  ) . 
 
The explicit solution of (7) reads (see, e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 71, 81)): 
  ( )        [(  
  
 
)       ( )].      (C1) 
The expected value of    is given by  [  ( )]        (  )    (C2) 
and the variance by    [  ( )]    
     (     )  [   (    )   ]   (C3) 
(see, e.g., Dixit and Pindyck 1994, pp. 71 f.). 
 
Mean-Reverting Geometric Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Process 
(See (6))    ( )  
  ( )
 
 
The explicit solution is given by Kloeden and Platen (1992): 
  ( )  
   [(  
  
 
)    ( )]
 
  
  ∫    [(  
  
 
)    ( )]  
 
 
       (C4) 
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To calculate the probability density of   ,  (  ), the stochastic process defined by (6) has the 
following stationary forward Fokker-Planck equation (Pasquali 2001, p. 169; see also Ewald 
and Yang 2007, p. 8): 
 
   
 [ (  
 
 
  )   (  )]  
 
 
 
  
   
  [ 
   
  (  )]       (C5) 
As shown by Pasquali (2001, pp. 169 f.) (see also Ewald and Yang 2007, p. 11), this equation 
has the following solutions for the density function  (  ): 
a) A non-trivial solution exists if and only if       and it is a Gamma density: 
(See (12))  (  )  
[
 
 
 
[
(
    
 
)
  
]
(( (   ))   ⁄ )  
]
 
 
 
 (
  
  
  ) 
 
(    ⁄ )  
    [
  (
  
 
)
  
  ] 
In this case, mean and variance are given by: 
 (  )  
 
 
 
   
(   )
 (
 
 
)  (  
  
  
)      (C6) 
and, respectively, 
   (  )  
    
(    )
 
    
(     )
 
    
(    )
 (  
  
(  )
)     (C7) 
b) For       a Dirac Delta distribution results whose mass is concentrated in      . 
c) For     , the Gamma density function has a maximum at    
 (    )
(  )
 and for 
   (    ) the maximum is 0. 
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APPENDIX D 
Equation (5) in the text: 
   ( )    (    ( ))       ( )  ( ) 
is derived from the differential equation of Wyard and Bouchaud (2003) (incorporating the vari-
ables as defined for this paper): 
   ( )
  
   [(
 
 
)∑   ( )  
 
     ( )]    ( )    ( ) with    ( ) as a Gaussian random variable. 
 
Using 
 
 
∑   
 
   ( )   ( ) and   ( )     ( )        with   ( )    and   ( ) ( 
 )  
 (    ) for all        and  ( )  
   
  
   (see Jetschke 1989, pp. 216-218), the differential 
equation can be written as (5) in the text. 
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